Nevada family-law case summaries

When Nevada child-welfare authorities remove a child from her parents, state law generally requires the agency to make "reasonable efforts" to reunite the family. One Nevada statute, NRS 432B.393(3)(c), creates an exception: if a parent's rights to a different child (a sibling) were already involuntarily terminated, the agency does not have to keep trying to reunify the family with the new child. In this case, WCHSA removed L.S.C. from her parents in August 2020 and asked the district court to find that, because the parents had lost their rights to L.S.C.'s sibling the year before, the agency was off the hook for reunification efforts. The parents objected, arguing the statute violates their constitutional right to raise their child without fair process. A court master agreed with the parents and found the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it effectively presumes a parent is unfit forever based on a past case, and that this presumption could later be used to terminate parental rights as to the new child under a separate statute, NRS 128.105(1). The district court adopted that recommendation. WCHSA then asked the Nevada Supreme Court for an extraordinary order (a writ of mandamus) overturning the district court's constitutional ruling. By the time the Supreme Court considered the petition, the dispute over reunification efforts in this particular family had already been resolved on different grounds, making the case technically "moot." The Supreme Court nonetheless decided to address the constitutional question because it is the kind of issue likely to come up repeatedly but resolve too quickly to ever be reviewed in time. On the merits, the Supreme Court held that NRS 432B.393(3)(c) does not violate due process. The court explained that, although parents have a fundamental constitutional right to the care and custody of their children, that right is implicated when the state removes children or terminates parental rights — not when the state merely relieves an agency of its duty to provide reunification services. Because the statute does no more than excuse the agency from reunification efforts, it does not infringe on a fundamental right. The court applied the more lenient "rational basis" test and concluded that the statute is rationally connected to Nevada's legitimate interest in keeping children out of dangerous homes and out of long-term foster care. The court noted that the district court had focused on a different statute — NRS 128.105(1), which permits termination of parental rights based in part on a finding under NRS 432B.393(3)(c). The Supreme Court explained that any constitutional concern about presuming parental fault belongs in a challenge to NRS 128.105, not to NRS 432B.393(3)(c). Even though the Supreme Court concluded the district court was wrong on the constitutional question, it denied WCHSA's petition because the underlying dispute had become moot — the agency had already been relieved of reunification efforts on a different basis, so there was nothing left to fix.

This case asks whether a parent facing the loss of his parental rights in Nevada is entitled to have a jury -- rather than a judge -- decide the case. The Nevada Supreme Court answered no. The Washoe County Department of Social Services (WCDSS) removed Jesus F.'s six children from his home in January 2010, citing drug use, safety hazards, and inadequate supervision. The children were placed in protective custody under NRS 432B.330 and lived in various out-of-home placements over the next four years. After the three older children reached adulthood, WCDSS petitioned to terminate Jesus F.'s parental rights as to the three remaining minor children. Jesus F. demanded a jury trial. The district court denied that demand, held a bench trial, and terminated his parental rights. On appeal, Jesus F. argued that both the U.S. Constitution and the Nevada Constitution gave him a right to a jury. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments. As to the federal constitution, the Seventh Amendment's civil jury-trial right does not apply to the states, and the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that due process requires a jury in termination cases. Applying the due-process balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, the court concluded that a bench trial here posed only a minimal risk of an erroneous decision because Jesus F. received notice, appointed counsel, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, and the right to appeal. As to the Nevada Constitution, Article 1, Section 3 preserves the right to jury trial as it existed when Nevada's Constitution was adopted in 1864. Termination of parental rights actions did not exist in 1864 -- they were created by the Nevada Legislature in 1975 -- and the Legislature has not granted a jury-trial right in such proceedings. The court also noted that requiring jury trials would slow family courts, undermine the children's anonymity, and require structural changes that several Nevada family courts are not equipped to make. The court observed that the majority of states deny jury trials in termination cases. The court also upheld the termination on the merits. Under NRS 128.109, when a child has been placed outside the home for 14 of any consecutive 20 months, the law presumes that the parent has made only token efforts and that termination is in the child's best interest. The district court found that Jesus F. did not rebut the presumption and that there were five separate grounds of parental fault. The Supreme Court held those findings were supported by substantial evidence and affirmed.