Nevada family-law case summaries

This case involves a father, Miguel E.C., and his five minor children. In March 2025, the State of Nevada filed a petition claiming the children needed protection. According to the petition, Miguel made numerous allegations - later found to be false - that the children had been sexually abused by their mother and/or her relatives. The petition said these false claims caused the children to undergo medical examinations and to take part in investigations of their mother and relatives, that Miguel appeared to have coached the children to make the false claims, and that Miguel may have a mental health condition driving his behavior. The children were removed from Miguel's care and placed with their mother. The district court held an evidentiary hearing (a court session where witnesses testify and evidence is presented). Miguel attended and testified. Other witnesses, including detectives who investigated the sexual-abuse allegations, also testified, and documents were introduced. Afterward, the court found that Miguel had abused and neglected the children by causing them mental injury that was not accidental. The court concluded that Miguel coached and coerced the children into making false abuse allegations as a way to try to gain custody, and that this caused the children emotional harm. The court then gave the mother sole custody, ended the agency's custody, gave Miguel supervised parenting time, said any future custody changes would have to go through a regular custody court, and closed the case. On appeal, Miguel argued three main things: that the district court's findings were wrong because the State presented false evidence, that his due process rights were violated because the court made him rush through his testimony, and that the judge was biased against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed. A key reason was a record problem: Miguel filed a certificate stating he was not requesting transcripts of the hearing, so the appeals court never received a written record of what was said. Under Nevada rules, when an appellant does not provide the necessary transcript, the appeals court assumes the missing transcript supports the lower court's decision. Because of that, the court could not meaningfully review Miguel's arguments about the evidence, and it noted that appeals courts do not re-weigh a trial court's decisions about which witnesses to believe. On due process, the court found Miguel had received notice of the hearing, appeared with his lawyer, and testified - and again, without a transcript, the court presumed the record supported how the trial judge handled the time for testimony. On bias, the court found Miguel had not shown the judge relied on outside information or displayed the kind of deep-seated hostility that would make a fair decision impossible. The opinion also addressed a jurisdictional objection from the State. The State argued the appeal should be dismissed because the order with the factual findings was not a final, appealable order. The court rejected that, explaining that the order placing the children with their mother and closing the case resolved everything and was therefore a final appealable order, which also allowed the court to review earlier interlocutory (non-final) decisions.

This case is about whether a child-welfare agency and the children themselves can appeal when a juvenile court dismisses a petition asking the court to protect the children from a parent. The petition here was filed under NRS Chapter 432B, the Nevada law that governs child-protection proceedings. After a hearing, the juvenile court found the abuse and neglect allegations against the father were not proven and threw the case out. CCDFS and the children tried to appeal that dismissal. The problem was a 2012 Nevada Supreme Court decision called In re A.B., which had said that orders coming out of juvenile proceedings involving child custody are not appealable - meaning the only way to challenge them in the Supreme Court was to file a writ of mandamus (a separate, more limited type of court request). The Supreme Court flagged this issue on its own and asked the parties to explain why the appeal should not be tossed out. The Supreme Court took a fresh look at the question and decided that In re A.B. got it wrong on this point. The court explained that Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 3A(b)(1) allows appeals from a "final judgment" entered by a district court, and that an order completely dismissing a child-protection case fits that definition because it ends the case and leaves nothing further for the court to decide. A juvenile court is part of the district court, so its final orders qualify. The father argued that a different rule, NRAP 3A(b)(7), which addresses appeals from certain child-custody orders that do not arise in juvenile court, blocks appeals from juvenile-court custody orders. The court rejected that reading. NRAP 3A(b)(7) by its terms simply does not cover juvenile-court custody orders; it does not strip away the appeal right that NRAP 3A(b)(1) provides for final judgments. The court therefore overruled In re A.B. in part - specifically, the part holding that all child-custody orders arising from juvenile proceedings are unappealable. The court was careful to limit its ruling: only orders that finally resolve NRS Chapter 432B proceedings are appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Interlocutory (mid-case) child-custody orders entered in those proceedings are still not appealable under this rule. Because the order in this case completely ended the child-protection proceedings, it is a final judgment, and the appeal may go forward. The court gave the appellants 60 days to file their opening brief.

Michael Martinelli and Michelle Lucero Del Real were in a romantic relationship that began in 2013, shortly after Del Real's son was born. Martinelli is not the child's biological father. The relationship ended in 2022 after, according to the opinion, Martinelli committed an act of domestic violence against Del Real in the presence of the child. In 2022, Martinelli filed a petition asking the court to grant him "nonparent visitation" - that is, court-ordered time with a child by someone who is not the child's parent. He claimed he had lived with the child, had a meaningful relationship with the child, acted as a de facto father, and that Del Real had unreasonably refused to let him see the child. Del Real opposed the petition. The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented) and set deadlines for discovery (the pretrial process of exchanging information). Before the hearing, Martinelli asked the court to stop Del Real from mentioning his arrests and domestic-violence incidents, and asked to reopen discovery to gather more information about the child's schooling and medical issues. Del Real, by then represented by free (pro bono) lawyers, opposed those requests, and separately asked the court to declare Martinelli a "vexatious litigant" - someone who misuses court proceedings to harass another person. The court denied Martinelli's two pretrial motions and held the evidentiary hearing, giving each side 90 minutes. Witnesses included two of the child's teachers, a family friend, and both Martinelli and Del Real. Del Real testified about an incident in which Martinelli slammed a door into her in front of the child (a video of this was shown to the court), about verbal abuse, and about Martinelli being arrested in Arizona for driving under the influence while the child was in the car. She also described the child's chronic medical condition (chronic pancreatitis) requiring frequent hospitalizations. The child's recorded interview indicated the child did not wish to visit Martinelli. The court ruled against Martinelli. Under Nevada law, when a parent has denied visitation, there is a legal presumption that giving visitation to a nonparent is not in the child's best interest, and the person seeking visitation must overcome that presumption with strong proof ("clear and convincing evidence"). The court found Martinelli did not meet that burden, citing the lack of positive emotional ties, his history of abusive behavior and addiction, the conflict in the relationship, and the child's stated preference not to continue a relationship with him. The court also found that Martinelli had filed the case to harass Del Real and had abused the discovery process, declared him a vexatious litigant, and ordered him to pay $5,000 in attorney fees to the Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada. After Martinelli filed a motion to set aside the judgment and a motion for a new trial, the court denied both and ordered an additional $500 in attorney fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld every part of the trial court's decision. It found the trial court acted within its discretion on the discovery and evidence rulings, that substantial evidence supported the denial of visitation, that Martinelli had in fact been given a chance to oppose the vexatious-litigant request (he filed a written opposition), and that he had not shown the judge was biased.

