Nevada family-law case summaries

Anthony Ibanez and Patamawadee Chaisawang were never married but have a child together, born in September 2021. In June 2023, Ibanez filed a court complaint asking for sole legal and primary physical custody after Chaisawang moved from Nevada to California with the child. He argued that Chaisawang had taken the child without his permission—an "abduction"—and asked that the child be returned to Nevada. Chaisawang responded, denied taking the child improperly, and formally asked the court for permission to relocate to California with the child. After a trial where both parents testified and submitted evidence—including text messages between them and a statement Ibanez gave to police the day after Chaisawang moved—the district court gave the parents joint legal custody, gave Chaisawang primary physical custody, and allowed her to relocate to California. The court also set a child support amount. Ibanez then filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its custody decision, arguing the court used the wrong legal standard when evaluating whether an abduction occurred and improperly relied on things that happened after the move. The court denied that motion and later issued a separate order setting Ibanez's monthly child support obligation at $959.33, based on a gross monthly income of $9,116.67 and a $250 reduction for transportation costs. On appeal, Ibanez raised several arguments. First, he said the court used a stricter standard of proof ("clear and convincing evidence") when deciding whether an abduction happened, when it should have used the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard (meaning "more likely than not"). The appeals court disagreed. It explained that while the trial court had referenced a subsection dealing with a special legal presumption against parents who commit abduction, the court also analyzed the abduction question under the ordinary best-interest factor and later clarified in writing that it had applied the "more likely than not" standard. The appeals court found Ibanez did not show the wrong standard was used. Second, Ibanez argued that the evidence proved Chaisawang abducted the child and that recognizing this would have shifted other factors in his favor. The appeals court noted that the trial court repeatedly declined to find an abduction, and that its findings—based on testimony and text messages showing Chaisawang had tried to reach a custody agreement while Ibanez refused to compromise—were supported by adequate evidence. The court emphasized that weighing evidence and judging witnesses' credibility is the trial court's job, and an appeals court does not re-weigh that evidence. Third, Ibanez challenged the decision letting Chaisawang relocate to California, saying the court improperly relied on benefits that only existed because of the move (like a California school). The appeals court explained that when there is no prior custody order, a parent still needs court permission to move a child out of state, and the court must decide what is in the child's best interest. The trial court found a "sensible, good faith reason for the move"—a better school with services for the child's speech delay, nearby family, and Chaisawang's flexible remote work. The trial court also clarified that it relied on forward-looking, prospective benefits rather than benefits that had already accrued from the move. Fourth, Ibanez challenged the child support calculation, saying the court overstated his income. The appeals court found the income figure was supported by evidence: his own disclosure form showing $6,516.67, plus regular monthly transfers of at least $1,500 from his grandmother, plus $1,100 in rental income. The court also noted Ibanez received the $250 transportation reduction he had requested. Finally, Ibanez argued the court wrongly denied him attorney fees because Chaisawang caused the litigation by abducting the child. Because the appeals court had already upheld the finding that there was no abduction and no abuse of discretion in the custody decision, it found no abuse of discretion in denying attorney fees. The court affirmed all the district court's orders.

