Nevada family-law case summaries

Michael Martinelli and Michelle Lucero Del Real were in a romantic relationship that began in 2013, shortly after Del Real's son was born. Martinelli is not the child's biological father. The relationship ended in 2022 after, according to the opinion, Martinelli committed an act of domestic violence against Del Real in the presence of the child. In 2022, Martinelli filed a petition asking the court to grant him "nonparent visitation" - that is, court-ordered time with a child by someone who is not the child's parent. He claimed he had lived with the child, had a meaningful relationship with the child, acted as a de facto father, and that Del Real had unreasonably refused to let him see the child. Del Real opposed the petition. The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented) and set deadlines for discovery (the pretrial process of exchanging information). Before the hearing, Martinelli asked the court to stop Del Real from mentioning his arrests and domestic-violence incidents, and asked to reopen discovery to gather more information about the child's schooling and medical issues. Del Real, by then represented by free (pro bono) lawyers, opposed those requests, and separately asked the court to declare Martinelli a "vexatious litigant" - someone who misuses court proceedings to harass another person. The court denied Martinelli's two pretrial motions and held the evidentiary hearing, giving each side 90 minutes. Witnesses included two of the child's teachers, a family friend, and both Martinelli and Del Real. Del Real testified about an incident in which Martinelli slammed a door into her in front of the child (a video of this was shown to the court), about verbal abuse, and about Martinelli being arrested in Arizona for driving under the influence while the child was in the car. She also described the child's chronic medical condition (chronic pancreatitis) requiring frequent hospitalizations. The child's recorded interview indicated the child did not wish to visit Martinelli. The court ruled against Martinelli. Under Nevada law, when a parent has denied visitation, there is a legal presumption that giving visitation to a nonparent is not in the child's best interest, and the person seeking visitation must overcome that presumption with strong proof ("clear and convincing evidence"). The court found Martinelli did not meet that burden, citing the lack of positive emotional ties, his history of abusive behavior and addiction, the conflict in the relationship, and the child's stated preference not to continue a relationship with him. The court also found that Martinelli had filed the case to harass Del Real and had abused the discovery process, declared him a vexatious litigant, and ordered him to pay $5,000 in attorney fees to the Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada. After Martinelli filed a motion to set aside the judgment and a motion for a new trial, the court denied both and ordered an additional $500 in attorney fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld every part of the trial court's decision. It found the trial court acted within its discretion on the discovery and evidence rulings, that substantial evidence supported the denial of visitation, that Martinelli had in fact been given a chance to oppose the vexatious-litigant request (he filed a written opposition), and that he had not shown the judge was biased.

Irina and Donovan Hansen married in 2007 and have one child. During the marriage Donovan worked as a firefighter (later a battalion chief) for the city of North Las Vegas, while Irina initially worked as a real-estate agent, became a stay-at-home mother, and later obtained a cosmetology license and opened a salon using a home-equity loan. When the marriage broke down, Donovan filed for divorce in 2019. The case went to trial in 2021, where Donovan had a lawyer and Irina represented herself. The trial court divided the couple's property, set child support and alimony, and awarded joint legal custody with Irina having primary physical custody. Irina appealed, arguing the trial court got several financial issues wrong and was biased against her. The Court of Appeals of Nevada rejected each argument and affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decision. On child support, Irina argued the court used inaccurate figures for Donovan's income. The appeals court explained that trial judges decide disputed facts and weigh witness credibility, and appellate courts do not second-guess those calls when they are supported by adequate evidence. Donovan's pay stubs, tax documents, and testimony supported the court's finding that his gross monthly income was $15,376.19, which produced a child support order of $1,445 per month. On alimony, Irina wanted at least $6,000 per month rather than the $3,000 per month for 60 months she received. The appeals court noted trial courts have broad discretion to award alimony that is "just and equitable." The trial court found Irina could earn about $3,000 per month from her cosmetology work and salon, that her reasonable post-divorce expenses were about $5,500, and considered her child support - and concluded $3,000 per month for five years was appropriate. The appeals court found this supported by the evidence. On property division, Irina argued Donovan got an unequal share without proper findings, that she should have kept the marital home, and that Donovan wasted community assets. The appeals court explained that community property is generally split equally, that the trial court found much of Irina's testimony about asset values not credible, that selling the marital home made sense given the mortgage and home-equity loan on it, and that Irina had not proven waste. It also upheld the finding that money in Donovan's deferred compensation account before the marriage ($87,992.62) was his separate property. On the pension issue, Irina wanted to be named the survivor beneficiary on Donovan's PERS (Public Employees' Retirement System) benefits. The appeals court explained that under Nevada law a divorce decree does not have to give a former spouse a survivor beneficiary interest, and the trial court permissibly let Donovan choose his survivor beneficiary at retirement while still splitting the community interest in the pension equally. On attorney fees, Irina argued she should have received an amount matching what Donovan spent. The trial court noted both sides spent substantial sums, that some of Irina's spending reflected her "stated intent to drag this case out for her financial advantage," but that there was a significant income disparity, and awarded her $10,000. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in declining to award more. Finally, on the bias claim, the appeals court held Irina had not shown the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" required to establish bias.