Two people, Antwann B. and Jessica B., asked the Court of Appeals of Nevada to step in and stop or override what a lower court (the family division of the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County) was doing in a case involving child welfare under NRS Chapter 432B, which governs the protection of children from abuse and neglect. They filed their request without a lawyer, representing themselves. The type of relief they sought is called an "extraordinary writ" - specifically a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition. A writ of mandamus is a court order forcing a lower court or official to perform a duty the law requires, or to correct an arbitrary or capricious use of discretion. A writ of prohibition is an order stopping a lower court from acting beyond, or without, its jurisdiction (its legal authority to hear the case). The Court of Appeals explained that deciding whether to even consider this kind of petition is entirely within its own discretion, and that the people asking for the writ carry the burden of showing that such relief is justified. After reviewing the petition and the documents submitted with it, the court concluded that the petitioners had not shown that extraordinary relief was warranted, and it denied the petition. Because the court denied the petition, it also denied as moot (no longer requiring a decision) an emergency motion the petitioners had filed on October 24, 2025.

This case involves a baby, A.R., who was removed from her parents in 2022 because of neglect and abuse. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) initially placed her with her paternal aunt, Mary. Over time, A.R. also began spending weekends with her maternal grandmother, Ericka. Both relatives loved A.R., wanted to adopt her, and were considered fit caregivers. After the parents' rights were terminated by the court, the district court had to decide where A.R. should live permanently. Both the aunt and the grandmother were good options, and the district court found them "equally situated" in most respects. To break the tie, the court considered DFS's recommendation. DFS preferred the aunt's home because A.R. had developed a close, sibling-like bond with her cousin (the aunt's child), and DFS believed keeping that bond intact was best for A.R. The court placed A.R. with the aunt for adoption, while preserving the grandmother's role through a Post Adoptive Contact Agreement giving her alternating weekend visits and two weeks of summer vacation each year. The grandmother asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in through a writ of mandamus - a court order directing a lower court to perform a duty required by law. She argued the district court placed too much weight on DFS's recommendation, did not make sufficient findings, did not hear enough evidence, and improperly favored a "nuclear family" structure. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and denied the petition. It explained that, after parental rights are terminated, a different statute (NRS 128.110) governs placement, and that statute gives the agency holding the child's custody discretion in deciding placement. The district court is not bound by the agency's preference, but it must consider it as part of figuring out what is in the child's best interest, which always remains the paramount concern. Here, the district court did exactly that: it acknowledged it could override DFS, but found DFS's reasoning - protecting A.R.'s bond with her cousin - persuasive. The Supreme Court also concluded that the district court's findings were sufficient and that its decision was not based on a generic preference for "traditional" families but on the specific facts of A.R.'s relationships. Some of the grandmother's other arguments were treated as waived because she did not raise them in the district court.

This case arises from a child-welfare proceeding in Clark County. After 19-month-old K.T. died of head trauma and a leg fracture, the mother's boyfriend was arrested and charged with murder and child abuse. The mother, Tautiana Bellamy, told investigators she had witnessed the boyfriend abuse K.T. but did not protect the child. Concerned about Bellamy's ability to protect her surviving 4-year-old daughter, A.T., DFS took protective custody of A.T. and the District Attorney filed a petition alleging A.T. was an abused or neglected child. When the case came before the district court, Bellamy entered a "no-contest" plea to the petition. A no-contest plea means the person does not admit the allegations are true but agrees not to fight them; the court then proceeds as if the allegations were admitted. The District Attorney objected, saying Nevada's child-welfare statute (NRS 432B.530) only allows a parent to either admit or deny the allegations, not plead no contest, unless the prosecutor agrees as part of a negotiation. The district judge accepted the plea anyway, made clear there was no deal attached to it (the District Attorney was not giving up the right to use Bellamy's statements in any future criminal case), and treated the plea as the equivalent of an admission for the dependency case. DFS, the District Attorney, and the child asked the Nevada Supreme Court to step in by writ - an extraordinary order used when there is no ordinary appeal available. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because rulings under NRS Chapter 432B are not appealable, and the question of whether courts may accept no-contest pleas in these cases is an important legal issue. A majority of the Supreme Court ruled against the petitioners and denied the writ. The majority concluded that NRS 432B.530 says the court must give parties an "opportunity to admit or deny" the allegations, but does not strictly limit them to only those two responses. The majority found the statute ambiguous and looked to its purpose. Because Nevada's child-protection laws are designed to resolve cases quickly - delays harm children waiting for permanency - the majority held that allowing a no-contest plea serves that goal. A no-contest plea avoids a contested evidentiary hearing, lets DFS move forward with services and a reunification plan, and lets a parent avoid admitting to potentially criminal conduct (which could implicate the parent's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). The majority also rejected the argument that accepting the plea over the prosecutor's objection violated separation of powers. Charging decisions and plea negotiations belong to the executive branch, but here the district court was not negotiating, not dropping charges, and not giving Bellamy any assurances about a future criminal case. Bellamy pleaded no contest to the entire petition as filed. Three justices dissented. They read the statute as plainly limiting parents to admitting or denying the allegations - nothing more - and would have granted the writ.

