Nevada family-law case summaries

The Ruckles had been serving as court-appointed guardians of their three granddaughters since January 2022, when a district court found that the children had been living with their mother, Sara Q., in squalid conditions and were thriving in the Ruckles' care. Over the next two years, Sara petitioned the court to begin reunification therapy - therapy designed to repair the relationship between a parent and her children - and the court eventually ordered the Ruckles, Sara, and the children to participate with a therapist named Dr. Stephanie Holland. Disagreements arose over the wording of the therapist's consent paperwork, and the therapy was slow to begin. Dr. Holland sent the court two confidential reports under NSRG 5, a rule that allows a guardianship judge to receive certain communications about a guardian's conduct or a protected person's welfare. After receiving the second report, the court issued a July 13, 2024 order expressing "significant concern" about the Ruckles' compliance with their duties, ordered the children to undergo psychoeducational testing, expanded Sara's visitation, and set an NSRG 5 hearing for July 25 to address the issues raised in Dr. Holland's report. One day before that hearing, Sara filed a petition asking the court to remove the Ruckles and terminate the guardianship. The court did not issue the formal "citations" (legal notices) that Nevada statutes require when such a petition is filed, and there is no indication the petition was set for any hearing. At the July 25 hearing, which lasted only seven minutes, the district court announced - without taking evidence, hearing argument, or directing briefing - that it was removing the Ruckles as guardians and terminating the guardianship. When the Ruckles' lawyer tried to speak, the judge said, "I understand you've stood up, but I've made my orders. I am terminating the guardianship today." The court told counsel he could file a motion for reconsideration. A written order followed in October 2024. The Ruckles appealed, arguing that they had a constitutional right to procedural due process - basic fairness, including notice and a chance to be heard - before a court could strip them of guardianship, and that they did not get either. The Court of Appeals agreed. Building on the Nevada Supreme Court's 2023 decision in In re Guardianship of D.M.F., the Court of Appeals expressly held that a custodial relative who serves as a guardian has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of the child, and is therefore entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court may, on its own initiative, remove the guardian and terminate the guardianship. The court found the notice given here was inadequate. The July 13 order flagged concerns but did not signal that removal or termination was being considered. Sara's last-minute petition came too late and was not accompanied by the statutorily required citations. And even if notice had been adequate, there was no meaningful opportunity to be heard because the district court issued its ruling at the start of a brief hearing, without briefing, evidence, or argument. Rather than simply reversing, the Court of Appeals vacated the order and sent the case back. Because Dr. Holland's confidential reports were not in the appellate record - and because Sara's petition described serious allegations including alleged emotional, psychological, and physical abuse and educational neglect - the court directed the district court on remand to permit briefing, hold an evidentiary hearing, and make the specific findings required by Nevada statutes and the NSRG before deciding whether removal or termination is warranted. In the meantime, the children will remain in Sara's physical and legal custody pending the district court's decision, although the trial court retains authority to enter temporary or emergency orders if circumstances require. The Court of Appeals also noted that the matter is moot as to the eldest child, A.L.R.-Q., because she has turned 18.

This case is about who gets to care for a baby, J.B., whose parents were both incarcerated when he was born. (His parents had been arrested for the homicide of his older sibling.) Because neither parent could care for J.B., Nevada's child-welfare agency had to find someone else to take him in. Shortly after J.B.'s birth, DFS placed him with Becky and Jay Whipple, family friends of J.B.'s grandmother. The Whipples were not licensed foster parents at the time, and the district court signed an order describing them as "Unlicensed Fictive Kin." "Fictive kin," under Nevada law, means a person not related to a child by blood but who has a significant emotional and positive bond with the child. No one objected to that designation when it was made. Months later, after a paternity test confirmed Miles Stano Jr. was J.B.'s father, the father asked that J.B. be sent to live with the paternal grandfather in Illinois. After interstate paperwork was completed (about nine months after J.B. was placed with the Whipples, by which point the Whipples had become licensed foster parents), the district court held a placement hearing. The district court did not take evidence about what was best for J.B. Instead, the judge ruled that, as a matter of law, a blood relative always wins out over an unrelated person in placement decisions, and the judge also reversed course and decided the Whipples were not really fictive kin after all. The court ordered J.B. moved to Illinois. Compounding the issue, J.B.'s court-appointed attorney did not appear at the placement hearing or at the later reconsideration hearing. The Supreme Court noted J.B. was largely without representation throughout the case, even though state law requires that children in these proceedings be represented by counsel. The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ and made several rulings. First, it explained that "fictive kin" status is judged from the perspective of both the prospective caregiver and the child. For an infant who cannot yet form relationships, the bond and commitment shown by the adult is what counts; an infant is not excluded from being placed with fictive kin just because the baby has not had time to bond. Second, the Supreme Court held that Nevada law does not put blood relatives ahead of fictive kin. The statute groups them together and prefers either over a foster home, but it does not rank them against each other. The decisive question is the child's best interest, and that requires actual factual findings. Third, the district court should not have proceeded with the placement hearing when J.B.'s attorney was absent and a continuance was being sought. Fourth, the Supreme Court ordered the case reassigned to a different district court judge, citing statements by the original judge that suggested he could not put aside his view that placement with "safe family" is always best. The Supreme Court vacated the placement order, lifted its prior stay, and sent the matter back for new proceedings before a different judge, who must hear evidence and make findings about what is actually in J.B.'s best interest.

