Nevada family-law case summaries

Anthony Ibanez and Patamawadee Chaisawang were never married but have a child together, born in September 2021. In June 2023, Ibanez filed a court complaint asking for sole legal and primary physical custody after Chaisawang moved from Nevada to California with the child. He argued that Chaisawang had taken the child without his permission—an "abduction"—and asked that the child be returned to Nevada. Chaisawang responded, denied taking the child improperly, and formally asked the court for permission to relocate to California with the child. After a trial where both parents testified and submitted evidence—including text messages between them and a statement Ibanez gave to police the day after Chaisawang moved—the district court gave the parents joint legal custody, gave Chaisawang primary physical custody, and allowed her to relocate to California. The court also set a child support amount. Ibanez then filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its custody decision, arguing the court used the wrong legal standard when evaluating whether an abduction occurred and improperly relied on things that happened after the move. The court denied that motion and later issued a separate order setting Ibanez's monthly child support obligation at $959.33, based on a gross monthly income of $9,116.67 and a $250 reduction for transportation costs. On appeal, Ibanez raised several arguments. First, he said the court used a stricter standard of proof ("clear and convincing evidence") when deciding whether an abduction happened, when it should have used the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard (meaning "more likely than not"). The appeals court disagreed. It explained that while the trial court had referenced a subsection dealing with a special legal presumption against parents who commit abduction, the court also analyzed the abduction question under the ordinary best-interest factor and later clarified in writing that it had applied the "more likely than not" standard. The appeals court found Ibanez did not show the wrong standard was used. Second, Ibanez argued that the evidence proved Chaisawang abducted the child and that recognizing this would have shifted other factors in his favor. The appeals court noted that the trial court repeatedly declined to find an abduction, and that its findings—based on testimony and text messages showing Chaisawang had tried to reach a custody agreement while Ibanez refused to compromise—were supported by adequate evidence. The court emphasized that weighing evidence and judging witnesses' credibility is the trial court's job, and an appeals court does not re-weigh that evidence. Third, Ibanez challenged the decision letting Chaisawang relocate to California, saying the court improperly relied on benefits that only existed because of the move (like a California school). The appeals court explained that when there is no prior custody order, a parent still needs court permission to move a child out of state, and the court must decide what is in the child's best interest. The trial court found a "sensible, good faith reason for the move"—a better school with services for the child's speech delay, nearby family, and Chaisawang's flexible remote work. The trial court also clarified that it relied on forward-looking, prospective benefits rather than benefits that had already accrued from the move. Fourth, Ibanez challenged the child support calculation, saying the court overstated his income. The appeals court found the income figure was supported by evidence: his own disclosure form showing $6,516.67, plus regular monthly transfers of at least $1,500 from his grandmother, plus $1,100 in rental income. The court also noted Ibanez received the $250 transportation reduction he had requested. Finally, Ibanez argued the court wrongly denied him attorney fees because Chaisawang caused the litigation by abducting the child. Because the appeals court had already upheld the finding that there was no abduction and no abuse of discretion in the custody decision, it found no abuse of discretion in denying attorney fees. The court affirmed all the district court's orders.

Timothy and Samantha Sheets share the same last name but were never married. They are the parents of a daughter, P.S., born in September 2022. Their relationship ended about a year after the child's birth, though Samantha continued living with P.S. in a house Timothy rented. The couple briefly reconciled in early 2024 and discussed moving away from Las Vegas, possibly to Montana, where Samantha had friends and family. In May 2024, after returning from a trip to Montana, the two had an altercation that led Samantha to call law enforcement. Timothy then filed a custody complaint seeking joint legal custody and primary physical custody, claiming Samantha had "abducted" the child. Samantha responded with her own request, asking for primary physical custody so she could relocate with P.S. to Billings, Montana. She gave several reasons: her extended family lived there, she would have free childcare, she had received a better job offer, and the area had cleaner air and water and a more rural lifestyle. Timothy opposed the move, arguing it would damage his relationship with the child and her relationship with her three half-siblings (his children from prior relationships, who lived in Las Vegas), and that Samantha was acting in bad faith to limit his contact and gain advantages in court. The district court first issued a temporary order giving Samantha primary physical custody, with arrangements built around Timothy's work schedule, which required him to work out of state—including in North Dakota—for two weeks each month. After a full evidentiary hearing with numerous witnesses, the court issued a detailed written order granting Samantha primary physical custody and permission to relocate to Billings. It awarded Timothy one week of parenting time per month, with a default schedule that the parties could adjust by mutual agreement to fit Timothy's work schedule. Timothy appealed. The Court of Appeals explained that a trial court has broad discretion in custody matters, and an appeals court will not disturb those decisions unless there was a clear abuse of discretion—meaning the decision was not supported by substantial evidence or was clearly erroneous. The appeals court emphasized that it does not re-weigh the evidence or re-judge the credibility of witnesses; that is the trial judge's job because the judge actually saw and heard the witnesses. Applying that standard, the court found that substantial evidence supported the district court's conclusion that Samantha had a "sensible, good faith reason for the move." Samantha and her prospective employer, Dr. Kayla Erickson, both testified about the legitimacy of the job offer, and Samantha testified about wanting to live near family, obtain free childcare and housing from her mother, and pursue better career opportunities. The court also reviewed the relocation factors from a Nevada Supreme Court case called Schwartz and the statutory "best interest of the child" factors, concluding that the trial court's findings—including that Samantha was more likely to support the child's relationship with her father and better suited to meet the child's needs—were supported by the evidence. While the court acknowledged that the child's relationship with her half-siblings favored Timothy, the trial court found that factor was "mitigated" by uncertainty over whether one half-sibling's mother (Jodi) would herself relocate closer to Montana. On the parenting time schedule, the appeals court noted that Timothy himself had not presented evidence clarifying how his work schedule was set or how far in advance he knew it, and he offered no concrete alternative schedule the trial court could have adopted. Because the order allowed the parties to adjust the default schedule by mutual agreement, the court found the schedule was supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order in full.

This is a short procedural order, not a decision on the merits of any dispute. Two parties, Renata Popelkova and Howard Miller, had a case in the family court. One side (Popelkova) appealed and the other side (Miller) filed a cross-appeal - meaning both parties asked the Nevada Supreme Court to review something from the lower court. Before the court decided any of the underlying issues, the two sides reached an agreement to end the appeals. This kind of agreement is called a stipulation - a formal, mutual agreement between the parties that is submitted to the court. Based on that stipulation, the court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. The order also states that each side will pay its own costs and attorney fees. Because this is a dismissal by agreement, the opinion does not explain the facts of the underlying family-law dispute, does not resolve any legal question, and does not address who "won." It simply closes out the appellate proceedings.

This case involves a custody dispute between two parents, Jennifer Crosier and Garrett Crosier, who married in Utah and had three children. After separating in 2017, Jennifer moved to Nevada with the children and Garrett moved to Colorado. Although they divorced in Utah in 2019, the parties agree that no Utah court ever issued a final custody decree. In April 2022, Jennifer filed a complaint in Nevada asking for sole legal and sole physical custody of all three children. In her complaint, Jennifer raised concerns about Garrett's alleged domestic violence, stating that he had a prior child abuse/neglect conviction from Utah and that the children were afraid of him. The two older children were interviewed by the Family Mediation Center (FMC) and described instances of alleged physical abuse by Garrett - one child said he slapped her and caused her to hit her head, and that he kicked the other child with a steel-toed boot; the other child said he picked her up and pulled her by her hair. Both older children said they preferred to stay with Jennifer in Nevada. At a single-day hearing in May 2023, both parents represented themselves without lawyers. The judge told the parties he would "take control of the questioning" to avoid wasting time, and the court itself questioned the parties and witnesses. The court admitted the FMC child interview report into evidence, but it never asked any questions about the abuse allegations in that report or the domestic violence claims from Jennifer's complaint. When Jennifer tried to raise the abuse issue in her closing argument, the court did not allow her to continue, stating she had offered "zero evidence" that Garrett abused the children. At the end of the hearing, the judge said he had to consider "certain factors in evaluating what is in a child's best interest," but he addressed only two of the twelve factors that Nevada law requires. The court decided the parents would share joint legal custody, that Jennifer would have primary physical custody of the two older children, and that Garrett would have primary physical custody of the youngest child in Colorado. The written custody decree that followed did not mention any of the twelve best interest factors and contained no factual findings about the children's best interest. A later post-decree order also failed to address those factors. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that when deciding custody, a court's only consideration is the best interest of the child, and the court must consider all twelve factors listed in the statute and put its findings in a written order that ties those findings to the custody decision. Because the decree here contained no such findings, the court found this was an abuse of discretion and reversible error. The court also held that the trial court should have addressed the domestic violence allegations - the FMC report containing those allegations was in evidence, yet the court never determined whether domestic violence occurred. Finally, the court held the trial judge should have analyzed whether moving the youngest child to Colorado was in that child's best interest, using a five-factor test from prior Nevada case law. The case was sent back for a new evidentiary hearing.