H.B. is a minor who lost his father and, after a period of homelessness with his mother, began living with his uncle, Marques. Marques asked the family court to make him H.B.'s legal guardian. Marques disclosed up front that he had a felony conviction (for attempted murder, in 2008) and was on parole. H.B.'s paternal grandmother appeared at the hearing supporting Marques, and Marques said H.B.'s mother also supported the arrangement by text message. The district court denied the petition with prejudice for two reasons. First, the judge concluded that Marques's felony conviction automatically disqualified him from being a guardian. Second, the judge found that Marques had not properly served notice of his petition on H.B.'s mother and other close relatives, as Nevada's guardianship statutes require. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with H.B. and Marques on the first point. Reading the statute that lists the things a court must consider in deciding whether someone is fit to serve as guardian, the court held that a felony conviction is one factor the judge must weigh - but it is not an automatic bar. The Legislature did not write an automatic disqualification into the statute, and the court will not add one. Other factors the law requires the judge to consider include the child's preference, the relationship between the proposed guardian and the child, and, ultimately, what is in the child's best interest. Because the district court treated the felony as dispositive and never reached those other factors, that part of its analysis was wrong. On the second point, however, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court. Marques did not serve H.B.'s mother or other close relatives by mail, in person, or by publication, and he did not file the affidavit needed to authorize service by publication. The statute lets a judge excuse normal service in limited circumstances, but Marques did not meet those criteria either. The Supreme Court held that the district court was within its discretion to refuse to overlook the service failures. Because the service problem alone supports the denial, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Marques's guardianship petition. But it also instructed the district court to remove the words "with prejudice" from its order, because a denial for failure to serve is not a ruling on the merits. The practical effect is that Marques may file a new petition. If he does, the family court will have to evaluate his suitability using all the relevant statutory factors - not just his criminal record - and then, if it finds him suitable, decide whether the guardianship would be in H.B.'s best interest.

Ryan Stojack asked a lower court (the family division of the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County) for access to his minor child's therapy records. The district court denied that request. Stojack then asked the Nevada Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus — an extraordinary court order compelling a lower court to perform an act the law requires as a duty, or to correct an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. The Court of Appeals explained that this kind of writ is an extraordinary remedy, and that the appellate court has discretion over whether to even consider such a petition. When the lower court's decision was itself a matter of discretion — as discovery decisions typically are — the person seeking the writ carries a heavy burden. After reviewing the petition and the documents before it, the court concluded that Stojack had not shown that extraordinary intervention was warranted, and it denied the petition. The court also noted the general policy against considering writ petitions that challenge discovery decisions. The order does not discuss the underlying facts of the family case or the merits of the records request in any detail.

This case involves a grandmother, Donna Gilmore, who asked a family court to make her the legal guardian of her three-year-old granddaughter. A guardianship is a legal arrangement in which a court gives one person the authority and responsibility to care for another person who cannot fully care for themselves - here, a young child. Gilmore filed her petition in May 2023. She claimed the child's mother, Monica Fears, could not properly care for the child because Fears was often homeless, lacked steady work and a vehicle, and had a substance abuse problem. She also noted that the child's father was in jail and could not care for the child. Gilmore said the child had been living with her since May 2022, and she asked the court for temporary guardianship until the case was decided. The court granted the temporary guardianship while it looked into the situation. The court later held an evidentiary hearing - a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented so the judge can make findings of fact. Both women testified. Gilmore said she often babysat the child while Fears worked and disagreed with Fears' choices about who else babysat the child. Fears testified that the child had not moved in with Gilmore; instead, Gilmore had simply been the babysitter while Fears worked night shifts. Fears said she had a full-time job as a restaurant server, also worked part-time as a tattoo artist, had a residence, took the child to medical care when needed, and had a plan for childcare through a housemate. Fears denied having a substance abuse problem. She also explained that she had fainted at work in May 2023 (later diagnosed as a syncope, a temporary loss of consciousness) and was hospitalized, after which Gilmore filed for guardianship and kept the child from her. Under Nevada law, the person asking to become a guardian must prove that the guardianship is necessary by "clear and convincing evidence," which is a demanding standard of proof. The district court found Gilmore did not meet that standard. The court found there was no evidence that Fears could not provide the child's basic needs, no evidence Fears had a drug or alcohol problem, and no evidence of crimes or domestic violence. The court also found that Gilmore had not proven the child was out of Fears' care for the six months before the petition was filed, so a legal presumption that a parent is unsuitable (which can apply when a child has been out of a parent's care for that long) did not apply. Because Gilmore did not prove Fears was unsuitable or that a guardianship was necessary, the court denied the petition and directed that the child be returned to Fears. On appeal, Gilmore argued the court got the facts wrong and that it should have found Fears unfit and found that the child had lived with her since May 2022. The Court of Appeals explained that it generally does not re-weigh evidence or second-guess the trial judge's decisions about which witnesses to believe. It concluded that the district court's findings were supported by the evidence. Gilmore also argued the judge was biased - that the judge asked demeaning questions, used a condescending tone, and had made up her mind before hearing all the evidence. The Court of Appeals rejected this claim, explaining that a judge's rulings and conduct during a case generally do not show disqualifying bias unless they stem from something learned outside the courtroom or reveal deep-seated hostility that would make a fair decision impossible. The court found the record showed the judge listened to the testimony and considered the evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.

