Nevada family-law case summaries

Robert and Joanna Ronchi began dating in 2004. The day before their 2008 wedding in Pennsylvania, they signed a premarital agreement - a contract made before marriage that decides how property will be divided if the couple later divorces. The agreement said it would be governed by Pennsylvania law, listed each person's separate property (including Robert's interest in his business, Element 115, and his retirement accounts), and included provisions in which each spouse gave up any claim to property held in the other spouse's sole name. Joanna, a Polish citizen, was 19 weeks pregnant when she signed. The couple married the next day and moved to Nevada in 2010. In 2015, Robert bought a house, titled only in his name, that became the family home. Joanna filed for divorce in 2022. After hearings, the district court ruled the premarital agreement was valid. It then divided the couple's property, awarding Joanna half of the portion of Robert's Fidelity IRA that came from his wages during the marriage and half of the equity in the house, while confirming Robert's business interest as his separate property. The court later ordered Robert to pay Joanna $30,304 in attorney fees. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals resolved the appeal in four main parts. First, it upheld the ruling that the premarital agreement was valid. Because the agreement chose Pennsylvania law, the court applied Pennsylvania contract principles, under which signed agreements are presumed valid and a person challenging one must prove it invalid by clear and convincing evidence. The district court had found that Joanna generally understood the agreement's purpose, could read and write English at the time, and that both parties handwrote on the agreement, "I choose to waive representation by an attorney." The district court was not persuaded that her pregnancy and immigration status amounted to duress, and the Court of Appeals concluded those findings were supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Court of Appeals reversed the award to Joanna of half of the marriage-era contributions to Robert's Fidelity IRA. Although the agreement never specifically said Robert's wages would be his separate property, its plain language released each spouse's rights to "[a]ny and all rights to any property of the other party titled in the other parties' sole name, whether before or after the marriage." Because the IRA was solely in Robert's name, the court held it remained his separate property even though marital wages went into it. For the same reason, the court reversed the ruling giving Robert a community interest in Joanna's own solely titled Fidelity IRA. Third, on the house, the Court of Appeals held the district court applied the wrong legal framework. The district court had used Nevada's "gift presumption" caselaw - the idea that when a spouse signs over title, she is presumed to have gifted her interest - and found Joanna rebutted that presumption with evidence that the house was titled in Robert's name only because of her credit problems, was paid for from a joint account, and that Robert admitted in an audio recording he had promised to put her name on the house and still "owed" it to her. The appellate court said that under the premarital agreement's plain language, property titled in one spouse's name stayed separate, so the gift-presumption analysis was error. But it concluded the substance of Joanna's argument and the district court's findings pointed to a different doctrine: "constructive fraud" - a breach of the special duty of trust spouses owe each other, which can allow a court to impose a "constructive trust" recognizing that an asset is actually co-owned despite how it is titled, even where a premarital agreement exists. The court vacated the ruling on the house and sent the issue back for the district court to decide whether Joanna established constructive fraud giving rise to a constructive trust. Fourth, the court rejected Joanna's argument that she was entitled to a share of the increase in value of Robert's business, Element 115. The Pennsylvania statute she relied on excludes from marital property anything the parties excluded by valid agreement, and the business was listed as Robert's separate property in the agreement's financial disclosure. Finally, because part of the property division was reversed, the court vacated the $30,304 attorney fee award. The case now returns to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the order.