This is a custody dispute between two parents, Nereida Cobian and Armando Emmanuel Ramirez, who had a child, L.R., born in Utah in October 2015. Early on, the parents submitted a letter to a Utah court in which Ramirez appeared to give up his parental rights, but the court did not treat it as a full waiver. Instead, the Utah court gave Cobian sole legal and physical custody and gave Ramirez standard parenting time, and it required Ramirez to pay child support. Cobian moved with the child, first to California and later to Las Vegas. Ramirez, who worked for and then as a civilian contractor connected to the Air Force, moved to Las Vegas as well. Over time, conflict grew. According to the district court's findings, Cobian repeatedly restricted Ramirez's time with L.R., moved to California in June 2021 without Ramirez's consent or a court order, and reported Ramirez to California child-welfare authorities for physical and sexual abuse. That investigation ended with the allegations found "unsubstantiated or inconclusive." California, which had briefly taken emergency jurisdiction, gave jurisdiction back to Nevada in July 2022. Ramirez asked the Nevada court to register the Utah order and to change custody. After an evidentiary hearing that was rescheduled four times, the district court awarded Ramirez primary physical custody, gave the parents joint legal custody, ordered L.R. returned to Las Vegas and enrolled in a Las Vegas school for the spring semester, ended Ramirez's child-support obligation, and held Cobian in contempt (with a $500 fine) for blocking Ramirez's parenting time over Thanksgiving 2023. Cobian appealed. On review, the Court of Appeals rejected each of her arguments. It concluded that Nevada was the child's "home state" and that the district court properly had jurisdiction to register the Utah order and decide custody. It found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to keep the case in Nevada rather than transfer it to California, because Ramirez still lived in Nevada and the Nevada court was familiar with the case. It upheld the custody change, noting that the trial judge made detailed findings that circumstances had substantially changed and that the child's best interests favored Ramirez. The appellate court explained that it does not re-weigh evidence or second-guess a trial court's credibility findings, including the trial court's determination that Cobian's abuse allegations were not credible. It upheld the relocation order, the contempt finding, and it declined to order the case reassigned to a different judge, finding that Cobian had not shown bias. The court did not decide certain issues. It declined to address the child-support challenge in detail because that challenge depended on reversing the custody award, which the court affirmed. It found the school-enrollment issue moot because the order concerned only the 2024 spring semester. And it concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the attorney-fees issue because the order under appeal only found that Ramirez was "entitled to" fees rather than actually awarding them.

Yvonne Ollerton and Rigoberto Ayala were never married but have two children together, born in 2008 and 2009. In 2016, a court gave the parents joint legal custody and gave Yvonne primary physical custody, meaning the children live mainly with her, while Rigoberto had scheduled parenting time. In December 2022, Yvonne asked the court for permission to move to Ohio with the children in the summer of 2023. She said she wanted to move for her own safety and well-being, describing a history of domestic violence by Rigoberto, including incidents in August 2020 and August 2021 where she said she had to physically defend herself in front of the children. She also said Ohio offered a better education system, a lower cost of living, and cheaper housing, and she attached a cost-of-living and housing comparison between Columbus, Ohio and Las Vegas. She tried to get Rigoberto's written permission by email, but he did not respond. Rigoberto opposed the move, arguing that Yvonne's reasons were personal to her rather than in the children's best interest, and that the children had family support in Las Vegas. However, he acknowledged that the domestic violence occurred, stating "for the domestic [violence] I will hold myself accountable," and at the hearing admitted he was "definitely in the wrong." At a March 2023 hearing, the district court said its job was to decide whether Yvonne had shown "adequate cause" to hold a fuller evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented). The court found she had "sensible good faith reasons" for wanting to move, but was not convinced she had shown that the children would gain an actual advantage from the move or that the move would serve their best interest. The court denied her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Nevada disagreed with how the district court handled the request. The appeals court explained that when a parent's written filings lay out a prima facie case - meaning enough relevant, non-repetitive facts that, if true, would support the request - the court should hold an evidentiary hearing rather than deny the motion outright. The appeals court concluded that Yvonne's filings did present relevant facts, including the parents' difficulty co-parenting and the financial benefits of moving to Ohio. The appeals court also noted that the district court did not appear to consider the domestic violence incidents - which Rigoberto himself acknowledged - when deciding the motion, and did not explain how relocation would fail to benefit the children given those incidents. For these reasons, the appeals court reversed the district court's order and sent the case back for further proceedings.

This case arose from a divorce between Joseph Raul Garcia Rodriguez and Zoila Leon-Yanez. Their disputes centered on how to divide their shared property, how much Garcia Rodriguez should pay in child support and alimony (spousal support), and whether he should pay Leon-Yanez's attorney fees. Early in the case, Garcia Rodriguez was representing himself. He did not file a required document (a pre-trial memorandum) and did not show up to a court date called "calendar call." Because of that, the court treated him as being in "default" - meaning it proceeded without his participation - and held a hearing where only Leon-Yanez testified. Based on her testimony, the court entered a divorce decree that gave Leon-Yanez a piece of real estate (a corner building with two units, one on Pine Street and one on Ashton Street, called the "P&A Street property"), ordered Garcia Rodriguez to pay $1,500 per month in alimony for 10 years, set his child support at $1,128 per month, and required him to pay $5,500 of Leon-Yanez's attorney fees. Garcia Rodriguez then hired a lawyer and asked the court to undo the decree. He argued he did not understand the court's procedural requirements, that the support amounts did not match his actual income, that the property was divided unequally, and that the attorney fee award was not properly justified. He also raised a concern that a second property - one on Division Street - had accidentally been swept into the award to Leon-Yanez. The district court refused to set the decree aside but treated part of his request as a motion to change (modify) his support obligations. It refused to lower child support, saying a financial disclosure form (FDF) he filed in June 2022 was missing a page. But it did lower alimony to $700 per month. Notably, Garcia Rodriguez had filed a corrected, complete FDF in July 2022, and the district court never discussed that updated form when deciding these issues. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sorted out the property question first. It concluded that, reading the decree together with the record, Leon-Yanez received only the P&A Street property (not two separate properties), and that the court's later order effectively awarded the Division Street property to Garcia Rodriguez. That produced a one-for-one split of the two real properties - exactly the equal division Garcia Rodriguez said was required. Because he did not explain how he was harmed by the rest of the property allocation, the court affirmed the property decisions. On child support, the appeals court found the district court made a mistake by refusing to consider the more recent July 2022 FDF, which showed his income had dropped. On alimony, the court found the same mistake: the district court relied on older figures and an assumption that Garcia Rodriguez still received rental income, without considering the July 2022 form showing he no longer did. On attorney fees, the court held that the district court failed to analyze the required factors (known as the Brunzell factors) before ordering him to pay $5,500. The result: the appeals court affirmed the property division but reversed the child support, alimony, and attorney fee rulings and sent the case back to the district court to reconsider those issues in light of the July 2022 amended FDF and the required legal factors.

Lauren and Taylor Wooten were married and had one child together. On December 31, 2020, Taylor filed for divorce in Nevada and asked for joint legal custody and primary physical custody (the arrangement where a child lives most of the time). Taylor's papers said Lauren had been served with the divorce documents at her Florida home. Lauren did not respond in time, and the court entered a divorce decree giving Taylor primary physical custody. Lauren then asked the court to undo the decree, arguing she had not been properly served because the documents went to a former address. In that same request, she asked for primary physical custody herself, for child support, and said the child had lived with her in Florida since 2019. The court decided to keep the parties divorced but to reopen and decide the disputed custody and support issues on their merits. Because Lauren argued the child's "home state" was Florida, the Nevada court held a conference with a Florida judge to figure out which state should decide custody, as required under a law called the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) - a set of rules that decides which state's courts handle a child custody case. The judges concluded the child had no true "home state" in 2020 because he had not lived in either state for six straight months before the case was filed. Since the Nevada case was filed first and a custody order already existed there, the Florida judge declined to take the case, and Nevada kept jurisdiction. After an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, the court gave the parties joint legal custody but gave Taylor final say on important educational and urgent medical decisions when the parents could not agree. It also gave Taylor primary physical custody. The court found, among other things, that Lauren had moved to Florida with the child without Taylor's consent, had at times blocked Taylor's communications, and had withheld the child during the holidays, while Taylor was more focused on the child's needs and made sure the child wore his prescription eyeglasses. On money, the court ordered Lauren to pay Taylor $300 per month in child support - a reduced amount, adjusted downward to account for the cost of transporting the child to Florida for Lauren's parenting time and the parties' relative incomes. It also had the parties split extracurricular costs. The court rejected Lauren's later request for about $41,000 in back child support, finding Taylor had credibly testified that he supported the child financially even after the move. The court denied both sides' requests for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed everything. On service of process, it held Lauren had given up that argument because she asked the court to decide the case on the merits instead of asking it to dismiss. On the other issues, it found the district court's decisions were supported by the evidence and within its discretion, and it noted that an appeals court does not reweigh evidence or second-guess a trial judge's credibility findings.