This case involves a custody dispute between two parents, Jennifer Crosier and Garrett Crosier, who married in Utah and had three children. After separating in 2017, Jennifer moved to Nevada with the children and Garrett moved to Colorado. Although they divorced in Utah in 2019, the parties agree that no Utah court ever issued a final custody decree. In April 2022, Jennifer filed a complaint in Nevada asking for sole legal and sole physical custody of all three children. In her complaint, Jennifer raised concerns about Garrett's alleged domestic violence, stating that he had a prior child abuse/neglect conviction from Utah and that the children were afraid of him. The two older children were interviewed by the Family Mediation Center (FMC) and described instances of alleged physical abuse by Garrett - one child said he slapped her and caused her to hit her head, and that he kicked the other child with a steel-toed boot; the other child said he picked her up and pulled her by her hair. Both older children said they preferred to stay with Jennifer in Nevada. At a single-day hearing in May 2023, both parents represented themselves without lawyers. The judge told the parties he would "take control of the questioning" to avoid wasting time, and the court itself questioned the parties and witnesses. The court admitted the FMC child interview report into evidence, but it never asked any questions about the abuse allegations in that report or the domestic violence claims from Jennifer's complaint. When Jennifer tried to raise the abuse issue in her closing argument, the court did not allow her to continue, stating she had offered "zero evidence" that Garrett abused the children. At the end of the hearing, the judge said he had to consider "certain factors in evaluating what is in a child's best interest," but he addressed only two of the twelve factors that Nevada law requires. The court decided the parents would share joint legal custody, that Jennifer would have primary physical custody of the two older children, and that Garrett would have primary physical custody of the youngest child in Colorado. The written custody decree that followed did not mention any of the twelve best interest factors and contained no factual findings about the children's best interest. A later post-decree order also failed to address those factors. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that when deciding custody, a court's only consideration is the best interest of the child, and the court must consider all twelve factors listed in the statute and put its findings in a written order that ties those findings to the custody decision. Because the decree here contained no such findings, the court found this was an abuse of discretion and reversible error. The court also held that the trial court should have addressed the domestic violence allegations - the FMC report containing those allegations was in evidence, yet the court never determined whether domestic violence occurred. Finally, the court held the trial judge should have analyzed whether moving the youngest child to Colorado was in that child's best interest, using a five-factor test from prior Nevada case law. The case was sent back for a new evidentiary hearing.

This case asks what happens to a Nevada parent's child-custody rights when she once pleaded guilty to felony child abuse but was later allowed to withdraw that guilty plea after completing probation. Yumila Cardenas-Garcia's six-year-old child, Z.K., was removed from her home by Clark County Department of Family Services after the home was found to be unlivable. In a separate criminal case, Cardenas-Garcia pleaded guilty to felony child abuse, neglect, or endangerment under NRS 200.508, and a judgment of conviction was entered. Her plea agreement was a so-called "drop-down" agreement: if she successfully completed probation, she could withdraw the felony plea and instead plead guilty to a misdemeanor (contributing to the delinquency of a minor). She did complete probation, and the felony plea was withdrawn. A Nevada statute, NRS 432B.555, says that if a court finds a parent has "ever been convicted" of felony child abuse, the court cannot return the child to that parent unless the parent proves by clear and convincing evidence that the child will not suffer physical or psychological harm from being returned. The district court held a hearing while Cardenas-Garcia still had the felony conviction on her record, found she had not met that high burden, and ruled the presumption against reunification applied. After her felony plea was withdrawn, she went back to the district court and asked it to find the statute no longer applied to her. The district court still found she had not rebutted the presumption. Cardenas-Garcia then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - an order from a higher court directing a lower court to do something it is legally required to do. She argued that because her felony conviction had been voided, she should not be treated as ever having been convicted, and the statute's higher burden should not apply. The Supreme Court disagreed and denied the writ. Focusing on the word "ever" in the statute, the majority held that NRS 432B.555 applies to anyone who at any point had a felony child-abuse conviction entered against them, even if that conviction is later withdrawn or voided. The court reasoned that the Legislature's choice of "ever" directs courts to look back at any conviction that was at any point on the record, regardless of its current legal status. The court emphasized, however, that the presumption is not a permanent bar. A parent can keep trying to rebut it as circumstances change, and district courts should "freely grant leave" to present new evidence when a party shows a significant change in circumstances - such as Cardenas-Garcia's successful completion of probation. Justice Bell dissented. She would have held that under existing Nevada precedent, a withdrawn guilty plea is treated as if it never existed, so Cardenas-Garcia legally has no felony conviction at all and the statute should not apply.

Two grandmothers in Las Vegas asked a Nevada district court to make them the legal guardians of their four grandchildren, saying the children had been living with them since March 2023 and were not safe with their mother and her new partner. The court initially denied the grandmothers' petition for procedural reasons (a service issue), and a new hearing was scheduled for April 2024 - several months away. While waiting for that hearing, the two oldest grandchildren, represented by appointed counsel, asked the court for a temporary guardianship - a short-term arrangement that would put their grandmothers in charge of them until the full hearing could happen. They said they were afraid to go back to their mother because of her new partner's history, that they might be unenrolled from school, and that they had been living with their grandmothers for nearly a year. Two days after they filed, the district court denied the request without holding a hearing, saying there was no emergency. The two children then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for an emergency order forcing the district court to reconsider. The Supreme Court agreed that the district court had not properly considered the request. Under Nevada law, when a parent has not had care, custody, and control of a child for the previous six months, there is a legal presumption that temporary guardianship is in the child's best interest and that the parent is unsuitable. The children had been out of their parents' care for well over six months, so those presumptions applied. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the district court appeared to have confused who was asking for the temporary guardianship - it was the two oldest children, not the grandmothers, so the fact that no one sought temporary guardianship over the two younger children was not a reason to deny the request. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to reconsider the petition on an expedited basis. It also noted that the district court could, if it preferred, require notice and hold a quick hearing rather than rule ex parte (without the other side present), so the mother and other interested parties would have a chance to respond.

This case concerns which state's courts have the authority to decide who should be appointed guardian of a young child, Y.U.G. The child was born in Las Vegas in June 2022 to Daron G. and Sway Dumes. When the child was about ten months old, the parents concluded they could not care for him because they did not have stable housing, so they entrusted him to his paternal aunt, Ladesha G., who lives in Compton, California. In April 2023, Ladesha took the child to live with her in California, while the parents stayed in Las Vegas. About three months later, in July 2023, Ladesha brought the child back to Las Vegas to obtain his birth certificate and social security card. While there, she filed a petition asking a Nevada court to appoint her as the child's guardian, and the parents consented. After filing, she returned to California with the child. At an October hearing, the district court raised a concern: because the child had been living in California after the petition was filed, the judge questioned whether a Nevada court had the power (called subject matter jurisdiction) to hear the case. The court then issued a written decision denying the petition, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because "California is the home state." The Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. It explained that Nevada law lets a Nevada court hear a child custody or guardianship matter if Nevada was the child's "home state" within six months before the case was filed, so long as the child is now outside Nevada but a parent still lives in Nevada. Here, the child had lived in Nevada from birth in June 2022 until moving to California in April 2023 — more than ten months — so Nevada was his home state. The guardianship petition was filed in July 2023, only about three months after the child moved, which is within the six-month window. And even though the child was in California when the petition was filed, both parents still lived in Las Vegas. Because all of those conditions were met, the court held that the Nevada district court did have jurisdiction and should not have denied the petition for lack of it. Because that conclusion resolved the appeal, the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the district court to proceed, and did not address the other issues Y.U.G. raised.