Todd and Tracy Elwardt married in 2013. In October 2023, Tracy filed for divorce, asking the court to divide their property and to award her alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other). After a trial, the district court divided the couple's property and gave Tracy support. Among other things, the court awarded Tracy four dogs valued at $2,000, half the equity in the marital home, and half of roughly $400,000 in sales commissions Todd earned during the marriage but had not yet been paid. The court also ordered Todd to pay Tracy $4,000 per month for four years (periodic alimony) and $24,000 over two years (rehabilitative alimony, meant to help her get training or education). Todd appealed and raised several arguments. First, he said two of the dogs, Fiona and Enzo, were gifts to him and therefore his own separate property, or that the court valued the dogs incorrectly. The appeals court explained that property acquired during a marriage is presumed to belong to both spouses (community property) unless someone proves otherwise with strong evidence. Because the dogs were acquired during the marriage, and because Tracy had been caring for them while Todd had limited contact, the court concluded Todd had not proven they were his separate property. On the value, only one dog's cost ($2,000) was proven at trial, so the court accepted that figure. But the appeals court noted the decree did not make clear whether Todd received other property to make up for his share of the dogs' value, and directed the lower court to fix that on remand. Todd's main challenge concerned the connection between the commissions and the alimony. Todd is paid entirely on commission, and those commissions are not paid to him until a client pays the underlying sales contract - which can take up to three years. That means in the years right after the divorce, much of Todd's monthly income could come from commissions he earned during the marriage, half of which the court had already awarded to Tracy. The appeals court agreed the commissions counted as community property, but found the district court did not adequately account for the fact that handing Tracy her share of those commissions would reduce Todd's income while boosting Tracy's finances. Because the court did not make specific findings on how this affected Todd's ability to pay and Tracy's need, the appeals court vacated (canceled) the $4,000-per-month periodic alimony award and sent it back for the district court to reconsider with proper findings. The appeals court rejected Todd's other arguments. On the marital home, Todd argued the money should be traced back to homes he owned before or during the marriage as his separate property. The court explained that when separate property is put into a jointly owned home during marriage, it is presumed to be a gift to the community unless proven otherwise, and Todd had not overcome that presumption - the home was in joint tenancy, mortgage payments came from shared funds, and Todd himself acknowledged Tracy had "earned" being on the title. On rehabilitative alimony, the court found Tracy's testimony about the cost and time to finish her master's degree supported the $24,000 award. Finally, Todd asked that a different judge handle the case on remand, arguing the judge formed negative opinions of him (the decree mentioned Todd spoiling Tracy's medication, writing derogatory notes on support checks, and reducing the functionality of Tracy's Tesla). The court presumed judges are unbiased and found the judge's comments came from what the judge learned during the case, not from an outside source, and did not show deep-seated antagonism. Importantly, the court said the district court did not actually rely on that conduct in deciding alimony or property. So the case did not need to be reassigned.

James and Pamela Gabroy were married for eighteen years. Pamela filed for divorce in September 2019, citing incompatibility. James was an internist (a physician) who had owned and operated his own medical practice for years. He had sold that practice for $800,000 in 2016 but kept working there as an independent contractor for three more years. When his contract was not renewed, he set about reopening the office under his own name. On Pamela's recommendation, James hired a woman named Queenie Manuel around June 2019 to help him with the licensing and credentialing process. Manuel presented herself as an experienced medical credentialist with insurance-industry connections. James agreed to pay her $5,000 a month. The marriage was breaking down at the same time. Over Labor Day weekend in 2019, Pamela said James displayed a revolver during an argument. She obtained a temporary protection order and filed for divorce shortly afterward. She also asked the court for a "joint preliminary injunction" (JPI) — an order that would have frozen both spouses from moving money out of shared accounts while the divorce was pending — but the record shows the court never actually issued one. At an October 2019 hearing, the court ordered the couple to figure out a firm cost to reopen James's practice and to release community funds for that purpose. Four days after that hearing, James wrote Manuel a check for $800,000. He said the money was supposed to go toward licensing, medical equipment, and even a dental practice for low-income patients. But Manuel vanished with the money. James reported her to police, and she was never found. Notably, James did not report this $800,000 loss on his federal tax return, even though he reported other, smaller losses. James later sold his