Dory and Eli Mizrachi divorced in 2012. In their divorce, the court gave both parents joint legal custody (shared authority over major decisions) and joint physical custody (roughly shared parenting time) of their son, J.M., who was born in 2008. In 2020, Eli asked the court to change the custody arrangement so he would have primary physical custody. He said J.M. reported that Dory had physically struck him, used inappropriate language, and had inappropriate conversations with him, and that Dory sometimes left the home at night, leaving J.M. unsupervised. Eli argued this amounted to a "substantial change in circumstances" affecting J.M.'s welfare and that giving him primary physical custody was in J.M.'s best interest. Dory disagreed, denied mistreating J.M., raised claims of domestic violence she said Eli committed during the marriage, and asked to keep the existing shared arrangement. The case moved through several stages. In March 2022, the court entered an order reflecting a temporary agreement letting J.M., who was older by then, use some discretion about how long he stayed with each parent. Later, the judge originally handling the case, Judge Mary Perry, recused herself (stepped aside) after acknowledging she had improperly asked Dory's attorney to help her courtroom clerk with a court issue. Eli asked her to recuse; Dory did not object. The case was reassigned to Judge Dawn Throne, who reviewed the record and video recordings of prior testimony rather than starting the whole hearing over. Neither party wanted to recall witnesses. After hearing evidence, including testimony from J.M. and both parents, Judge Throne found there had been a substantial change in circumstances, chiefly the serious deterioration of the relationship between J.M. and Dory. The court reviewed the statutory "best interest" factors and concluded it was in J.M.'s best interest to give Eli primary physical custody, while keeping joint legal custody and giving Dory scheduled parenting time. On appeal, Dory made six arguments. The Court of Appeals rejected all of them. It held: the March 2022 order was temporary, not final, so the court could keep holding hearings; Dory waived her complaint about Judge Perry's recusal because she did not object at the time; Judge Throne was sufficiently familiar with the record and did not have to restart the hearing; the custody modification was supported by substantial evidence and was not an abuse of the court's discretion; even if the court was wrong to exclude testimony about pre-divorce domestic violence, Dory did not show that error affected the outcome (so it was "harmless"); and the exclusion of the child's new therapist's testimony was proper under the "law-of-the-case doctrine" because a prior judge had already decided that issue and Dory did not show a reason to revisit it.

Bernadette Perez and Cornell Haywood were never married but have one child together, born in 2006. In 2011, Bernadette and the child moved to Texas, and Cornell has had limited contact with the child since. In 2017, Bernadette—with help from the Clark County District Attorney Family Support Division (DAFS), a government office that assists with child support—started a case seeking child support arrears (past-due support) for part of January 2017. The district court entered a consent order setting Cornell's monthly obligation at $462 and requiring him to pay $1,923 in arrears for January through April 2017. Bernadette did not sign that order and says she was never served with the filed copy. She later learned the order awarded only four months of arrears, rather than the maximum of four years that state law allows. In 2019, Bernadette hired a lawyer and asked the court either to modify the 2017 order or to enter a new judgment, seeking constructive arrears (past support the court can order for a period before the case was filed) going back four years. Cornell did not oppose her motion. DAFS, however, appeared and recommended denying it, saying Cornell had a right to rely on the earlier settled arrears. After objections and back-and-forth, the district court sent the matter to the hearing master for an evidentiary hearing on whether to award arrears for February 1, 2013 through December 31, 2016—the four-year window before Bernadette's 2017 support request. Before that hearing, the hearing master told Cornell to provide proof of his 2013–2016 income and told Bernadette to provide a schedule of arrears and medical expenses. Cornell did not object to Bernadette's proposed schedule and gave DAFS some tax documents but filed nothing before the hearing. At the hearing, both parties testified that Cornell provided no support for the child from 2013 to 2016. Cornell testified about his earnings: roughly $14,000 as an entertainer in 2013, about $10,855 in 2014, and around $16 an hour after starting a job in 2015 that continued into 2016. Cornell offered no argument against Bernadette's request. Neither side formally admitted the tax returns into evidence, and Bernadette submitted no additional documents. The hearing master declined to order more arrears, reasoning that Bernadette had failed to present evidence of Cornell's income or support for her medical-expense and insurance requests. Bernadette objected, and the district court affirmed. She then appealed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed for several reasons. First, it declined to consider the brief filed by DAFS because DAFS did not represent any party to the appeal, and its arguments exceeded the authority the law gives it. Second, the court noted that Cornell never filed an answering brief despite being ordered to, and the court treated that failure as a confession of error. Third—and independently—the court concluded that the hearing master's report and the district court's order were not supported by substantial evidence, because the hearing master had actually received evidence (live testimony counts as evidence) about Cornell's failure to pay support and about his income, yet failed to fully consider awarding arrears or even the statutory minimum, or directing more discovery. The court sent the case back for a new hearing to determine whether four years of retroactive child support and payment of identified medical expenses is warranted.