This case concerns a baby boy, D.M.F., who was born exposed to opiates and amphetamines. His parents admitted to methamphetamine use during pregnancy, so they agreed that the paternal grandmother, Yalonda, would care for the twins (D.M.F. and his brother A.F.) as a temporary guardian while they sought drug treatment. CPS investigated, allowed the babies to go home with Yalonda, and approved her as caregiver. About three months later, A.F. died from positional asphyxia after the parents fell asleep with him on a bed. Police and CPS investigated and found no abuse or neglect; the death was ruled a tragic accident. CPS did, however, find that the parents had relapsed on methamphetamine. Yalonda then promised to seek a formal court guardianship over the surviving twin, D.M.F., and CPS once again approved her as caregiver. About a month after A.F.'s death, Yalonda asked the district court to be appointed D.M.F.'s legal guardian. The court granted that petition without objection. Six months later, the district court received an ex parte communication (a behind-the-scenes message) from another judge who had learned of A.F.'s death from CPS records in a separate case. The court appointed an investigator and held a hearing about whether Yalonda had misrepresented things in her petition by not telling the court about A.F.'s death. After the hearing, the court issued an order removing Yalonda as guardian and terminating the guardianship altogether, and referred the matter to CPS. D.M.F., through counsel, appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court held that a district court does have power, on its own initiative, to remove a guardian and end a guardianship - it does not need someone to file a formal petition first. But the court must follow constitutional and statutory rules. The Supreme Court ruled the district court violated D.M.F.'s due process rights. Due process means a person must get fair notice and a real chance to be heard before the government takes away an important interest. Here, none of the court's orders clearly told D.M.F., Yalonda, or the parents that the court was considering the major step of removing the guardian and ending the guardianship. The investigator's report contained no recommendations, the hearing took no sworn testimony, and the participants were never clearly told what was on the table. The Supreme Court also held the district court abused its discretion. To remove a guardian, the court must find one of the conditions listed in NRS 159A.185(1) and then conduct a "best interests of the child" analysis using the factors in NRS 159A.186(2). To terminate a guardianship, the court must make specific findings under NSRG 10(A) about the child's health, whether a guardianship is still needed, less restrictive alternatives, and best interests. The district court did none of these things. It also relied on factual mistakes - for example, finding A.F. died "only days" before the petition was filed when in reality it was a month before, and finding A.F. died "within a few days" of Yalonda becoming temporary guardian when she had cared for the twins for three months without incident. On the CPS issue, the Supreme Court held the district court did not exceed its authority. Although the district court expressed opinions about what CPS should do, the actual order simply referred the matter to CPS for "action as they deem fit," and that was permissible. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the lower court to reinstate Yalonda as guardian (if she is willing and able). If the district court still wants to consider removal or termination, it must give clear notice, hold a full hearing, and make the findings the statutes require.

Ahed Said Senjab and Mohamad Abulhakim Alhulaibi are Syrian citizens who married in Saudi Arabia and have one child. In 2018, Alhulaibi came to Las Vegas on an F-1 student visa to attend UNLV. In January 2020, Senjab and the child joined him on F-2 dependent visas. Two months later, Senjab filed for divorce in Clark County, also seeking spousal support, child custody, and child support. Alhulaibi moved to dismiss, arguing the Nevada court had no power to hear the case. Nevada's divorce-jurisdiction statute, NRS 125.020, requires that at least one spouse have been a "resident" of Nevada for at least six weeks before filing. Older Nevada Supreme Court decisions had said "residence" in this statute meant the same thing as "domicile" - a true, permanent home where a person intends to stay. Alhulaibi argued that because their student-related visas required them to maintain a foreign residence, they could not legally form the intent to remain in Nevada, so neither spouse could be domiciled here. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. Reading the statute's words plainly, the court held that "residence" means just that - residence - not domicile. The statute itself uses the two terms separately, treating them as different. A separate Nevada statute, NRS 10.155, defines legal residence as the place where a person has been physically present during the period for which residence is claimed. Because the district court had already found that Senjab and Alhulaibi were physically present in Nevada for at least six weeks before the complaint was filed, the residency requirement was met, and the district court had jurisdiction to hear the divorce. The court sent the case back to the district court to proceed with the divorce action. The court did not decide whether F-2 visa holders can or cannot establish domicile, because that question was no longer necessary to resolve the case. The court also did not address the custody and support issues, since the district court had not ruled on them.

This case asks who is allowed to run the trial when the State seeks to permanently sever a parent's legal relationship with her child. In the Eighth Judicial District (Clark County), such trials had often been conducted by a "hearing master" - a court-appointed lawyer (not a judge) who hears evidence, makes findings, and recommends a result to a district judge, who then reviews the record and makes the final decision. The Nevada Supreme Court held that this two-step approach is not allowed for termination of parental rights (TPR) trials. A district judge - not a hearing master - must preside over the trial in the first instance. The underlying facts: Tahja L. was a teenager when she brought her six-month-old daughter L.L.S. to a Department of Family Services (DFS) office, hoping to place her temporarily while Tahja finished high school. DFS instead filed a neglect petition, placed L.L.S. in foster care, and eventually moved to terminate Tahja's parental rights. The case was assigned to a hearing master. L.L.S.'s lawyer objected, arguing that a district judge should hear the trial; Tahja did not join that objection. The juvenile court overruled the objection. After the originally assigned master became a district judge, a different hearing master conducted the trial, recommended termination, and the district judge - after watching the entire video of the trial - terminated Tahja's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under Nevada law, TPR proceedings under NRS Chapter 432B must be conducted by a "court," and although the statutes define "court" to include a hearing master under certain circumstances, that inclusion only works if the master's role is consistent with the Nevada Constitution. The court held that having a master preside over a TPR trial violates a parent's right to procedural due process, because the right at stake - the permanent loss of one's child - is so serious that the parent must present her case directly to the judge who will decide it, not to an intermediary whose findings are then reviewed from a recording. The court applied the three-part federal test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing (1) the parent's interest, (2) the risk that the procedure used will produce a wrong result, and (3) the government's interest in efficiency. The court described a parent's interest in keeping her child as among the strongest interests the law recognizes, comparing termination to a "civil death penalty." It found that having a master, rather than the judge, see witnesses face-to-face increases the risk of error, and that the State's efficiency interests are not significantly served, because the district judge still has to review the entire record. The court also pointed to recent legislative history in which the Eighth Judicial District's Chief Judge told lawmakers the district was specifically seeking new judges to "eliminate the use of hearing masters" in dependency cases. The court therefore reversed the termination order and sent the case back for a new TPR trial before a district judge. Three justices dissented.