practice to another doctor for $180,000 — far less than the $800,000 he had received for it in 2016 and the same $800,000 he had just handed Manuel. In February 2020, James fell down a flight of stairs, fractured his skull, and injured his back. The court suspended his temporary spousal support because of his health, and the parties later stipulated (formally agreed) to that suspension. James spent eighteen months recovering in an assisted living facility. In October 2022, Pamela amended her divorce complaint to allege that James had committed "marital waste" — that is, wrongly wasting or destroying property belonging to the marriage. James denied it and accused Pamela of the same. After a trial, the district court found that James's $800,000 payment to Manuel was indeed marital waste and ordered him to reimburse Pamela for the community's share of that money. The court also awarded Pamela $1,150 per month in alimony for five years (ending sooner if she died or remarried). On appeal, James argued three things. First, he said the $800,000 payment simply followed the court's own order to release community funds to reopen his practice, so it could not be waste. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The trial court had found James's testimony not credible — questioning why he would pay a $5,000-per-month employee an $800,000 lump sum, and pointing out that he first testified he had written off the loss on his taxes but then admitted on cross-examination that he had not. Because appellate courts do not re-weigh a trial judge's assessment of who is believable, and because there was enough evidence to support the finding, the appeals court upheld the waste finding. James also argued the trial court wrongly relied on a violation of a JPI, since no JPI ever existed. Pamela conceded no JPI was issued but argued the mistake did no harm. The appeals court agreed it was "harmless error" — meaning the mistake would not have changed the result — because the waste finding rested on other, sufficient evidence, and because James made this unusually large payment right after Pamela filed for divorce, when the marriage was already broken. Second, James argued the court did not properly weigh the legally required factors before awarding alimony. The appeals court found the trial court had adequately considered the required factors, made findings on most of them, and treated as neutral or inapplicable the factors on which neither party presented evidence. Even while noting that "many courts would not have ordered alimony" given James's age, health, and reduced finances, the appeals court held the award was supported by the evidence and complied with the statute. Third, James argued the court wrongly excluded evidence about Pamela's alleged offshore bank accounts. The appeals court declined to consider this argument because James did not cite the record or provide adequate legal support.

Melissa and Paco Horta married in October 2012 and have three minor children. About a decade before the marriage, Paco's father gave him a landscaping business called Silver Lands, Inc. Paco earned a salary from the business and also took money out as company profits. Paco filed for divorce in May 2021, and while the case was pending the district court ordered him to pay temporary spousal support, temporary child support, and some of Melissa's attorney and expert fees. After a trial, the district court issued a divorce decree. It calculated Paco's monthly income, imputed (assigned) an income of $100,000 per year to Melissa based on her earning capacity, awarded her alimony of $3,000 per month for five years and child support of $3,474 per month, and divided the couple's community property. Because of the way it divided property, the court ordered Paco to pay Melissa an "equalization payment" of about $738,000 in monthly installments over ten years. The court declined to award either party additional attorney or expert fees. On appeal, Melissa raised many arguments: that the court miscalculated Paco's income by leaving out a $461,000 "shareholder loan" he took from the business; that the court should not have assumed she could earn $100,000; that it should have awarded more child support and back child support; that Paco wasted $476,000 of marital money on a failed Reno property investment; that she deserved attorney and expert fees; and several other points about parenting time, the family therapist, keeping discovery open on the marital home, and interest on the equalization payment. Paco, in his cross-appeal, argued the court miscalculated the community's interest in Silver Lands. The Court of Appeals rejected almost all of these arguments, finding that the district court acted within its discretion and that its findings were supported by the evidence. On most points, the appeals court explained that it does not re-weigh conflicting evidence or re-judge which witnesses were more believable - that is the trial court's job. The appeals court agreed with Melissa on one narrow point. While the trial court properly found that Melissa had not proven Paco "wasted" the $476,000 Reno investment, the trial court never made findings about whether any of that money still existed. Paco testified he got no return on the investment, but also said the investment home was eventually sold, though he could not recall the sale price. Because some or all of the money might still exist, the appeals court sent the case back (remanded) so the trial court can determine whether any funds remain and, if so, divide them. The court affirmed everything else in the decree.

