Nevada family-law case summaries

Egan Walker and Laura Latimer divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During the marriage, Walker had worked as a deputy district attorney and earned about 8.54 years of credits in Nevada's Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS). As part of the divorce, the couple signed a marital settlement agreement that gave Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits accrued through June 1, 2001. To secure her share, the agreement called for a "qualified domestic relations order" (QDRO) - a court order recognized by retirement plans that directs how benefits are split. The QDRO required Walker to choose "Option 2" at retirement, which is a payment plan where the retiree gets a smaller monthly check during life so that, after death, a designated beneficiary continues receiving the same amount for life. After the divorce, Walker remarried, then later returned to public service as a court master and ultimately as a district court judge. When he became a judge, he had a one-time choice to keep his retirement benefits in PERS or move them into the Judicial Retirement System (JRS). He chose JRS and named his current wife as his beneficiary. Years later, when planning for retirement, Walker discovered that PERS and JRS had historically allowed only one person to be named as an Option 2 beneficiary. That created a problem: Latimer was contractually entitled to be an Option 2 beneficiary for her share, but Walker also wanted his current wife to be an Option 2 beneficiary for the rest. Walker asked the district court to sort it out. The district court agreed Walker could name both his ex-wife and current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries, but it also said Latimer was entitled only to 4.25 years of PERS credits and got nothing from the JRS account. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the relevant Nevada statute does not actually prohibit naming more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court read the statute alongside other Nevada laws protecting a former spouse's interest in retirement benefits, and concluded that allowing two Option 2 beneficiaries best honors what the parties bargained for in the divorce: Latimer keeps her contracted-for share, and the current wife receives the rest. The court was not persuaded by PERS's arguments that federal tax law or actuarial complexity required a single-beneficiary rule. But the Supreme Court disagreed with the part of the order that gave Latimer credits in a PERS account that no longer exists. Because Walker had moved his PERS service credits into JRS, his old PERS account was closed, so awarding Latimer 4.25 years of credits in that closed account was, in the court's words, awarding her "a portion of nothing." The court held that when an ex-spouse has a protected interest in PERS retirement benefits and the member then transfers those benefits to JRS, the ex-spouse's interest follows the money into JRS. The case was sent back to the district court to fix that part of the order.

Noune Davitian-Kostanian and Varoujan Kostanian divorced in 2012 after more than 25 years of marriage. Their stipulated divorce decree required Varoujan to pay Noune alimony for ten years (ending October 1, 2021) and to pay child support for their youngest son, Alex, who has autism, until he turned 18 (or graduated high school at 19). Alex turned 18 in 2015, and child support stopped at that time. One day before Varoujan's last alimony payment was due, Noune filed a motion asking the family court to (1) extend or modify alimony, and (2) restart child support for Alex as a disabled adult. The district court denied both requests. On child support, the court said it had no power to act because Alex was already an adult and support had ended years earlier. On alimony, the court found Noune had not shown a "change in circumstances." The Nevada Supreme Court partly agreed and partly disagreed. On child support, the Court held the district court was wrong to say it lacked jurisdiction. Nevada has a special statute, NRS 125B.110, that requires a parent to keep supporting a handicapped child past age 18 if the handicap arose before adulthood and the child cannot become self-supporting. Nothing in that statute requires the parent seeking support to ask before the child turns 18, and nothing imposes a deadline. The fact that more than five years had passed since Alex's child support ended is just one factor for the lower court to weigh, not a bar. The Court sent the case back so the district court can make findings about whether Alex qualifies for continued support. On alimony, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. NRS 125.150(8) says alimony "may" be modified on a showing of changed circumstances, and a 20-percent change in the paying spouse's gross monthly income triggers a review - but does not force the court to actually change the alimony. The district court considered Noune's arguments and reasonably concluded she had not adequately supported her claim of changed circumstances. That decision was within the trial court's discretion.

Greg and Heidi Pelkola divorced in 2014 and share legal custody of their three children, with Heidi having primary physical custody. After the divorce, Heidi obtained court permission under Nevada's relocation statute (NRS 125C.006) to move with the children from Nevada to Arizona. In October 2019, she asked the district court for permission to move again, this time from Arizona to Ohio. Greg did not consent. The district court told Heidi she did not actually need permission for this second move, reasoning that the Nevada statute only governed her original move out of Nevada. The court nevertheless granted permission and made limited findings about how the Ohio move would affect Greg's visitation. Greg appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with him on two points. First, the court read the statute's words literally: NRS 125C.006 requires permission whenever a custodial parent intends to relocate the child "to a place outside of" Nevada, and that language covers a move from one out-of-state location (Arizona) to another (Ohio), not just a move directly out of Nevada. The court noted that the opposite reading would let a parent who had moved with permission to a nearby state then move anywhere in the world - even Japan - without notice to the other parent. Second, because the relocation statute did apply, the district court was required by NRS 125C.007 to make specific findings on a list of factors, including whether there was a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, whether the move served the children's best interests, and whether the move offered an actual advantage to the relocating parent and child. If those threshold factors are met, the court must then weigh additional factors about quality of life, motives, and visitation. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not make the required findings and so abused its discretion by granting the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back so the district court can hold an evidentiary hearing and issue specific findings on each applicable factor. The court also reversed the attorney-fee award tied to the relocation petition and instructed the lower court to recalculate it as necessary.