Richard and Margarita Rosiak married in 2000 and divorced after Margarita filed for divorce in Nevada in 2018. Richard, an attorney, ran his own law firm; Margarita worked for him as his only employee, and, according to the district court's findings, went unpaid for roughly 20 years. Throughout the marriage, everything - law firm income, rent from properties, and all personal and business expenses - flowed through one account: the law firm's operating fund. Richard never paid himself a salary, stopped filing tax returns in 2015, and kept essentially no financial records. The couple also owned multiple properties in California and Las Vegas, plus a house at 9917 Wiley Burke that had a complicated ownership history involving Margarita's family. After trial, the district court found Richard was not credible and had made multiple material misrepresentations. Because he provided no documents to support the income figure on his financial disclosure form, the court calculated his gross monthly income at $57,438 based on deposits into the law firm operating fund, and ordered him to pay $3,178 in monthly child support. It also awarded Margarita $202,500 in lump sum alimony, gave her a $224,011 share of the law firm's value, divided the couple's property unequally (Margarita received $3,040,889 in assets and $218,228 in debt; Richard received $8,764,891 in assets and $1,491,647.09 in debt), made Richard solely responsible for at least $204,805 in tax liability, found Richard owed $63,955 in child support arrears, and awarded Margarita attorney fees. On appeal, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed almost all of these rulings. A recurring theme was the "invited error" doctrine - the principle that a party cannot complain on appeal about a problem he himself created. Because Richard commingled all money in one account, kept no adequate records, paid no salaries, stopped filing tax returns, and hired no accountant or expert, the court held he could not now fault the district court for working with the only evidence available: the gross deposits into his firm's account. The appellate court did, however, send three related issues back to the district court. First, Richard receives Social Security benefits, and his minor child K.R. receives a dependent benefit that Margarita now collects directly. Margarita conceded on appeal that Richard should get a credit against his child support for that benefit. The court therefore vacated the monthly child support order only as to the Social Security dependent payment and sent the issue back for the district court to consider an offset (and to explain its decision if it declines one). Second, because that offset could change the arrears calculation, the court also vacated the $63,955 arrears order. Third, because parts of the judgment supporting the attorney fee award were vacated, the fee award was vacated too. Separately, the court vacated a portion of the order that made both spouses each 100 percent responsible for the same debt on 9917 Wiley Burke - which the court described as what "appears to be a clerical error" - and remanded for correction.

Sam and David Orgad married in Israel in 1983, moved to the United States in 1990, and in 2003 started a heating and air conditioning business called Temperature Control Services (TCS). During the marriage, David mostly ran the business while Sam raised the children and occasionally helped with management. Their relationship broke down, and Sam filed for divorce in Las Vegas in August 2019. The couple was granted a divorce in August 2021, but the court held off on deciding how to split their property, whether alimony (financial support paid from one spouse to the other) should be paid, and attorney fees until a trial. At trial, the two sides disagreed about how much the business was worth. David's expert valued TCS at $260,000 but did not testify at trial. Sam's expert testified that it was worth $663,000. The court found Sam's expert's report more accurate—partly because it accounted for potential unreported income that David's expert did not—and valued the business at $629,967. The court also addressed "marital waste," which refers to one spouse spending or destroying shared money for selfish reasons while a divorce is underway. David admitted he had wasted money, including trading in vehicles for new ones despite a court order (a joint preliminary injunction) barring such activity. He suggested $150,000 as the waste figure. After reviewing bank statements, tax returns, and the business's income statement, the court found David had wasted $167,354.56 over 27 months. Using the business value, other assets, and the waste figure, the court calculated that David owed Sam an "equalization payment" of $407,660.78 for her share of the community property, to be paid in $1,500 monthly installments. The court gave Sam the option (not a requirement) to secure that payment with a life insurance policy on David's life, at her own expense. The court also awarded Sam $8,000 per month in alimony for 11 years. The Court of Appeals reached two main conclusions. First, it decided the district court did not properly explain its alimony award and reversed that part, sending it back for the lower court to redo. The appeals court noted that David's take-home income was about $7,500 per month, yet the court ordered him to pay $8,000 per month in alimony while also finding he needed $5,000 per month to live on—figures that did not add up. The appeals court also found the lower court had relied on expense figures from Sam's Financial Disclosure Form that reflected her costs in Poland (where she had been living), even though she testified she intended to live in Las Vegas with different expenses, and then estimated her expenses at $8,000 per month without explaining how. The court also faulted the lack of findings explaining why 11 years was the right duration for a 38-year marriage in which Sam was primarily a homemaker. Second, the appeals court upheld the marital waste finding. Because David admitted he had committed waste, the burden shifted to him to justify his spending, and the court found the $167,354.56 figure was supported. Sam's argument that additional waste went unaccounted for was rejected as not sufficiently developed. The appeals court also rejected several other arguments as not cogently argued or not supported, including Sam's complaint about the life insurance option (the court noted she was given a choice, not an order) and David's arguments about the business valuation and about being required to operate TCS (the court noted the order did not actually require him to keep operating it).

This case involves a custody dispute between two parents, Joshua Lee Perry and Nae-Ryung Lee, over their young child. The couple married and lived in San Diego, California, where their child was born in March 2019. In October 2021, the family took what began as a six-month vacation to South Korea, Nae-Ryung's home country. That trip was extended by two more months. In June 2022, Joshua and the child returned to the United States while Nae-Ryung stayed in South Korea. Joshua and the child then moved to Las Vegas to live with the child's paternal grandmother, and Nae-Ryung joined them there in August 2022. After living with the family in Las Vegas for several months, Nae-Ryung alleged that Joshua had "kidnapped" the child, claiming the parties had agreed to return to South Korea. In October 2022, she filed for divorce in Las Vegas and asked for primary physical custody, permission to relocate with the child, and an order preventing Joshua from taking the child out of state. Both parents asked the Nevada court to take jurisdiction over the custody question, although Nae-Ryung also argued the child had no home state. The district court issued temporary custody orders, asked both sides to submit written arguments about jurisdiction, and held a hearing. It then decided that Nevada was not the child's "home state" - a legal term describing where a child has lived for a set period before a case begins - and dismissed the entire custody portion of the divorce case. Importantly, the court stopped there and did not consider whether Nevada might still have jurisdiction for other reasons allowed by law. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that Nevada law lists several different grounds under which a court can take jurisdiction over a custody case, not just the "home state" rule. Because the district court looked only at the home-state ground and never analyzed the other possible grounds, the appeals court concluded the dismissal was premature. The court sent the case back so the district court can properly examine whether any of the other jurisdictional grounds apply. The appeals court also instructed that, if there is a custody case pending in South Korea, the district court must take that into account when analyzing jurisdiction on remand.

This case is a divorce that turned into a custody fight between a child's mother and his paternal grandparents. Rebecca and Christopher Frane married in November 2016 and had a son, P.F., born in September 2013 (before the marriage). According to the opinion, from the time P.F. was about three weeks old, he lived primarily with his grandparents, Paula and William Wall. Rebecca filed for divorce in December 2020. While the case was ongoing, the court entered a temporary order that kept things as they were, letting P.F. remain with the Walls. In May 2022, the Walls asked to join the case (a "motion to intervene") and sought permanent custody, saying they had been caring for P.F. full-time. The court allowed them to intervene and held a one-day trial. By trial, Rebecca was asking for sole legal and sole physical custody of P.F. Christopher asked for primary physical and joint legal custody, and he nominated the Walls to continue caring for the child in his place. After trial, in October 2022, the court awarded primary physical custody to the Walls, with all three adults sharing joint legal custody. Both parents were ordered to pay monthly child support to the Walls. The court also divided the couple's shared property and ordered Christopher to pay Rebecca $3,250 to even things out. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Nevada affirmed, meaning it left the district court's decision in place. Nevada law starts with a presumption - called the "parental preference doctrine" - that a child is better off with a biological parent than with a non-parent. That presumption can be overcome by showing a parent is unfit or that "extraordinary circumstances" exist. The appeals court concluded that the district court made enough findings to justify overcoming that presumption in favor of the grandparents, pointing to findings that Rebecca had neglected the child since birth, had shown little interest in him, chose to live apart from him since he was three weeks old, and that the child was stable and cared for by the Walls. The appeals court also addressed whether joint physical custody should have been ordered instead. It explained that Nevada law presumes joint physical custody is not in a child's best interest when a court finds, based on substantial evidence, that a parent cannot adequately care for the child for at least 146 days a year. The district court made that finding about Rebecca, and the appeals court held the finding was supported. The court also noted that the district court separately found it was in the child's best interest to award custody to the Walls based on statutory "best interest" factors, and that Rebecca did not challenge those particular findings. Finally, on the property division, Rebecca argued there was an unequal split. The appeals court walked through the numbers and concluded the property was in fact divided equally after the $3,250 offset, so there was no abuse of discretion.