This is a divorce case between Irina and Douglas Ansell. Before marrying in 2012, the couple signed a prenuptial agreement—a contract that spells out, in advance, how property will be treated as "separate" (belonging to one spouse) or "community" (shared) and how it will be divided if they divorce. Doug's separate property included several businesses (called the Ansell companies) and real estate. The couple married, had one child, and Irina filed for divorce in October 2015. The case took years. The district court split it into three separate trials: one on child custody, one on whether the prenuptial agreement was valid (the court ruled it was and that it would govern the financial issues), and a third on how to divide the couple's assets. That third trial happened in December 2017, but the court did not actually issue the divorce decree until February 2021—more than three years later. The decree gave Irina some alimony, child support, and an "equalization payment" (a lump sum meant to balance out the division of property) of $972,471. After the decree, both sides filed motions. Doug asked the court to give him credit for personal income tax payments he had made, arguing those taxes were a shared community obligation, and he asked for attorney fees. The court agreed with Doug: it credited half his tax payments against what he owed Irina and awarded him attorney fees, which together wiped out his entire equalization payment obligation—reducing Irina's award to essentially zero. The court denied Irina's own late-filed motion as untimely. Irina then appealed. Before reaching the substance, the court had to deal with a technical problem: Irina's notice of appeal named only the November 2021 post-trial order, not the February 2021 decree. Doug argued this meant she could not challenge the decree at all. The court disagreed. It explained that Nevada strongly prefers deciding appeals on their merits rather than on technicalities, that Irina's intent to appeal the decree could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances, and that Doug was not misled or harmed. The court did, however, remind Irina's counsel to name every order they intend to appeal in the future. On the substance, the court reached mixed results. It rejected Irina's argument that the district court was required to accept a particular expert's much higher valuation of Doug's businesses (about $9.9 million in appreciation); the court found she had not properly preserved that argument, had not cited the record to support it, and had not cogently explained why the court was bound to adopt that valuation. But the court agreed with Irina on several other points. It held that the district court wrongly refused to give Irina any share of the increase in value of Doug's real estate. Under the plain language of the prenuptial agreement, Irina automatically got a community property interest in the appreciation of Doug's separate property—whether or not she had put personal time or effort into managing the properties. The court also held that the district court wrongly assigned certain of Doug's loans and debts to the community, because the prenuptial agreement said debts became joint only if both spouses signed a document agreeing to be jointly indebted, and no such document existed. The court further held that the district court failed to consider whether Irina received any benefit from Doug's income after the couple separated—income that, under Nevada law, is presumed to remain community property until the divorce is final. On the tax issue, the court found the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous about whether Irina could be liable for tax debt incurred during the marriage without a signed joint-indebtedness document, and the district court had not made the factual findings about the parties' intent needed to resolve that ambiguity. Because of that, and because it was unclear whether Irina received any of Doug's income during the relevant period, the court reversed the tax ruling and sent it back. Finally, because the court reversed parts of the decree, the attorney fee awards no longer rested on solid ground—it was no longer clear that Doug was the "prevailing party" or that he had beaten his settlement offer—so the court vacated (cancelled) the fee awards. The case returns to the district court to redo the affected portions.