This case involves the State's effort to permanently end a father's legal relationship with his young son. Marcus and the child's mother, Dana, were both incarcerated when the child, T.M.R., was an infant. Marcus had pleaded guilty to felony coercion after an incident in which he hit Dana's 100-year-old great-grandmother, Gladys, and damaged her home. With both parents in custody, Nevada's Department of Family Services (DFS) placed T.M.R. in foster care and eventually petitioned to terminate the parents' rights so the child could be adopted. At trial, the State surprised Marcus by calling Gladys to testify even though it had never formally listed her as a trial witness in the manner Nevada's civil discovery rules normally require. Marcus asked the court to exclude her testimony because she had not been disclosed at least 45 days before trial as required by NRCP 16.2(e)(4). The trial judge ruled that NRCP 16.2's disclosure rules do not apply to termination of parental rights cases and let Gladys testify. After hearing all the evidence, the court terminated Marcus's parental rights. The Nevada Supreme Court used this appeal to clear up an ambiguity in the civil rules. The Court explained that Nevada has three related rules governing when parties must disclose their witnesses: NRCP 16.1 covers most civil cases (but exempts family-court cases), NRCP 16.2 covers divorces and similar matters, and NRCP 16.205 covers paternity and custody disputes between unmarried parents. None of the rules explicitly says it applies to a case to terminate parental rights. Reading the rules together, however, the Court concluded that NRCP 16.2's witness-disclosure rules do apply in termination cases. The Court reasoned that any other reading would allow "trial by ambush" - a surprise witness used against a parent facing what the Court described as "the equivalent of the civil death penalty." So the trial judge was wrong to admit Gladys's testimony without proper notice. But the Supreme Court went on to hold that the mistake was "harmless" - meaning it did not change the outcome - because, even setting Gladys's testimony aside, there was more than enough other evidence to justify ending Marcus's parental rights. That evidence included: T.M.R. had been out of his parents' home for more than 14 months (which under Nevada law creates a legal presumption that termination is in the child's best interests); T.M.R. had bonded with his foster family, who wanted to adopt him; Marcus had failed to make timely progress on the case plan DFS designed to help him reunify with his son; Marcus minimized his drug use and blamed his relapses on Dana; he refused multiple drug tests; and he denied having anger problems despite the underlying violent incident. Because that evidence amply supported the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Marcus's parental rights.

This case is about whether a baby in foster care should be presumed to belong with her biological sister, even though that sister has already been adopted by another family. Baby Girl W. was born in October 2017 and was quickly placed in foster care as a child in need of protection. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) decided that adoption was the right long-term plan for her. Baby Girl W. has a 3-year-old biological half-sister named Vivian, who was previously adopted by Amy Mulkern in Massachusetts. DFS itself contacted Amy in early 2018 to ask whether she would adopt Baby Girl W. so the sisters could grow up together. Amy went through the interstate placement process and was approved as a possible placement. But DFS ultimately concluded that Baby Girl W. had bonded with her current foster parents - who are also willing to adopt her - and recommended she stay with them. Amy went to the Nevada district court handling the dependency case. The court allowed Amy and the foster parents to participate as "persons with a special interest," meaning they can recommend a placement and testify at the placement hearing. But the district court also ruled that, because Vivian had been adopted, she was no longer legally Baby Girl W.'s sibling for purposes of a Nevada statute - NRS 432B.550(5)(a) - that tells courts to presume placing siblings together is in a foster child's best interest. The district court therefore decided that presumption did not apply. Amy and Vivian asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order forcing the lower court to do something it is required by law to do. They wanted the Supreme Court to make the district court apply the sibling presumption when deciding where Baby Girl W. should live. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Amy and Vivian on that point. The court explained that Nevada law repeatedly emphasizes keeping siblings together - in initial protective placements, in placements after parental rights are terminated, in adoptions, and in custody decisions. No Nevada statute says that adoption erases sibling status for placement purposes. Because the Legislature has stressed sibling relationships so consistently, the court concluded it would not assume - without clearer instruction - that lawmakers wanted the presumption to vanish the moment one sibling is adopted. The court therefore directed the district court to apply the rebuttable sibling presumption in NRS 432B.550(5) when deciding where to place Baby Girl W. "Rebuttable" means the presumption can still be overcome - the district court can still decide, based on evidence, that placement with the sibling is not in the baby's best interest. The court did not order any other relief, noting that the district court had already considered the Mulkerns' arguments, included Amy as a possible placement, and invited her to participate at the upcoming placement hearing. The court also added a footnote making clear that its ruling does not change separate Nevada rules about confidentiality, visitation, or inheritance after adoption, and does not require DFS to do more than its statutory duty to look for relatives.