Douglas Brofman and Gina Fiore were never married but share a child born in 2015. In 2019, Fiore asked the family court to award joint legal and physical custody with no child support owed by either parent. Brofman countered by seeking joint legal custody, primary physical custody, child support, permission to move with the child to Cleveland, Ohio, and repayment of loans he said he had made to Fiore. After a one-and-a-half-day trial, the district court denied Brofman's request to relocate, awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody, decided the child would attend the school Fiore was zoned for, and ordered Fiore to pay child support to Brofman. The parties then litigated a series of additional disputes, which the court resolved in orders entered in September, October, and November 2021. Brofman appealed the decree and all of these orders. A large part of the Court of Appeals' decision turns on a technical but important concept: appellate jurisdiction, meaning the court's legal authority to hear an appeal at all. In Nevada, an appeal is allowed only when a statute or court rule authorizes it. One of the most common bases is an appeal from a "final judgment" - a decision that resolves everything in the case. Here, the district court had never entered a written order resolving Brofman's counterclaim seeking repayment of loans, so there was no final judgment. Because of that, the Court of Appeals held it had no jurisdiction to review the child support portion of the decree, the make-up parenting time portion of the September 20 order, the denial of Brofman's request for attorney fees and a pre-judgment writ of attachment (an order securing property before judgment) in the October 20 order, or any of the November 1 orders. Those parts of the appeals were dismissed. The court noted in a footnote that once a final judgment is entered, Brofman may appeal from it and challenge these interim decisions at that time. The custody portion of the decree, however, was appealable under a specific rule allowing appeals from orders finally establishing custody of minor children, so the court reached the merits of Brofman's custody-related arguments. First, Brofman argued the district court should not have admitted reports from the parties' independent medical examinations. But his own trial lawyer had agreed (stipulated) to their admission, and the court held that this agreement waived any challenge on appeal. The court also noted that stipulating to evidence for strategic reasons - here, because there was not enough time for the expert to testify at the short trial - is a strategic decision that does not entitle a party to relief. And because Brofman did not give the appellate court the trial transcript where the reports were apparently discussed, the court applied its usual rule of presuming that missing materials support the lower court's decision. Second, Brofman argued that the school-choice issue should not have been decided based on written memoranda without a live evidentiary hearing. The court explained the unusual posture: Fiore had not given Brofman notice before trial that she would seek to change the parties' prior home-schooling arrangement, so the district court could not fairly have decided school choice at trial itself. Instead, the district court let Brofman file a memorandum on the issue and Fiore a response, which gave him notice and a chance to be heard. The Court of Appeals held that Brofman waived his complaint about the lack of an evidentiary hearing because he never asked for one below. It also noted that the parties' memoranda were supported by unsworn declarations, which Nevada law allows in place of sworn affidavits, and that the district court also relied on trial evidence - which, again, Brofman had not provided in transcript form. The custody and support decree was affirmed in its entirety. Third, the court affirmed the denial of Brofman's motion for a new trial. Brofman claimed Fiore introduced misleading or fraudulent text messages at trial, but the court held that even assuming his arguments were correct, he had not shown prejudice materially affecting his substantial rights: the district court denied relocation because Brofman failed all three parts of the threshold relocation test, and only one finding involved a text message. The court also rejected Brofman's claim that he was denied oral argument on the motion (the transcript showed he was allowed to argue) and his argument that the school-choice decision required a full relocation analysis, since the relocation statute applies to moves out of state or far enough away to impair the other parent's relationship with the child - not to choosing a school within Las Vegas.

Cecil Estein, Jr., and Mia Ward were never married but have one child together, D.W., born in 2013. According to the opinion, Ward was the primary caretaker for the child during his first nine years, until Estein concluded his service in the United States military in 2018. After that, the parents worked together to increase Estein's parenting time, and they reached a partial agreement in which they agreed to share joint legal custody (the right to make major decisions for the child) and set out holiday and vacation plans. The parents could not agree, however, on physical custody (where the child primarily lives) or on New Year's parenting time. Estein went to district court asking for joint physical custody and a 50/50 split of parenting time. After motions and a trial before a judge (rather than a jury), the district court weighed the "best interest of the child" factors listed in Nevada law and decided that Ward should have primary physical custody, with Estein having parenting time on weekends. Estein appealed that decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, meaning it left the district court's decision in place. The appellate court explained that it reviews custody decisions only for an "abuse of discretion" - that is, it does not decide the case over again from scratch. It will accept the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and it will not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess the trial judge's assessments of who was credible. The court noted that Estein's main argument was not that the district court failed to make adequate findings or that its findings lacked support in the evidence. Instead, he argued that the trial court reached the wrong conclusion from the evidence. Because the appellate court does not re-weigh evidence on appeal, that kind of argument was not a basis for reversal. Estein also argued that the district court should have applied a legal presumption in favor of joint physical custody. But the opinion states that the district court had a specific reason for not applying that presumption - the parents had reached a verbal arrangement before trial giving Ward primary physical custody - and Estein did not challenge that reasoning on appeal. Because he did not challenge it, the court treated that argument as waived (given up).

This is a family-law case about whether a father could get parenting time with his teenage son. After Jose and Zully divorced, a judge gave Zully sole legal and physical custody of their children, and also gave Zully the power to decide whether Jose could spend any time with the children at all. Jose then asked the court for more parenting time with the couple's son, I.P. Zully objected. At a hearing, the court weighed evidence about what would be best for I.P. Part of that evidence involved a plea Jose had entered years earlier. Specifically, Jose had entered what is called an "Alford plea" - a type of no-contest plea, named after a U.S. Supreme Court case, where a defendant does not admit guilt but accepts a conviction - related to sexual coercion of I.P.'s older sister, who is now an adult. The trial judge wrote an 18-page order examining each factor Nevada law requires courts to consider when deciding what is in a child's best interest. The judge found that granting Jose parenting time was not in I.P.'s best interest. The judge relied on things like: I.P. (who is over 12) became frightened, depressed, and anxious when he learned his father wanted parenting time; a high level of conflict between the parents, including Jose's attempts to have Zully deported and his continuing anger toward her; and the fact that Zully had been I.P.'s sole caretaker for more than six years, including while Jose was incarcerated, and had met all of I.P.'s needs. On appeal, Jose argued the judge's findings were not adequately supported by evidence. He also correctly pointed out that under Nevada law, an Alford plea should not be used against a person in a civil case. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial judge made a mistake by considering Jose's plea. But the appeals court concluded the mistake was "harmless" - meaning it did not change the outcome - because the judge's other findings, which did not depend on the plea, independently supported the decision to deny parenting time. The appeals court also declined to consider Jose's challenge to the attorney-fees-and-costs award because he did not develop a real argument about it. In the end, the appeals court affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decisions.

Mark Madarang and Celice Germer have one child together, born in 2018. They never married and, before this case, had no court order setting out who had custody. Madarang moved to New Jersey for work in 2017, visited Las Vegas regularly to spend time with the child, and moved back to Las Vegas in 2020, where he could work remotely and see the child more. By February 2021, the parents were routinely splitting time, with Madarang having the child roughly three days a week. In mid-2021, Germer told Madarang she planned to move to Oregon with the child for better work opportunities. Madarang then filed a petition asking a court to establish custody, seeking joint legal custody and primary physical custody if Germer relocated, and asking the court to stop her from moving before it ruled. Germer filed her own petition seeking sole legal custody and primary physical custody, plus a request for temporary custody to allow the move to Oregon. The two cases were combined. After a hearing in October 2021, the district court granted Germer's request to relocate temporarily, gave Madarang Thanksgiving and winter break, and scheduled a full evidentiary hearing for January 2022. At that hearing, the court heard from both parents, Madarang's girlfriend, and Germer's former work manager. In March 2022, the court issued its final decree: joint legal custody, primary physical custody with Germer (including the move to Oregon), and set parenting time for Madarang on certain holidays and school breaks. The decree said the "receiving parent" pays for the child's transportation for scheduled custodial time, and the parent using any extra parenting time pays those travel costs. Madarang appealed. He argued the court wrongly let Germer move, that the temporary move tainted the final decision, and that the court simply copied the "best interest" factors into its relocation analysis. He also said the court did not make enough findings supporting Germer, pointed to behavior he considered inappropriate, questioned whether a possible promotion actually helped the child, and said Germer sometimes blocked his relationship with the child. He also objected to paying travel costs when he was not the one moving. The Court of Appeals explained that it reviews custody and parenting-time decisions for "abuse of discretion" - meaning it does not second-guess the trial judge unless the judge acted unreasonably or made findings not supported by adequate evidence. The court said Madarang was essentially unhappy with how the trial judge weighed the evidence, but that weighing evidence and judging witness credibility is the trial court's job, not the appellate court's. Because the district court had addressed each issue, considered the statutory best-interest and relocation factors, and based its conclusions on substantial evidence, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion. On travel costs, the court noted there is no law requiring one parent or the other to pay for travel tied to custodial time, so that decision falls within the trial judge's discretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree.