Justin and Sarah Maurice divorced in 2015 under an agreed ("stipulated") divorce decree. That decree gave them joint legal custody of their two children, but gave Sarah primary physical custody, with Justin having the children on alternating weekends. In 2020, Justin asked the family court to change the arrangement to joint physical custody. He gave several reasons: his job and work schedule had changed, Sarah's work schedule had changed, he was now available to care for the children himself while Sarah worked (rather than having third parties watch them), more than five years had passed since the divorce, the children had bonded with their stepsiblings, and, he said, the change was in the children's best interests. He also pointed out that during the COVID-19 pandemic he had been the parent primarily helping the children with school, that the parties had actually been following a different schedule than the decree required, and that the children had expressed a preference to spend more time with him. The family court turned down Justin's request without holding a hearing to take evidence. Its main reason was that a change in work schedule, by itself, is not a "substantial change in circumstances" — the legal threshold a parent must cross to change primary physical custody. Justin asked the court to reconsider; the court again refused and ordered Justin to pay $1,500 of Sarah's attorney fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the family court on two points. First, it explained that a change in a parent's work schedule can count as a change in circumstances if it affects the children's welfare, so the family court was wrong to reject the motion based mainly on the idea that a work-schedule change never qualifies. Second, the court said the family court gave no specific explanation for why Justin had not shown "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing — a hearing where witnesses and evidence are presented — and nothing in the record suggested his claims were just repetitive or only meant to discredit Sarah. Because Justin had presented enough to justify a hearing, the family court should have held one before deciding whether to change custody. The appeals court reversed the family court's decision and sent the case back for further proceedings. Because it undid the underlying ruling, it also canceled ("vacated") the $1,500 attorney-fee award.

When Eli and Diane Mizrachi divorced, they agreed - without writing it down in detail - that Eli would have their child for "the Jewish holidays" each year and Diane would have the child for "the Christian holidays." That phrase was placed into the divorce decree as the court's order. Less than ten months later, the parents started fighting about what "the Jewish holidays" actually meant. Eli said it meant 12 different Jewish holidays for their full duration; Diane said it meant only the first day of four major holidays - Hanukkah, Passover, Rosh Hashanah, and Yom Kippur - matching a default schedule that judges in the Family Division use as a starting point. Diane asked the district court to "clarify" the decree. Without taking testimony or evidence, the judge - relying on the parties' written filings, lawyers' arguments, and the judge's own Internet research - decided that "the Jewish holidays" meant just the first day of the four holidays Diane identified. Eli appealed. The Court of Appeals first had to decide whether what the district court did was "clarification" (defining what an existing right means) or "modification" (changing the parties' rights). The court concluded it was clarification, because the decree gave Eli the right to parenting time on the Jewish holidays and the district court was only deciding which days that phrase covered, not changing the underlying right. Next, the court asked whether the phrase "the Jewish holidays" was ambiguous - that is, whether it had more than one reasonable meaning. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was ambiguous: Eli's reading (all 12 holidays) was reasonable, Diane's reading (four holidays, first day only) was reasonable, and other reasonable readings exist as well, because not every Jewish family observes the same holidays. Because the phrase was ambiguous, the district court was allowed to clarify it. But the Court of Appeals held that the district court used the wrong procedure. When a court clarifies an ambiguous term in a divorce decree that grew out of the parties' agreement, the court must try to figure out what the parties themselves meant when they agreed - not simply impose a default schedule. The parties had each made factual claims about what they intended, and those claims conflicted. The district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to sort out those facts and determine the parties' actual intent. Because that did not happen, the Court of Appeals reversed and sent the case back for further proceedings. The court did not decide which side's interpretation of "the Jewish holidays" is correct. It also did not reach Eli's argument that the ambiguity should be held against Diane because her attorney drafted the decree, leaving that question open for the district court to consider after taking evidence.