This case involves the termination of parental rights of a mother and father over their four children. The case began in December 2013 when the oldest child, then-fifteen-year-old S.L., showed up at school with a black eye and told a friend that her father, Donald, had hit her. Although S.L. initially told Child Protective Services that she had hit her eye on a cabinet, an investigation revealed multiple bruises and abrasions consistent with abuse. All four children were removed from the home in January 2014 and eventually placed together in a foster home. Once safely in foster care, the children disclosed years of abuse. At trial, S.L. testified that Donald had been abusing her since around third grade. The abuse she described included being hit with a belt and buckle, having her wrist cut with a knife, being shot with a BB gun, having a tooth knocked out, being jumped on while Donald wore work boots until she passed out, being made to stand on her head for thirty minutes, being denied food, and being treated differently from the other children. S.L. testified that her mother, Melissa, knew about the abuse and covered S.L.'s facial injuries with makeup. The children were also coached to repeat false stories about how the injuries occurred. Donald and Melissa entered no-contest pleas to the protective custody petition and were given case plans. They participated in assessments and therapy. However, throughout the process, both parents continued to insist that S.L.'s injuries were self-inflicted. Recorded jail calls captured Melissa calling S.L. a "killer kid" with "a brain of a fucking peanut." A psychological assessment found both parents at high risk to abuse or neglect again. On appeal, the parents argued that taking away their parental rights because they refused to admit the abuse violated their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination - the constitutional protection against being forced to confess to a crime. The Nevada Supreme Court had recently addressed a similar issue in a case called A.D.L., where it ruled that a parent cannot be forced to admit a crime under threat of losing her children. The Court rejected the parents' argument here. It distinguished A.D.L., where a single accidental-looking injury was at issue and the mother had otherwise satisfied her therapy requirements. In this case, the Court explained, the abuse was severe, repeated, and stretched over years, and the parents had not engaged in meaningful therapy that would address the abuse and ensure the children's safety if returned home. The Court drew a line: parents cannot be compelled to admit a crime, but they can be required to engage in genuine therapy aimed at protecting their children. Losing children for failing to undergo such therapy, the Court said, "is simply a consequence of the reality that it is unsafe for children to be with parents who are abusive and violent." The Court also affirmed that there was enough evidence to support the district court's findings that the parents were unfit, had failed to adjust, had made only token efforts toward reunification, and posed a risk of serious injury to the children. Because the children had been outside the home for 30 months at the time of trial, a legal presumption applied that the parents had only made token efforts, and the Court agreed they failed to rebut that presumption. Finally, the Court agreed that termination served the children's best interests, noting that the children had bonded with and integrated into a foster family willing to adopt them.

This case involves a Nevada family in which the oldest child, S.L., suffered severe physical and emotional abuse over a period of years. The abuse came to light in December 2013 when S.L., then fifteen, arrived at school with a black eye and told a friend that her stepfather Donald had hit her. Although S.L. initially told Child Protective Services that she had hit her eye on a cabinet, an investigation found multiple bruises and abrasions consistent with abuse. All four children were removed from the home in January 2014 and placed with the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS). Once in foster care, the children began describing what had happened at home. S.L. later testified that Donald had abused her since third grade — hitting her with a belt and buckle, cutting her wrist with a knife, shooting her hand with a BB gun, knocking out a front tooth, jumping on her chest while wearing work boots until she passed out, making her stand on her head for 30 minutes, and denying her food. She said her mother Melissa knew about the abuse and helped cover bruises with make-up, and that Donald made the children rehearse stories to tell outsiders. Donald and Melissa entered no-contest pleas to the protective custody petition and were given case plans. They attended assessments and therapy programs, but throughout the process they continued to insist that S.L.'s injuries were self-inflicted. A psychological assessment rated both parents at high risk to abuse or neglect again. Recorded jailhouse phone calls captured Melissa calling S.L. a "killer kid" and saying she "has a brain of a fucking peanut." After a trial, the district court terminated both parents' rights. On appeal, the parents made a constitutional argument: they said they could not be punished — by losing their children — simply for refusing to admit to a crime, because the Fifth Amendment protects people from being forced to incriminate themselves. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that argument here. The court explained that, under its earlier decision In re Parental Rights as to A.D.L., parents indeed cannot have their rights terminated solely because they refuse to confess. But the court drew a line: parents can be required to engage in meaningful therapy designed to make sure the children will be safe at home, and a failure to make real progress in therapy is a different thing from a refusal to confess. Here, the court said, the parents' rights were not terminated merely because they would not admit the abuse — they were terminated because the abuse was extensive and ongoing, the parents had not meaningfully addressed it in therapy, the assessments showed a high risk of repeat abuse, and the therapist who supported reunification had never seen the children's injuries and believed the abuse had not happened. The court also held that there was strong evidence supporting termination on the statutory grounds — parental unfitness, failure to adjust, token efforts, and risk of serious injury — and that termination was in the children's best interests, given that they had bonded with a foster family willing to adopt them, and the two younger children's wish to return home was conditioned on the violence stopping.

This case arose after the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) received an anonymous hotline call in April 2010 alleging that Keaundra D.'s infant son, C.L.B., Jr., had been burned on the face. Keaundra told investigators that the burn occurred when her two-year-old daughter, A.D.L., reported that C.L.B., Jr. had "tried to kiss" a hot iron that fell off a dresser while Keaundra was in another room. DFS removed both children from Keaundra's care. One physician who examined the child in person, Dr. Neuman, found "no evidence of abuse." A different doctor, Dr. Mehta, who reviewed only photographs, opined the burn was deliberate. The juvenile court found the injury was nonaccidental and ordered Keaundra to follow a "case plan" - a list of steps she had to complete to get her children back. She maintained housing and a job, kept in touch with DFS, completed parenting classes, and finished a physical-abuse assessment and therapy. Her therapist testified that her risk of reoffending was low and that she showed none of the signs typical of an abusive parent. DFS itself reported that she had "successfully completed her case plan and has the knowledge and tools to effectively parent her children." But DFS still wanted her parental rights terminated, and the district court still terminated them, for one reason: Keaundra would not admit that she had deliberately held the iron to her son's face. Her case plan required her to "articulate" the "sequence of events" leading to the abuse "as sustained by the Court." Because she insisted the burn was accidental, the court treated her as out of compliance. DFS confirmed at trial that, had Keaundra admitted intentional abuse, it would not have sought termination. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people from being forced to incriminate themselves, not just in criminal trials but in any proceeding where their answers might be used against them in a future criminal case. Admitting that one held a hot iron to a child's face would expose a person to prosecution for child abuse under Nevada law (NRS 200.508). The court held that a parent cannot be forced to choose between admitting a crime and losing her children - that choice is unconstitutionally coercive. The court drew a line: a juvenile court may require a parent to participate in meaningful therapy, even if therapy works better when a parent acknowledges past conduct, and a parent who refuses meaningful therapy may face consequences. But a court cannot require, as a condition of keeping parental rights, that the parent expressly admit to a crime. The court also held that the evidence did not support termination on its own merits. Nevada law presumes termination is in a child's best interest when the child has been out of the home for 14 of 20 consecutive months, and presumes a parent has made only "token efforts" in similar circumstances. The court found Keaundra rebutted both presumptions: she stayed in regular phone contact, her mother brought the children to visit, A.D.L. cried and begged to go home to her mother, Keaundra helped support the children financially, and after the first termination order the children waited 17 months in foster care before being placed with relatives. Without the presumptions, there was not substantial evidence to terminate.