Irina and Donovan Hansen married in 2007 and have one child. During the marriage Donovan worked as a firefighter (later a battalion chief) for the city of North Las Vegas, while Irina initially worked as a real-estate agent, became a stay-at-home mother, and later obtained a cosmetology license and opened a salon using a home-equity loan. When the marriage broke down, Donovan filed for divorce in 2019. The case went to trial in 2021, where Donovan had a lawyer and Irina represented herself. The trial court divided the couple's property, set child support and alimony, and awarded joint legal custody with Irina having primary physical custody. Irina appealed, arguing the trial court got several financial issues wrong and was biased against her. The Court of Appeals of Nevada rejected each argument and affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decision. On child support, Irina argued the court used inaccurate figures for Donovan's income. The appeals court explained that trial judges decide disputed facts and weigh witness credibility, and appellate courts do not second-guess those calls when they are supported by adequate evidence. Donovan's pay stubs, tax documents, and testimony supported the court's finding that his gross monthly income was $15,376.19, which produced a child support order of $1,445 per month. On alimony, Irina wanted at least $6,000 per month rather than the $3,000 per month for 60 months she received. The appeals court noted trial courts have broad discretion to award alimony that is "just and equitable." The trial court found Irina could earn about $3,000 per month from her cosmetology work and salon, that her reasonable post-divorce expenses were about $5,500, and considered her child support - and concluded $3,000 per month for five years was appropriate. The appeals court found this supported by the evidence. On property division, Irina argued Donovan got an unequal share without proper findings, that she should have kept the marital home, and that Donovan wasted community assets. The appeals court explained that community property is generally split equally, that the trial court found much of Irina's testimony about asset values not credible, that selling the marital home made sense given the mortgage and home-equity loan on it, and that Irina had not proven waste. It also upheld the finding that money in Donovan's deferred compensation account before the marriage ($87,992.62) was his separate property. On the pension issue, Irina wanted to be named the survivor beneficiary on Donovan's PERS (Public Employees' Retirement System) benefits. The appeals court explained that under Nevada law a divorce decree does not have to give a former spouse a survivor beneficiary interest, and the trial court permissibly let Donovan choose his survivor beneficiary at retirement while still splitting the community interest in the pension equally. On attorney fees, Irina argued she should have received an amount matching what Donovan spent. The trial court noted both sides spent substantial sums, that some of Irina's spending reflected her "stated intent to drag this case out for her financial advantage," but that there was a significant income disparity, and awarded her $10,000. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in declining to award more. Finally, on the bias claim, the appeals court held Irina had not shown the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" required to establish bias.

Amr and Huriyeh Hosny married in 1989 in Macau and moved to the United States in 2004, where they ran businesses and held assets together. They separated in 2018, and Huriyeh filed for divorce. After a 2020 trial, the family court entered a divorce decree that, among other things, ordered Amr to pay Huriyeh $5,000 per month in lifetime alimony (ongoing financial support), reimburse her $6,000 for an expert witness, pay a $38,000 loan Huriyeh had taken from her sister (in part to cover her attorney and expert fees), and pay off a U.S. Bank credit card. Amr appealed. The Court of Appeals found several problems with how the trial court reached its decisions. On alimony, the appeals court concluded that the trial court's factual findings were "contradictory, unclear, and not supported by substantial evidence." The trial court noted that Amr's income was $120,000 in 2017 but had dropped to $72,000 by 2019, yet it never settled on which income figure it actually used to set the alimony amount. The appeals court said the trial court appeared to assume Amr could keep earning what he historically had, without accounting for the downturn in his business tied in part to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court also divided rental properties between the spouses, which means Amr will collect less rental income going forward — a fact the appeals court said the trial court did not properly factor in when deciding how much support Amr could afford to pay or how much Huriyeh actually needed. The appeals court also identified erroneous findings about how much Amr paid to support the couple's adult children and how much he was already paying Huriyeh during the case. On the demonstrative exhibits (exhibits 5 and 14, which were charts or summaries the trial court relied on), the appeals court held it was error to admit them because the expert who apparently prepared them never testified to establish the foundation for the financial information they contained. The exhibits also contained mathematical errors and information inconsistent with other admitted evidence. Because the trial court leaned on these flawed exhibits in setting alimony and dividing debts, the appeals court found the error prejudicial. On the $6,000 in expert witness fees, the appeals court explained that under Nevada law, an expert generally must testify in order to recover more than $1,500 in fees. Because this expert did not testify, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees above that threshold. The appeals court reversed the district court's judgment and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with its order. On remand, the trial court will need to reassess the full division of community property and debt (including the promissory note, the Bank of America card, and the U.S. Bank card) when deciding alimony, and ensure Huriyeh does not receive a "double recovery" for fees and costs already covered through debts assigned to Amr.