This case comes out of a divorce that was finalized in 2014. Years later, two competing requests were before the family court at the same time: Matthew's request to change the child custody arrangement, and Melissa's request for permission to relocate with the couple's minor child. The family court issued an order that denied Matthew's request to modify custody. But that same order did not finish the job — it stated that a further evidentiary hearing (a hearing where evidence is presented) should be scheduled to consider Melissa's request to move away with the child. In other words, the custody-related questions in the case were not fully wrapped up. Matthew tried to appeal the denial of his custody-modification request. Before deciding the merits, the appellate court examined whether it even had the authority — its "jurisdiction" — to hear the appeal at this stage. Generally, a party can only appeal after a court issues a decision that fully resolves the matter, not a decision that leaves parts of the dispute still pending. This is meant to avoid "piecemeal" appeals, where a single case produces multiple separate trips to the appellate court. Matthew argued the order he was challenging was the final judgment in the case and therefore appealable. Melissa argued the order was not appealable and the appeal should be dismissed. The court agreed with Melissa. It explained that the true final judgment in the case was the 2014 divorce decree, and that both parties' later requests were "post-judgment" motions. While a decision denying a request to change custody can sometimes be appealed as a "special order entered after final judgment," that was not possible here because the order did not resolve everything — Melissa's relocation request was still awaiting a hearing. The court also addressed Matthew's worry that dismissing the appeal would leave him with no way to challenge the custody ruling. It disagreed, explaining that once the family court fully resolves all the pending custody issues, including Melissa's relocation request, Matthew can challenge the denial of his motion at that later point, in an appeal that includes the relocation decision.

William and Ammie Wallace married in 2009, had three children, separated in 2017, and divorced in September 2020. In their divorce decree, they agreed that Ammie would have primary physical custody and that William would have the children on weekday afternoons from 3:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., with the parents alternating weekends. According to the opinion, the parents did not actually follow that schedule for a period. During the COVID-19 pandemic, when the children were learning from home and both parents were working from home, they used a different, more equal arrangement that William described as joint physical custody with a "2/3/2 timeshare." They kept this up until the children went back to in-person school in spring 2021, at which point they returned to the schedule written in the divorce decree. In June 2021, William asked the court to change the custody order, arguing that the parents had really been sharing custody roughly equally ("de facto joint physical custody") and that keeping that arrangement was in the children's best interest. Ammie asked the court to deny the motion without a hearing, saying William had not shown any substantial change in circumstances affecting the children, who she said were doing well in her care. After a 20-minute hearing without testimony or evidence, the district court denied William's motion. The court found that Ammie had primary physical custody (having the children about 70% of the time) and that William had not shown "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing because he had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It explained that to change a physical custody order in Nevada, a parent must show both (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare and (2) that the change serves the child's best interest. The court held that William never argued that returning to the decree's original terms was a substantial change in circumstances, so he waived that point. It also explained that a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision, Romano v. Romano, overruled the part of the older Rivero decision that William relied on - meaning a court no longer has to first decide what kind of custody arrangement exists before deciding whether to modify it. Because William did not adequately show a substantial change in circumstances, his appeal failed.