This is a family-law appeal about which parent gets primary custody of two children and whether one parent may move out of state with them. Brent and Caitlin St. George divorced in October 2020 and initially shared custody equally - both joint legal custody (the right to make major decisions for the children) and joint physical custody (roughly shared parenting time). In March 2021, Caitlin asked the court to change that arrangement. She wanted primary physical custody so that she could move with the children to Orlando, Florida. After a hearing where the judge heard testimony and reviewed documents from both sides, the trial judge sided with Caitlin, giving her primary custody and permission to relocate. Brent then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Nevada. The appeals court explained that it does not re-decide these cases from scratch. Instead, it checks whether the trial judge "abused" her discretion - meaning made a decision without adequate support in the evidence or law. The court will keep the trial judge's factual findings so long as they are backed by "substantial evidence," which the court described as evidence a reasonable person could accept as enough to support the decision. In custody matters, the guiding question is the best interest of the child. Brent's main argument was not that the evidence failed to support the judge's findings. Instead, he complained that the judge did not directly compare, side by side, what the children's lives would look like in Las Vegas with him versus in Orlando with Caitlin. The appeals court rejected this argument. It noted that even though the written order did not lay out a literal side-by-side comparison, the judge clearly considered Brent's evidence about the children's Las Vegas life - finding, for example, that the children were doing well in school, had a nice home with Brent, that Brent is a great father, and that the children have extended family in Las Vegas. The judge nonetheless concluded that moving to Orlando with Caitlin served the children's best interest, partly because the children could maintain a relationship with a half-sibling and because the judge found Caitlin more likely to allow the children to keep a relationship with the other parent. The appeals court emphasized that it does not reweigh witness credibility or the evidence on appeal. Brent also argued, briefly, that his constitutional right to parent was violated because the judge gave too much weight to the children's relationship with the new sibling. The appeals court declined to grant relief on this point, in part because Brent did not develop the argument or cite supporting authority, and in part because considering a sibling relationship is a permitted part of the best-interest analysis. The court affirmed the trial judge's decision.

Diamond Hall and Justin Martin were never married but share one child, referred to in the opinion as G.M. According to the opinion, in December 2019 Diamond went to Justin's house unannounced and uninvited, entered through the dog door, and refused to leave when asked. Justin testified she poked him in the eye and chest, and a video from Justin's home security system showed her making a poking motion and trying to grab his phone while he appeared to be calling the police. Diamond denied poking him and said she was acting in self-defense, though she admitted behaving badly and admitted she had shoved Justin on an earlier occasion within the prior 12 months. She was arrested and charged with trespass and battery constituting domestic violence. Days later, Diamond filed for child custody and Justin filed an answer and counterclaim. The custody case dragged on, partly because of COVID-19 delays and partly because Diamond's criminal case kept getting reset. At a pretrial hearing, the judge said the custody case needed to be resolved and could not be continued again. The judge told Diamond to talk to her criminal lawyer about whether to testify at the custody trial or instead invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege - the right not to give testimony that could be used against her in the criminal case. When the parties agreed (stipulated) to postpone the custody trial until after the criminal case, the judge rejected that agreement. Justin then asked for a continuance himself, and the judge denied it. The trial was finally set for August 16, and Diamond never filed her own motion to continue. At the one-day custody trial, Diamond chose to testify and claimed self-defense. By testifying, she gave up (waived) her Fifth Amendment right to stay silent. During the trial, Justin's attorney referenced hours of video, and short video clips were admitted into evidence without objection after Diamond testified. The judge found, by "clear and convincing evidence," that Diamond had committed multiple acts of domestic violence - two on December 1, 2019 (battery and coercion), plus another in the preceding 12 months. Under Nevada law, that finding created a "rebuttable presumption" that giving Diamond physical custody was not in the child's best interest, meaning the burden shifted to her to disprove it. The judge found she did not overcome that presumption and awarded Justin primary physical custody, with Diamond getting parenting time of 48 hours every weekend. Diamond asked the court to reconsider, arguing Justin had failed to hand over video evidence during pretrial discovery. The judge found she had actually disclosed the existence of the videos herself in her pretrial memorandum, that she never filed a motion to compel or raised the issue with the discovery commissioner, and that neither side gave the full video to the court even though the court offered to watch it. The judge denied reconsideration and ordered Diamond to pay Justin's attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Diamond's constitutional rights were not violated. The court explained she never objected below to holding the custody trial first, that it was Justin (not Diamond) who moved to continue, and that the district court never forced her to testify - it only reminded her she had a choice and even suggested she consult her criminal lawyer. Because she voluntarily chose to testify, the court found her Fifth Amendment argument unpersuasive. The court also concluded she received due process: notice and an opportunity to be heard, with the correct "best interest of the child" standard applied. On the video-evidence issues, the court held Diamond failed to show how the missing footage would have changed the outcome or affected her substantial rights - and, importantly, because the judge separately found an earlier act of domestic violence that alone triggered the presumption, any error about the December video was "harmless." The court affirmed.

Christina Sobczyk and Aaron Osborne share one child, C.O., born in January 2015. In 2017, a New York court entered a stipulated (agreed-upon) custody order that gave Christina "sole custody" and allowed her to move with the child to Nevada, while Aaron received parenting time on a gradually increasing schedule. That order also required both parents to have independent access to the child's healthcare and education records, and required Christina to give Aaron written updates about the child's providers. Christina moved to Nevada in September 2017. In 2018, Aaron had some contact with the child, including two authorized visits in New York. During the August visit, Child Protective Services came to Aaron's home based on allegations from Christina; CPS found the allegations unfounded and left the child in Aaron's care. The district court later reviewed video and found the child did not appear "stressed, traumatized, or frightened" during that visit. Agencies in both New York and Nevada investigated allegations against Aaron and closed their cases as unsubstantiated. In September 2018, Christina brought the New York order into the Nevada court system and asked the court to stop all contact between Aaron and the child. Aaron responded by asking the court to confirm joint legal custody and to grant joint physical custody. The case went to trial, and the court heard 13 days of testimony between June 2019 and February 2020. The trial was delayed by an attorney's withdrawal and the COVID-19 pandemic. The presiding judge then retired, and a senior judge granted Aaron's request for a new trial, explaining she was uncomfortable deciding the case by only watching videos of the earlier proceedings. Before the new trial, Aaron asked the court to exclude evidence of his criminal history and certain out-of-court statements the child had made to a therapist. The court excluded that evidence. After the new trial, the court found that Christina had severely interfered with Aaron's relationship with the child. It ordered joint legal custody, gave Christina primary physical custody, and provided that Aaron's parenting time would increase gradually and be determined by a "reunification specialist." On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld most of the district court's decisions. It concluded the senior judge acted within her discretion in granting a new trial under NRCP 63, which allows a successor judge to order a new trial if she did not preside over the original trial. It upheld the evidence rulings, in part because Christina did not provide transcripts of the relevant hearing, so the court presumed the missing records supported the lower court's decision. It upheld the joint legal custody and the primary physical custody determinations, finding they were supported by the evidence. However, the Court of Appeals reversed one part of the order. It held that by leaving Aaron's parenting time to be determined entirely by the reunification specialist, the district court improperly handed off decision-making authority that only a court can exercise. The court sent the case back so the district court can decide the parenting-time schedule itself and spell it out with specific times and terms.