Wesley and Maria Lewis divorced in 2011 and shared joint physical custody of their child. Wesley was ordered to pay child support. In 2013, after Maria asked the court to enforce the support obligation, the district court found Wesley in contempt for not paying, entered a judgment for arrears, and required him to take the child to tutoring classes and pay half of the cost. In 2014, Maria asked the court to modify custody and again to enforce the prior orders. After a hearing where Wesley represented himself, the district court awarded Maria primary physical custody, kept the tutoring requirement in place, and held Wesley in contempt again - this time sentencing him to a total of 80 days in jail for missed support payments and missed tutoring trips. The court stayed (paused) the jail sentence on the condition that Wesley "follow the Orders of the Court." Wesley appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed three main questions. First, was the contempt order "civil" or "criminal"? This matters because the Sixth Amendment right to a court-appointed lawyer applies only to criminal proceedings. Civil contempt is meant to coerce someone into complying (for example, "you sit in jail until you pay"). Criminal contempt is meant to punish someone for past disobedience. The court explained that for a contempt order with a fixed jail term to count as civil, it must contain a "purge clause" - language that lets the contemnor get out of the punishment by complying with the order (for example, paying what is owed). Wesley's order had no purge clause: if his stay were lifted, he had no described path to avoid or shorten jail by paying. The court therefore held the order was criminal in nature and that Wesley's Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he had no lawyer at the contempt proceedings. The contempt order was vacated, and counsel must be appointed on remand if Wesley is found indigent. Second, did the district court properly modify custody? The Supreme Court said no. Nevada law forbids using a custody change to punish a parent for disobeying court orders. The district court's written and oral explanations leaned heavily on Wesley's failure to pay support, pay medical insurance, and pay tutoring costs - in other words, his disobedience. The district court also failed to make specific findings on each of the best-interest-of-the-child factors required by NRS 125.480(4) (2009). For both reasons, the custody modification was reversed, and because the child support modification was based on the custody modification, it was also reversed. Third, did the district court err in continuing the tutoring obligation? The Supreme Court said no. The 2013 order required tutoring until the child tested at or above grade level "as tested by [the tutoring school]." She had not yet met that benchmark in math at the tutoring school, even though she did well on Clark County School District tests. The tutoring obligation was therefore affirmed. The court also rejected Wesley's claim of judicial bias, finding nothing in the record that would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge's impartiality.

This case involves the termination of a father's parental rights to his two surviving children. Between 2006 and 2011, the family experienced seven separate incidents in which one of the three children swallowed foreign objects such as coins, magnets, and batteries. All occurred while the father, Arli, was at work and the mother, Abigail, was home with the children. One son, J.M., died in 2006 from undetermined causes. After three-year-old E.M.M. required surgery to remove a large battery lodged in his throat, doctors became concerned that Abigail was forcing the children to swallow objects and contacted child protective services. The doctors compared the size of the battery, for a child E.M.M.'s age, to an adult swallowing a golf ball. In November 2011, DFS removed A.P.M. and E.M.M. from the home and placed them in foster care. The juvenile court gave each parent a "case plan" - a written list of things they had to do (such as parenting classes and counseling) to try to get their children back. Arli completed his case plan quickly. Even so, in December 2012, DFS asked the court to terminate both parents' rights permanently. After a five-day hearing, the district court ordered termination, finding that Arli had been neglectful by not taking action to protect his children after the repeated swallowing incidents - including continuing to leave them alone with Abigail - and that termination was in the children's best interests. Abigail died while the appeal was pending, leaving only Arli's appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed two new legal questions. First, it held that finishing a court-ordered case plan does not, by itself, prevent a court from terminating parental rights. A completed case plan can be persuasive evidence in the parent's favor, but Nevada law does not make it a shield against termination if the other legal grounds are satisfied. Second, it interpreted a Nevada statute that creates two legal presumptions when a child has lived outside the home "for 14 months of any 20 consecutive months": (1) the parent is presumed to have made only token efforts, and (2) termination is presumed to be in the child's best interest. Arli argued the district court had to wait the full 20 months before applying these presumptions. The Supreme Court disagreed - once the 14-month threshold is hit, the presumptions can apply right away. Here the children had been out of the home about 17 months, which was enough. Finally, the court held that "substantial evidence" - meaning enough credible evidence that a reasonable factfinder could agree - supported termination. The court pointed to Arli's failure to take protective action after seven serious swallowing incidents, his limited relationship with the children, and the foster parent's testimony that she had a close relationship with the children and wished to adopt them. The court noted that even with Abigail's death, Arli remained "unable to protect his children from danger, swallowing or otherwise." Two justices dissented in whole or in part. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Cherry, would have remanded for a new best-interests hearing because Abigail - the apparent source of the danger - had died and Arli had completed his case plan. Justice Saitta agreed with most of the majority opinion but wrote separately to dissent on the parental-fault finding, viewing Arli's mistaken belief about Abigail and his completed case plan as not enough to amount to neglect.