Alan and Brianna Barber were married in 2013 and have two children. After one of the children told Brianna that Alan had been sexually assaulting her over an extended period, Brianna contacted law enforcement, Alan was arrested, and Brianna obtained a temporary restraining order. Alan was later released while the criminal case proceeded, but Brianna did not know where he was. Brianna filed an amended complaint for divorce seeking sole custody of the children with no parenting time for Alan, child support, and division of the couple's community property. Rather than serving Alan personally, her attorney delivered the summons and amended complaint to Ryan Helmick, the lawyer representing Alan in the pending criminal case. Helmick apparently signed the acceptance of service. Alan never responded, the court clerk entered a default (a finding that a party failed to answer), and after a "prove-up" hearing at which Brianna testified, the district court entered a divorce decree by default. The decree gave Brianna 100 percent of the marital home. When Brianna later asked the court clerk to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the home, Alan learned of the divorce proceedings, hired a lawyer, and asked the court to set aside the decree. He said he had never authorized Helmick to accept service for him, so he was never properly served. The district court denied his request. Although the court acknowledged at the hearing that it did not "have enough information" about the service issue, it did not find the service invalid, and it declined to consider Alan's other arguments because his motion did not invoke the specific grounds listed in NRCP 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect). The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that "[a] default judgment not supported by proper service of process is void and must be set aside," and that the mere fact that a Nevada-licensed attorney signed an acceptance of service does not by itself show the attorney was authorized to accept service for the client. Alan's sworn assertion that Helmick was not authorized to accept service was uncontradicted, which created a factual dispute the district court was required to resolve. The Court of Appeals sent the case back with instructions: the district court must decide whether Helmick actually had Alan's consent to accept service. If service was improper, the default decree must be voided and a new decree considered. If service was valid, the district court must then evaluate, under a proper NRCP 60(b) analysis, Alan's remaining arguments about custody, child support, and the property division.

Kerstan and Michael Micone divorced in 2009. They shared joint legal custody of their two children, but Kerstan had primary physical custody. Their daughter I.M. struggled in Las Vegas public schools, possibly due to dyslexia. The parents agreed I.M. should attend private school in Reno and live during the school year with her paternal grandparents there, returning to Kerstan in the summers. I.M. moved to her grandparents' home in August 2013. In 2014, Michael asked the family court to give him primary physical custody of I.M. Kerstan opposed the change. Instead of choosing between the two parents, the district court awarded primary physical custody to the grandparents - even though the grandparents had never asked to be part of the case and neither parent had been told the judge was considering that option. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that custody award. The Court explained that a court generally cannot enter a judgment for or against someone who is not a party to the lawsuit. To get custody, a non-parent (like a grandparent) must either file their own custody case or formally join (intervene in) the existing one. Beyond that, before a Nevada court can take custody away from a fit parent and give it to a non-parent, it must make specific findings that giving custody to either parent would be detrimental to the child and that placing the child with the non-parent is necessary to serve the child's best interest. None of that happened here. The Court also held that giving custody to the grandparents without warning violated the parents' due process rights - their right to fair notice and a chance to be heard - because both parents had been arguing only about which of them should have custody, not about whether the grandparents should. The Court left undisturbed the portion of the order dealing with child support arrearages, because Kerstan did not include the hearing transcript needed to review that ruling. The case was sent back to the district court. On remand, the district court was directed to consider Kerstan's argument - which she had raised only in a reconsideration motion below - that no change in custody is warranted when a custodial parent sends a child to live elsewhere for educational reasons.