Nechole Garcia and Evgeny Shapiro were once a couple and had one child together, A.G.-S., who was later diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. When their relationship ended, they could not agree on how to share custody or how much child support should be paid, so the case went to court. After a two-day trial, the district court decided the parenting schedule, set Garcia's child support obligation, and dealt with requests about past-owed support. Garcia appealed, raising several complaints about how the trial judge handled the case. The Court of Appeals rejected most of Garcia's arguments but agreed with one. First, Garcia argued the judge improperly let in evidence about settlement talks between the parties. The court disagreed. It explained that the materials she pointed to were never actually admitted as evidence. Arguments in motions are not evidence, and each time Shapiro tried to ask her about negotiation-related matters at trial, her objections were sustained (upheld) or the information was struck (removed) from the record. Because nothing was admitted, there was no error - and even if there had been, she never showed it harmed her case. Second, Garcia argued the judge failed to properly weigh the high level of conflict between the parents when choosing a parenting schedule. The court found that the judge had, in fact, considered the conflict, expressly noting it was high, and had weighed Garcia's point (that her schedule would mean fewer exchanges and possibly less conflict) against other factors. The judge picked Shapiro's proposed schedule as being in the child's best interest, and the court found enough evidence to support that decision - including that the parents had identical work schedules and that Shapiro's schedule would let A.G.-S. spend more time with her half-siblings, with whom she had a close bond. Third, Garcia argued the judge miscalculated Shapiro's income for child support by relying on his most recent tax return instead of bank deposits she said totaled more than $90,000 in 2020. The court found the judge did consider those bank deposits but concluded that deposits do not automatically equal income, especially since Garcia asked Shapiro about only one deposit (which he said came from pandemic-related unemployment assistance). Faced with conflicting evidence, the judge was entitled to rely on the tax returns, disclosure forms, and testimony, and the appeals court would not second-guess that. Finally, Garcia argued the judge wrongly refused to decide her request for child support arrears (past-due support) by mistakenly stating she had not asked for any. Here the court agreed with Garcia. The record showed she repeatedly requested "constructive" arrears - in her countermotion, her pretrial memorandum, an admitted exhibit, and her closing brief - claiming Shapiro owed $16,638.72. Because the judge declined to rule based on a mistaken belief that she never asked, the court reversed that portion and sent the matter back for the district court to actually decide the arrears request. Everything else was affirmed.

This case arose from a divorce and child custody dispute. Frank Luciano started the divorce and custody proceedings in October 2019. Amy filed an answer, and the case moved forward. In December 2019, the court held a case management conference and set a "calendar call" (a scheduling check-in) for May 5, 2020, and a trial for May 19, 2020. Both parties were told these dates in open court. Amy did not appear at the calendar call. The court kept the case on the calendar for the trial date to give her another chance to present evidence. Amy also did not appear at the May 19 trial. The court then took evidence from Frank and, in June 2020, entered a final divorce decree awarding Frank sole legal and sole physical custody of the couple's child, with Amy's parenting time left to Frank's discretion. The court noted that if Amy brought the matter back, it would consider evidence to re-establish contact between her and the child. In July 2020, Amy filed a motion to set aside the decree under NRCP 60(b) (a rule allowing a court to undo a judgment in certain circumstances). She claimed she had not been served with court papers, that the decree resulted from fraud or misconduct, that Frank had committed domestic violence against her, and other allegations. The court held a hearing and, in December 2020, denied the motion, finding she had received written notice of the hearing and trial dates in open court and had not shown a basis to set aside the decree. The court again said it would consider modifying custody and support if she filed an appropriate motion. In May 2021, Amy filed a second NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside several prior orders, repeating similar arguments. The court denied it, finding she had not provided proof that she served the motion on Frank and that it had already considered the same arguments in her first motion. She then appealed. The appellate court first found it lacked jurisdiction over the part of the appeal challenging the divorce decree itself. A notice of appeal generally must be filed within 30 days after the notice of entry of the order being appealed. The notice of entry of the divorce decree was served on June 8, 2020, but Amy did not file her notice of appeal until September 17, 2021 - far too late. Her NRCP 60(b) motions were not filed in time to pause ("toll") the appeal deadline. Because the appeal was late as to the decree, the court dismissed that portion. As to the two orders denying NRCP 60(b) relief, the court affirmed. It explained that district courts have broad discretion over custody decisions and over motions to set aside judgments, and that these decisions are reviewed only for "abuse of discretion." The court found that Amy did not offer cogent argument or relevant authority supporting her claims. It noted that while a court must make specific best-interest findings, including on domestic violence, when making a custody determination, Amy's arguments really challenged the underlying custody decision in the decree - which was not timely appealed - and she cited no authority requiring such findings when deciding an NRCP 60(b) motion. The record showed she was served with the summons, complaint, and the relevant orders, undercutting her fraud and lack-of-service arguments. On the second motion, the court explained that it was denied in part because Amy failed to serve it on Frank, and because Amy did not challenge that specific finding on appeal, the court affirmed on that basis. Finally, the court rejected the claim that custody was awarded as punishment, noting the record showed the court took evidence at trial before making its custody decision rather than entering a default without a hearing.

Lisa and Joel Eorio married in New Mexico in 2006 and have two children together; Joel is also the equitable father of Lisa's third child. In 2019, Lisa moved to Las Vegas for a job, and Joel followed later with the children after they finished the school year. About a year after the move, the couple separated. Joel filed for divorce and asked the court for primary physical custody so that he could move back to New Mexico with the children. Lisa answered and asked that the children stay with her in Las Vegas. Before trial, the parties reached agreements about custody depending on how the court ruled on the move. They agreed that if they lived in the same state, they would share the children (joint physical custody). If the court allowed Joel to move to New Mexico, Joel would have primary custody and Lisa would get substantial parenting time. If the court denied the move and Joel went back to New Mexico anyway, Lisa would have primary custody and the children would stay with her in Las Vegas. Because of these agreements, the only question the trial had to decide was whether Joel could relocate with the children. At an April 2021 trial, both parents testified. Joel said moving back to New Mexico would make him more financially stable because he could live rent-free with his parents and transfer his job. Lisa testified it would be better for the children to stay with her in Las Vegas. The district judge went through the legal factors and found that most of the "best interest" factors either did not apply or applied equally to both parents. Even so, the judge concluded Joel had met the legal requirements and allowed him to move to New Mexico with the children. On appeal, the Court of Appeals focused on whether the district court explained adequately why moving was in the children's best interests. Under Nevada's relocation law, the parent who wants to move must prove, among other things, that the move is in the children's best interests, and the court must make specific findings and connect those findings to its decision. The appeals court found that the written divorce decree never actually stated that relocation was in the children's best interests; it only said most factors did not apply or were equal between the parents. The court then looked at the judge's spoken findings from the trial, but those findings only showed that neither parent was disqualified from sharing custody - they did not explain how moving to New Mexico served the children's best interests. Because the court could not tell, from either the written order or the oral findings, how the judge concluded that relocation was in the children's best interests by the required standard of proof, it reversed that part of the decision and sent the case back. On remand, the district court must make specific findings, tie them to its conclusion about which best-interest factors (if any) support giving Joel primary custody for the purpose of moving, and then weigh all the factors by comparing the children's potential home in each location. The court ordered that the existing relocation order stays in effect until a new order is entered.

Jose Salazar and Agustina Cervantes Landa married in Las Vegas in March 2001. Before the marriage, in 1999, Jose bought a house on Ardmore Street (the "Ardmore property"). A few months into the marriage, Agustina was deported to Mexico, where she lived for about eleven years while Jose visited roughly once a year. The couple had three children during that time. In 2012, Agustina returned to Las Vegas and the couple lived together again in the Ardmore property. In 2014 they bought a second house on Panocha Street (the "Panocha property") and moved there, renting out the Ardmore house. In 2019, Jose filed for divorce. After a trial, the district court gave Jose primary physical custody of the children, ordered Agustina to pay him $144 per month in child support, and ordered Jose to pay Agustina $600 per month in alimony for ten years. It gave the Panocha property to Jose and the Ardmore property to Agustina, each as their own separate property, and ordered Jose to pay Agustina $60,000 to make the values of the two houses come out roughly even. Jose asked the court to reconsider. The district court kept the alimony award but corrected a math error, lowering the equity payment Jose owed Agustina from $60,000 to $38,999.50. It also required Agustina to take financial responsibility for the Ardmore property by refinancing the mortgage into her own name within 120 days or selling the house; if she did neither, Jose could sell it. Meanwhile, Jose had to keep making the Ardmore mortgage payments until the house was refinanced or sold, and in exchange he got monthly credits against both his alimony obligation and the equity payment he owed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Jose on some points and disagreed on others. First, it upheld the alimony award. The court explained that the district court had walked through the required legal factors and made detailed findings, and that arguments about Agustina living with another man amounted to arguments about marital fault, which courts are not allowed to consider when setting alimony. The court also rejected Jose's complaints about how income was calculated, noting that tax records in the file supported the figure for his income and that a spouse's testimony is an acceptable basis for determining income. Second, the court agreed with Jose that the district court made a mistake in calculating Agustina's child support. Under the applicable regulation, alimony a person receives counts as income when calculating that person's child support obligation. Because the district court used only Agustina's $800 monthly income and left out the $600 in alimony she receives, the calculation was wrong and must be redone on remand. Third, the court agreed with Jose about the Ardmore house. Because Jose owned that house before the marriage, it started out as his separate property. The court explained that when community funds (money earned during the marriage) are used to pay a mortgage on separate property, the marital community earns a proportional share of the property, and it may also be entitled to a share of any increase in the home's value attributable to community efforts. The district court gave the whole Ardmore house to Agustina as her separate property without accounting for Jose's separate interest, so that award was reversed. On remand, the district court must calculate the parties' separate interests and the community's interest and divide the property equitably.