Alan and Brianna Barber were married in 2013 and have two children. After one of the children told Brianna that Alan had been sexually assaulting her over an extended period, Brianna contacted law enforcement, Alan was arrested, and Brianna obtained a temporary restraining order. Alan was later released while the criminal case proceeded, but Brianna did not know where he was. Brianna filed an amended complaint for divorce seeking sole custody of the children with no parenting time for Alan, child support, and division of the couple's community property. Rather than serving Alan personally, her attorney delivered the summons and amended complaint to Ryan Helmick, the lawyer representing Alan in the pending criminal case. Helmick apparently signed the acceptance of service. Alan never responded, the court clerk entered a default (a finding that a party failed to answer), and after a "prove-up" hearing at which Brianna testified, the district court entered a divorce decree by default. The decree gave Brianna 100 percent of the marital home. When Brianna later asked the court clerk to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the home, Alan learned of the divorce proceedings, hired a lawyer, and asked the court to set aside the decree. He said he had never authorized Helmick to accept service for him, so he was never properly served. The district court denied his request. Although the court acknowledged at the hearing that it did not "have enough information" about the service issue, it did not find the service invalid, and it declined to consider Alan's other arguments because his motion did not invoke the specific grounds listed in NRCP 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect). The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that "[a] default judgment not supported by proper service of process is void and must be set aside," and that the mere fact that a Nevada-licensed attorney signed an acceptance of service does not by itself show the attorney was authorized to accept service for the client. Alan's sworn assertion that Helmick was not authorized to accept service was uncontradicted, which created a factual dispute the district court was required to resolve. The Court of Appeals sent the case back with instructions: the district court must decide whether Helmick actually had Alan's consent to accept service. If service was improper, the default decree must be voided and a new decree considered. If service was valid, the district court must then evaluate, under a proper NRCP 60(b) analysis, Alan's remaining arguments about custody, child support, and the property division.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.

Thomas and Svetlana Potter married in 1994, had a child in 1995, and divorced shortly after the child was born. Svetlana was initially awarded primary physical custody, but in 1996 the parents agreed by stipulation to share joint physical and legal custody - meaning both parents shared responsibility for the child's day-to-day care. According to the record, the arrangement worked without custody problems from 1996 to 2003, with both parents actively involved. In 2003, Svetlana received a job offer from a California hospital for a registered nurse position at a higher salary than she was earning in Las Vegas, and she wanted to pursue a nurse anesthesiologist degree from a California school - a program not available in Las Vegas. She filed a petition under NRS 125C.200, Nevada's relocation statute, asking for permission to move to Corona, California with the child. Thomas opposed it, arguing that the Legislature amended the relocation statute in 1999 so that it no longer applied to joint physical custody arrangements, and that Svetlana would first have to win primary physical custody before she could seek relocation. The district court treated the case as an ordinary relocation petition under NRS 125C.200, analyzed the relocation factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz, granted Svetlana's petition, awarded her primary physical custody, and provided for significant contact and visitation between Thomas and the child. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that NRS 125C.200 does not apply when parents share joint physical custody. The statute's current text speaks only of "custodial" and "noncustodial" parents; an earlier version of the statute (formerly NRS 125A.350) had expressly covered "a parent having joint custody," but the Legislature removed that language. The court found the legislative history confirmed that the statute was intended to apply only to primary physical custody situations. Instead, the court explained the correct procedure: when a parent who shares joint physical custody wants to move out of Nevada with the child, that parent must file a motion for a change of custody under NRS 125.510(2), seeking primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating. The district court then decides, under the "best interest of the child" standard, whether the child is better off living outside Nevada with the relocating parent as primary physical custodian, or living in Nevada with the non-moving parent as primary physical custodian. The moving parent bears the burden of proving that living out of state with him or her serves the child's best interest. Because the district court applied the wrong statute, did not use the factors from Truax v. Truax, and made no finding that the move was in the child's best interest, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for the district court to decide whether it is in the child's best interest to live in California with Svetlana or in Nevada with Thomas.