Audria Ruscitti and Ian Druckman had a child together but never married. Shortly after the child's birth, Ian signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity — a legal document that establishes a man as a child's father without going to court. The couple lived together and raised the child jointly, and even discussed moving out of Nevada together, but they separated before doing so. After Ian moved out, Audria moved to California with the child for better job opportunities — without Ian's knowledge or consent. Ian then asked a Nevada court to order the child's return and to give him joint legal and primary physical custody. Audria asked the court to award her sole legal and primary physical custody and to let the child stay in California with her. The district court gave both parents joint legal custody, awarded Audria primary physical custody, and approved her relocation. Ian appealed. The central question was what custody rights unmarried parents have when paternity has been legally established but no court has ever issued a custody order. The Nevada Supreme Court held that in that situation, both parents have equal custody rights. Quoting the statute, the court emphasized that "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." NRS 126.031(1). The court also addressed Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.200, which requires a custodial parent to get the other parent's consent or court permission before moving a child out of state. Because no court had ever awarded either parent primary physical custody, that statute technically did not apply. But the court held that its policy should still guide these situations: when parents have equal custody rights, one parent may not move the child out of state over the other parent's objection without a court order. The proper course is to file a motion for primary physical custody along with a request to relocate. A parent who moves the child unlawfully faces consequences — for example, the court deciding custody should not consider anything about the child's new life in the other state (new school, friends, or routine) when deciding what is best for the child. To get permission to relocate, a parent must first show "a sensible, good faith reason for the move." If that showing is made, the court then decides custody and relocation based on the child's best interest, incorporating five factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz — factors such as whether the move will improve the child's and parent's quality of life, whether each parent's motives are honorable, and whether the parent staying behind will have a realistic opportunity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Applying these rules, the majority concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court had found a good-faith reason for the move (Audria's job opportunities in California and the parties' earlier plans to move out of state together), had considered the relevant best-interest and Schwartz factors, and had not relied on any facts arising from the child's time in California. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the custody and relocation rulings. However, it reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Ian as a sanction for a supposedly frivolous motion to stay, concluding his motion "was based on reasonable grounds because he sought stability for his child," and remanded that issue for reconsideration. The court rejected as meritless Ian's additional arguments that the district court improperly limited his evidence and that the judge should be disqualified for bias. Two justices dissented. They agreed unmarried parents have equal custody rights, but argued Audria's removal of the child without Ian's consent or court permission was wrongful, that the district court should have weighed that conduct against her, and that the case should be sent back for a new custody determination.

Shinichi and Yoko Ogawa married in Japan in 1997 and moved several times between Japan and the United States, buying a home in Henderson, Nevada. Their three children were all born in Japan. In June 2004, the children traveled from Nevada to Japan. The parents told very different stories about that trip: Yoko said it was only a summer vacation and that Shinichi refused to send the children back in August 2004; Shinichi said the whole family had planned to live in Japan permanently. Either way, the children stayed in Japan with Shinichi. About eight months after the children left, in February 2005, Yoko filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court to order the children's immediate return, calling their retention in Japan an international abduction. The Nevada court agreed with Yoko, ordered the children returned, later held Shinichi in contempt when they were not returned, and ultimately - after a hearing at which Shinichi's lawyer appeared but Shinichi personally did not - entered a "default" divorce decree. That decree gave Yoko sole legal and physical custody with "no contact" for Shinichi, all of the community property (including a share of a house in Japan), spousal and child support, and attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court decided three questions. First, did the Nevada court have power to decide custody at all, given that the children had been out of Nevada for eight months when the case was filed? Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) - a law that generally gives custody-deciding authority to a child's "home state" - a child's temporary absences from a state do not break the required six-month residency period. Because the evidence supported the district court's finding that the children left Nevada in June 2004 for a temporary three-month vacation, Nevada remained their home state, and the Nevada court properly had jurisdiction. Second, was the order sending the children back to the U.S. proper? The district court had relied on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty designed to ensure the prompt return of children wrongfully taken from their home country. But Japan has not signed that treaty, so the Convention and its U.S. implementing statute provide no remedy here. Even so, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not need the treaty: because it had custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, it had authority to order the children's return as part of the custody case. So the return order stood, even though the Hague Convention did not apply. Third, was the default divorce decree proper? A "default" is what happens when a party fails to respond to a lawsuit. Here, Shinichi had filed an answer and a countercomplaint for divorce, and his lawyer appeared at the divorce hearing - only Shinichi himself was absent. The Supreme Court held that under those circumstances a default was inappropriate, and that the district court erred by treating the hearing as a one-sided "prove-up," awarding Yoko everything she asked for, cutting off meaningful cross-examination, and never deciding the case on its merits. The court reversed the decree's awards of custody, property, support, and fees, and sent the case back for a hearing on the merits. It denied Shinichi's request that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand, because he cited no record support or legal authority showing reassignment was necessary.