Andrew Warren and Aimee Jung Ahyang were never married but have one child together. In early 2019, Warren asked the court to give him primary physical custody. Ahyang answered and asked for primary physical custody herself, citing Warren's emotional and mental status. Warren, in turn, argued that Ahyang had issues with drug usage. The trial court held a two-day evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, then issued detailed written findings and awarded the parents joint legal custody while giving Ahyang primary physical custody. Warren asked the trial court for a new trial and for reconsideration. When that request was denied, he appealed. The Court of Appeals is not a place where the whole case is retried; instead, the appellate judges check whether the trial court had a reasonable basis for its decision and did not misuse its discretion. Warren's main complaint on appeal was that the trial court leaned too heavily on his mental health when it decided custody. The appellate court disagreed, saying the record did not support that claim. Nevada law requires the trial court to weigh a list of specific factors when deciding what is in a child's best interest. Reviewing the trial court's written findings, the appellate court noted that none of those factors favored Warren; several favored Ahyang, and the rest were neutral or did not apply. The court added that even if Warren's mental health had been treated as a non-issue, the other factors would still have supported the award to Ahyang. Warren also argued the trial court should have ordered Ahyang to undergo drug testing. The appellate court noted that the trial court found Ahyang "used to have a drug issue, but she has fixed it," based on three negative drug tests she presented and a review of CPS records. The appellate court concluded that was enough evidence to support the trial court's conclusion. Warren further objected to two stipulations and orders about vacation and holiday time that were entered after the hearing, saying the court never asked whether he agreed and never required his signature. The appellate court observed that Warren's own attorney had signed both stipulations, and that a local court rule allows a stipulation to be entered when it is signed by a party's attorney. Because Warren had not presented evidence below that he did not consent, the appellate court declined to consider that argument for the first time on appeal. Finally, Warren argued he deserved a new trial because the trial court excluded his medical records and because he was surprised by his inability to admit them. The appellate court explained that the trial court did not exclude the records entirely; it excluded them only for the first day of the hearing so Ahyang could review them, and it told Warren he could renew his request on day two. Warren never renewed the request. Because Warren failed to disclose the records before the hearing and then failed to seek their admission on day two, the appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial. The judgment was affirmed.

This case involves a young child, referred to as E.R., who was removed from her mother's custody at one month old in July 2015 because of neglect. DFS placed her in foster care and tried to find relatives to take her, but found none at first. After more than a year, the child was placed with foster parents Philip R. and Regina R., who wanted to adopt her. About 15 months after the child's initial removal, the child's mother's first cousin, Stephanie R., who lives in Georgia with her husband Joey R., contacted DFS and asked to take the child. By that time, DFS was moving toward terminating the mother's parental rights, which the court did in February 2017. The foster parents had begun adopting the child. DFS then asked the district court to decide whether the child should stay with the foster parents (with whom she was strongly bonded) or be moved to live with the maternal relatives in Georgia. After a hearing, a court master recommended sending the child to the maternal relatives, finding that the family connection was the "overriding consideration," even though the move would cause the child trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. The foster parents and DFS asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed to grant the writs and ordered the case redone. The court explained several things. First, once parental rights are terminated, the rules for placing a child change. Before termination, NRS 432B.550(5) governs placement, and that statute uses mandatory language ("preference must be given") in favor of placing a child with a relative. After termination, however, NRS 128.110(2) governs, and it uses softer, more permissive language ("may give preference") and gives the placement agency more discretion. Second, the maternal relatives' delay in coming forward did not disqualify them. Stephanie did not know the child was in protective custody until October 2016, so she had a reasonable excuse for the delay. Third, and most importantly, even when a familial preference applies, the child's best interest is the main consideration. The Supreme Court found that the hearing master and district court did not adequately weigh the child's best interest. They treated the family connection as automatically controlling and did not make written findings about what was best for this particular child, who was deeply bonded with her foster family and would suffer trauma from another move. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate its placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning a fresh hearing), this time applying NRS 128.110(2), giving appropriate weight to the child's best interest, and considering DFS's discretion in deciding placement.

This case concerns where a young child, E.R., should live. DFS removed E.R. from her mother's custody when she was one month old because of neglect. After efforts to reunify mother and child failed, the mother's parental rights were terminated in February 2017, and the foster parents who had cared for E.R. since September 2016 began the process of adopting her. About 15 months after E.R. was first removed, a maternal cousin in Georgia (Stephanie R.) contacted DFS and asked to have E.R. placed with her and her husband. After interstate-placement approval and an evidentiary hearing, a court master recommended moving E.R. to Georgia, reasoning that the "family connection is the overriding consideration" even though the child was strongly bonded to the foster parents and another removal would cause her trauma. The district court adopted that recommendation. DFS and the foster parents asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court used the wrong statute. While the case was working through reunification, NRS 432B.550(5) governed placement and gave a strong preference to placing the child with relatives. But once parental rights were terminated, a different statute, NRS 128.110(2), took over. That statute uses softer language: the agency "may" prefer relatives, and "shall, if practicable" keep siblings together. So the agency's discretion and the child's best interest carry more weight at that stage. The Court agreed with the lower court on one point: the maternal cousin had a reasonable excuse for coming forward late because she did not know E.R. was in protective custody, and DFS could have located her earlier. So her delay did not eliminate any familial preference she might have. But the Court found two serious problems with the placement order. First, the master and district court did not make written findings about what was actually in E.R.'s best interest beyond acknowledging the move would traumatize her. Second, by using NRS 432B.550(5) instead of NRS 128.110(2), the courts below did not give appropriate weight to DFS's discretion in choosing placement post-termination, and did not develop the facts about whether placing E.R. with a newer sibling (born to the same mother in April 2017) was actually practicable. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to vacate the placement order and hold a new trial (a "trial de novo," meaning the court starts fresh rather than just reviewing the master's work) applying the correct statute and making proper findings about E.R.'s best interest.

Ken Nguyen and Robert Boynes were a same-sex couple who dated from November 2009 to May 2013. During the relationship, they decided to adopt a child together and went to Catholic Charities of Southern Nevada. At the time, Catholic Charities did not allow same-sex couples to adopt jointly, so according to Rob, the plan was for Ken to adopt first and Rob to adopt afterward as a second parent. Both men took part in the entire adoption process - background checks, classes, post-placement visits - and Rob even drafted the "birth mother letter" that helped them be selected. A child was placed with Ken in February 2013, and both men were there to receive the newborn. After the placement, the child spent most nights at Rob's house, Rob took the child to most doctor's visits, supplied most of the baby gear, and was listed as a father on the child's baptism certificate. The child's middle name is Rob's surname. But the men's relationship ended in May 2013. When Rob asked Ken to put him on the birth certificate, Ken refused. Ken finalized his own adoption alone in October 2013 and refused to let Rob complete a second-parent adoption. Rob then sued, asking the court to recognize him as a parent and to give him custody. The district court ruled for Rob, and Ken appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court applied a doctrine called "equitable adoption," which allows a court to enforce an adoption agreement when one person promised to adopt, the other relied on that promise, and a child would be harmed if the promise were broken. The Court had recognized this doctrine in a 1987 case (Frye v. Frye) and had declined to extend it in two later cases where the dispute was really about whether someone was the biological parent. Here, the Court said this case was different: neither Ken nor Rob is biologically related to the child, and the question was whether the two men had agreed to adopt together. The Court found substantial evidence that they had agreed, that Rob relied on Ken's promise, and that the child would be harmed by Rob's removal from his life. The Court also rejected Ken's claim that the district court treated him differently because he and Rob were a same-sex couple. The Court said child custody decisions are made case by case, and nothing in the record showed the result turned on the parties' sexual orientation. Finally, the Court affirmed the joint custody order. Ken had argued Rob was a "stalker" who sent harassing emails, which would trigger a presumption against giving custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence. The district court found only a single forwarded email tied to Rob, which it concluded was not enough to show "obsessed stalking behavior." Ken also accused Rob of destroying his computer to hide evidence; the district court found the proof inconclusive. The Supreme Court held substantial evidence supported those findings. Three justices - Justice Stiglich, Chief Justice Cherry, and Justice Hardesty - concurred. They would have reached the same outcome under Nevada's Parentage Act rather than under equitable adoption, relying on the Court's earlier decision in St. Mary v. Damon, which recognized that paternity statutes can apply in same-sex parentage cases.

