Nevada family-law case summaries

This case concerns a long-running custody dispute over one child, PJ, born in December 2018. The parents, Maila Likua and Paulino Gomez, married in 2016, lived together in Mesquite, Nevada, and separated in February 2022. Gomez filed for divorce, and a three-year custody battle followed. Early on, the court split the financial issues from the custody issues. In June 2022, the parents agreed to share legal and physical custody on an alternating three-week schedule until a custody trial could be held. After that trial, the court's first custody order (September 2023) gave the parents joint legal custody but gave Likua primary physical custody and permission to move PJ permanently to Molokai, Hawaii, while Gomez kept substantial parenting time. Gomez asked the court to reconsider; that request was denied, and he appealed. While that appeal was pending, Gomez asked the trial court for permission to change custody again, claiming Likua had taken PJ out of preschool and left Hawaii without telling him from April to mid-May 2024, and had concealed the child's whereabouts. Because of the seriousness of those allegations, the trial court issued what is called an "indicative ruling" (a signal that it would reconsider if given the chance), and with the supreme court's approval, the case was sent back to the trial court to address custody and relocation again. After a second custody hearing in November 2024, the trial court reversed course: it gave Gomez primary physical custody (with Likua keeping substantial parenting time) and allowed PJ to move back to Nevada. The court found that PJ's school attendance had dropped, his academic performance lagged behind his peers, and he had ongoing behavioral and focus problems. It also found that communication between the parents had broken down and that Likua had repeatedly interfered with Gomez's parenting time, including on Father's Day 2024, and had traveled with PJ without telling Gomez. On appeal, Likua first argued that the trial court unfairly placed extra duties and burdens on her as the primary custodial parent, violating her right to a fair process. The Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that both parents fully briefed and argued their positions, presented evidence and witnesses, and made closing arguments. The court noted that, because Gomez was the one asking to change custody, he carried the burden of proof, not Likua. The three passages Likua pointed to simply described the ordinary obligations of a parent who shares legal custody — such as keeping the other parent informed of the child's location and honoring scheduled parenting time, including required FaceTime calls. Likua next argued that the trial court got the changed-circumstances and best-interest analyses wrong. The Court of Appeals applied a deferential standard, meaning it would not second-guess factual findings supported by enough evidence that a reasonable person could accept them. It found that PJ's academic decline and Likua's interference with Gomez's parenting time were enough to support a substantial change in circumstances, and that the trial court had made specific findings on each of the twelve best-interest factors, three of which favored modification. On relocation, the Court of Appeals made an unusual observation: the relocation statute technically did not even apply here, because Gomez (the parent seeking the move) was the non-custodial parent already living in Nevada, and the move was back to Nevada rather than away from it. But because no one raised this point and the trial court treated the statute as a guide, the appeals court reviewed the relocation analysis as instructive and found the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence. Finally, the court declined to address Likua's request for community funds to pay attorney fees, because the orders that actually denied or deferred those fees were not the ones she listed in her notice of appeal. The court also declined to address her claim of judicial bias, finding it moot because the case was being affirmed rather than sent back, and noting that even on the merits the bias claim would fail.

Christopher and Joy Douglas married in 2015 and had one child together. In June 2022, Christopher filed for divorce and asked to be the child's primary caretaker. Joy asked to be primary caretaker as well and to move the child to Iowa, where she was already living. After holding a hearing, the district court sided with Christopher on the major issues: it gave him primary physical custody, denied Joy's request to move the child to Iowa, denied her request for alimony (spousal support), and denied her request that Christopher pay for the child's travel to Iowa for her parenting time. Both sides had asked the court to make the other pay their attorney fees. Christopher asked for fees under a state law (NRS 18.010(2)(b)) that allows a winning party to recover fees when the other side pursued a claim without reasonable grounds or to harass, and under a local court rule (EDCR 5.219) that allows sanctions for things like filing frivolous positions or dragging out a case to run up costs. The district court found that both parties actually won on some issues and lost on others, and — importantly — that neither party had pursued the case without reasonable grounds or to harass the other, and that neither had taken an unwarranted position or needlessly prolonged the litigation. So the court denied fees under those provisions. The court separately found Joy was entitled to fees under a different divorce-fees statute (NRS 125.040), but that part of the case was not before the appellate court. Christopher appealed the denial of his own fee request. He argued that Joy's positions — asking for custody and relocation without meeting the requirements, asking for alimony while (he said) being deliberately underemployed, and asking him to pay travel costs even though she was the one moving — were frivolous, and that because he won on the big issues he should get his fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that whether a claim ultimately loses is not the same as whether it was frivolous or brought without reasonable grounds. Joy had testified at the hearing in support of her requests, and the record did not show her claims lacked any credible support. Because the district court had adequate grounds for its decision, the appellate court could not say the trial judge abused her discretion, and it affirmed (upheld) the denial of Christopher's fees.

Ryan and Marie are the divorced parents of three young children. After their 2019 separation, Marie was awarded primary physical and sole legal custody, and a psychologist evaluated Ryan, finding him unfit at the time and recommending therapy followed by gradual reunification with the children. Marie was permitted to relocate with the children to California. Ryan briefly had supervised in-person visits and then weekly virtual visits, but the visits stopped in June 2020 after Marie switched to a paid supervision platform that Ryan said he could not afford. In the years that followed, Ryan continued to seek treatment from multiple mental-health providers, several of whom reported he had made progress and recommended reunification. He sent diapers, wipes, money toward a medical procedure for one of the twins, and a pair of custom sneakers. He also emailed Marie's lawyer asking to see his children. He did not, however, formally move the court to modify custody, and he did not pay court-ordered child support, citing financial difficulties tied in part to a prior felony conviction. In late 2022, Marie filed a petition to terminate Ryan's parental rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court terminated Ryan's rights, finding he had abandoned and neglected the children and made only "token efforts" to be involved in their lives. The court relied on two statutes: NRS 128.107, which lists factors courts must consider in termination cases, and NRS 128.109, which creates a presumption that termination is in a child's best interest when the child has lived outside the home for a long time. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The majority held that NRS 128.107 does not apply when the children are in the physical custody of a parent (as opposed to foster care, a relative, or a guardian), and that NRS 128.109 applies only in cases brought under NRS Chapter 432B - the chapter governing child welfare cases involving the State. Because this was a private termination proceeding by one parent against the other, neither statute fit. The court also concluded that the evidence did not support any of the three parental-fault grounds. On abandonment, the court reasoned that the statutory presumption did not apply because the children were placed with Marie by court order, and even if it did, Ryan rebutted it by repeatedly requesting visits, sending gifts and support, and pursuing the treatment recommended by the custody evaluator. The court emphasized that financial inability to pay support cannot itself establish abandonment, and that an unrepresented parent's failure to navigate court procedures cannot be held against them in this context. On neglect, the court noted Marie testified the children were thriving in her care, so Ryan's conduct could not be deemed sufficiently harmful. On token efforts, Ryan's documented therapy, requests for visitation, and gifts were enough to defeat the finding. The court reversed the termination order, instructed the district court to order destruction of the amended birth certificates that had been issued (which had changed the children's last names), and sent the case back for further proceedings. Justice Lee concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority's reading of NRS 128.107, arguing the statute should apply whenever the parent whose rights are being considered does not have physical custody, even if the other parent does.