Beau Davis and Andrea Ewalefo, who never married, share an eight-year-old son, E.D. Davis works in Africa, primarily on Texas A&M-supervised reconstruction projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Ewalefo lives with E.D. in Nevada. The parents agreed E.D. should live mostly with Ewalefo and that they should share legal custody, but they disagreed about how Davis's visits should work. Davis asked the district court to let E.D. visit him for several two-week stretches and most of each summer, with the visits taking place in Rwanda or Uganda - safer countries that border the DRC where Davis works. Ewalefo opposed visits in Africa, citing her concerns about regional safety and the fact that Rwanda and Uganda have not signed the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty that helps return abducted children to their home countries. The district judge ruled that Davis could have up to five two-week visits per year, but barred any visits in Africa and went further by forbidding either parent from taking E.D. anywhere outside the United States until he turns 18, unless they both agree in writing or get a court order. The judge said briefly that "the world is a dangerous place" and noted that Rwanda and Uganda were not Hague signatories, but did not write detailed findings explaining how these restrictions served E.D.'s best interest. Davis appealed. A three-judge panel of the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed by a 2-1 vote, with concerns about the lack of findings. Davis then asked the full Nevada Supreme Court to reconsider. The Nevada Supreme Court, sitting en banc, agreed to reconsider and reversed the travel and visitation restrictions. The court held that under Nevada law, a judge deciding custody must make specific written findings explaining how the decision serves the child's best interest. The decree here did not explain why visiting Africa was bad for E.D., why Davis could not take E.D. anywhere outside the United States during his allotted visitation, or why a flat ban on international travel until age 18 was justified. The court noted that the district judge had actually made findings favorable to Davis - including that both parents are fit, conflict between them is minimal, there is no evidence of abuse or risk of abduction, and E.D. had previously traveled to Africa with his parents and benefited from it. The court explained that judges may, in appropriate cases, restrict international travel or visitation in countries that have not signed the Hague Convention - but only with findings showing why such restrictions serve the child's best interest. If the concern is abduction, the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act (NRS Chapter 125D) provides graduated tools, from requiring travel itineraries to posting bonds to outright travel bans. Saying merely that "the world is a dangerous place" is not enough. The case goes back to the district court to take more evidence and make proper findings about whether E.D. can safely visit his father in Rwanda or Uganda, whether such visits are in his best interest, and whether any abduction prevention measures are warranted. The portions of the decree the parties did not dispute (custody and child support) remain in place. Two justices dissented, arguing that the record contained substantial evidence supporting the district court's decision and that the majority was effectively reweighing evidence the trial judge had already evaluated.

Michael and Ellen Bluestein divorced in 2004 after 13 years of marriage and one child together. They agreed Michael would have the child from Thursday evening to Sunday morning each week, with Ellen having the child the rest of the time. A month after the divorce, they filed a parenting agreement, adopted by the court, that called the arrangement "joint legal and physical custody." Neither parent paid child support. Years later, Michael started receiving public assistance. The State went after Ellen for partial reimbursement as child support. To avoid the joint-custody child support formula (which produced an $82-per-month obligation for her), Ellen asked the family court to relabel her as the "primary physical custodian." She did not ask to change the actual schedule - just the legal label. Her argument relied on a 2009 Nevada Supreme Court case, Rivero v. Rivero, which said that a joint physical custody arrangement generally requires each parent to have the child at least 40 percent of the time (about 146 days a year). Ellen calculated that Michael had the child only 38 percent of the time, below the threshold. The district court agreed with Ellen. After an evidentiary hearing focused largely on who was responsible for the child on Thursdays, the court found Ellen had the child 260 days and Michael 105 days in 2011, and on that basis redesignated her as primary physical custodian. The court then sent the case back to a child support master to recalculate support. The court did not say whether changing the custody label was in the child's best interest. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It made two main points. First, once either parent asks the court to revisit a custody agreement, the court does have authority to review the arrangement and apply current Nevada law - even if the moving parent only asks to change the label, not the timeshare. Second, and more importantly, the 40-percent guideline from Rivero is just a tool. It cannot be applied mechanically as the only factor. The controlling question, by statute, is what is in the child's best interest. Because the district court treated the 40-percent figure as the sole basis for changing the custody designation - and never made findings about the child's best interest - it abused its discretion. The Court was particularly concerned that this kind of mechanical application can result in stripping a parent of joint custody status (with downstream consequences for child support) even when the existing schedule gives the child frequent contact with both parents and even when the only reason for the relabeling is to shift the support calculation. The case was sent back to the family court to reconsider the request with the child's best interest as the primary focus.

Audria Ruscitti and Ian Druckman had a child together but never married. Shortly after the child's birth, Ian signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity — a legal document that establishes a man as a child's father without going to court. The couple lived together and raised the child jointly, and even discussed moving out of Nevada together, but they separated before doing so. After Ian moved out, Audria moved to California with the child for better job opportunities — without Ian's knowledge or consent. Ian then asked a Nevada court to order the child's return and to give him joint legal and primary physical custody. Audria asked the court to award her sole legal and primary physical custody and to let the child stay in California with her. The district court gave both parents joint legal custody, awarded Audria primary physical custody, and approved her relocation. Ian appealed. The central question was what custody rights unmarried parents have when paternity has been legally established but no court has ever issued a custody order. The Nevada Supreme Court held that in that situation, both parents have equal custody rights. Quoting the statute, the court emphasized that "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." NRS 126.031(1). The court also addressed Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.200, which requires a custodial parent to get the other parent's consent or court permission before moving a child out of state. Because no court had ever awarded either parent primary physical custody, that statute technically did not apply. But the court held that its policy should still guide these situations: when parents have equal custody rights, one parent may not move the child out of state over the other parent's objection without a court order. The proper course is to file a motion for primary physical custody along with a request to relocate. A parent who moves the child unlawfully faces consequences — for example, the court deciding custody should not consider anything about the child's new life in the other state (new school, friends, or routine) when deciding what is best for the child. To get permission to relocate, a parent must first show "a sensible, good faith reason for the move." If that showing is made, the court then decides custody and relocation based on the child's best interest, incorporating five factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz — factors such as whether the move will improve the child's and parent's quality of life, whether each parent's motives are honorable, and whether the parent staying behind will have a realistic opportunity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Applying these rules, the majority concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court had found a good-faith reason for the move (Audria's job opportunities in California and the parties' earlier plans to move out of state together), had considered the relevant best-interest and Schwartz factors, and had not relied on any facts arising from the child's time in California. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the custody and relocation rulings. However, it reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Ian as a sanction for a supposedly frivolous motion to stay, concluding his motion "was based on reasonable grounds because he sought stability for his child," and remanded that issue for reconsideration. The court rejected as meritless Ian's additional arguments that the district court improperly limited his evidence and that the judge should be disqualified for bias. Two justices dissented. They agreed unmarried parents have equal custody rights, but argued Audria's removal of the child without Ian's consent or court permission was wrongful, that the district court should have weighed that conduct against her, and that the case should be sent back for a new custody determination.

Shinichi and Yoko Ogawa married in Japan in 1997 and moved several times between Japan and the United States, buying a home in Henderson, Nevada. Their three children were all born in Japan. In June 2004, the children traveled from Nevada to Japan. The parents told very different stories about that trip: Yoko said it was only a summer vacation and that Shinichi refused to send the children back in August 2004; Shinichi said the whole family had planned to live in Japan permanently. Either way, the children stayed in Japan with Shinichi. About eight months after the children left, in February 2005, Yoko filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court to order the children's immediate return, calling their retention in Japan an international abduction. The Nevada court agreed with Yoko, ordered the children returned, later held Shinichi in contempt when they were not returned, and ultimately - after a hearing at which Shinichi's lawyer appeared but Shinichi personally did not - entered a "default" divorce decree. That decree gave Yoko sole legal and physical custody with "no contact" for Shinichi, all of the community property (including a share of a house in Japan), spousal and child support, and attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court decided three questions. First, did the Nevada court have power to decide custody at all, given that the children had been out of Nevada for eight months when the case was filed? Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) - a law that generally gives custody-deciding authority to a child's "home state" - a child's temporary absences from a state do not break the required six-month residency period. Because the evidence supported the district court's finding that the children left Nevada in June 2004 for a temporary three-month vacation, Nevada remained their home state, and the Nevada court properly had jurisdiction. Second, was the order sending the children back to the U.S. proper? The district court had relied on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty designed to ensure the prompt return of children wrongfully taken from their home country. But Japan has not signed that treaty, so the Convention and its U.S. implementing statute provide no remedy here. Even so, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not need the treaty: because it had custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, it had authority to order the children's return as part of the custody case. So the return order stood, even though the Hague Convention did not apply. Third, was the default divorce decree proper? A "default" is what happens when a party fails to respond to a lawsuit. Here, Shinichi had filed an answer and a countercomplaint for divorce, and his lawyer appeared at the divorce hearing - only Shinichi himself was absent. The Supreme Court held that under those circumstances a default was inappropriate, and that the district court erred by treating the hearing as a one-sided "prove-up," awarding Yoko everything she asked for, cutting off meaningful cross-examination, and never deciding the case on its merits. The court reversed the decree's awards of custody, property, support, and fees, and sent the case back for a hearing on the merits. It denied Shinichi's request that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand, because he cited no record support or legal authority showing reassignment was necessary.