This case involves a dispute over the adoption of a child, G.P., among the child's relatives. Before G.P. was born, the birth mother asked the child's step-great-grandmother and great-grandfather, Katherine and Michael, to take temporary guardianship. They agreed and obtained temporary guardianship from a Washoe County court. The child's grandparents, Angela and Randall, then filed their own competing petition for guardianship in the same court. While the guardianship dispute was pending, the birth parents signed written consents to terminate their parental rights and to allow Katherine and Michael to adopt G.P. Katherine and Michael then filed an adoption petition in Clark County, where they live. The Clark County court, unaware that a guardianship case was pending in Washoe County, granted the adoption. When the grandparents Angela and Randall learned of the adoption, they asked the Clark County court to set it aside under a procedural rule (NRCP 60(b)) that lets courts undo judgments in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. They argued the great-grandparents had hidden the existence of the Washoe County guardianship case. The Clark County judge agreed and set aside the adoption. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The central question was whether the grandparents had "standing" — that is, the legal right — to ask the court to undo the adoption at all, given that they were not parties to the adoption case. The Supreme Court explained that only parties to a case, people in close legal privity with parties, or nonparties whose own legal rights are directly affected by the judgment can file an NRCP 60(b) motion to undo it. The Court concluded that being a grandparent, by itself, does not give someone a legal interest in a grandchild's adoption sufficient to challenge it. Nevada's adoption statutes do not list grandparents among those entitled to notice or to object, and grandparents generally do not have a constitutional right to intervene in an adoption absent something extra, like a pre-existing court-ordered visitation right. The Court also held that simply having filed a guardianship petition that had not yet been decided created only a "prospective" interest — a possible future interest — which is not enough to confer standing to attack an adoption decree. Because Angela and Randall were not parties to the adoption, were not in privity with a party, and had no legal interest that was directly affected by the adoption decree, the Supreme Court held the district court should not have entertained their motion. The adoption stands.

Sandra Nance and Christopher Ferraro have one child, born in 2008. Sandra lives in Las Vegas; Christopher lives in New York. Before their divorce, Sandra accused Christopher of domestic violence and child abuse, and Child Protective Services investigated. In 2011, the parties agreed that Sandra would be the primary residential parent. After ongoing co-parenting problems, the district court ordered a custody evaluation, required Christopher to exercise his parenting time in Nevada for a period, and required both parties to take parenting classes. In November 2012, the parties signed a stipulation that called their arrangement "joint legal and physical custody," and the child continued to live with Sandra in Nevada. In 2015, Christopher asked the court to give him primary physical custody and to let him move the child to New York. Sandra objected and wanted to bring up Christopher's earlier domestic violence and abuse - including the custody evaluation, CPS reports, and witness testimony - to argue that moving the child to live with him was not in the child's best interest. Christopher asked the court to block all evidence about events before the November 2012 order, citing two Nevada Supreme Court cases, McMonigle and Castle. The district court agreed and barred Sandra's older evidence. It then ruled that the parents had been sharing joint physical custody, granted Christopher primary physical custody, and let him move the child to New York. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that McMonigle and Castle limit when a parent who is trying to change custody can rely on old facts to show that "circumstances have changed" - the threshold a parent must meet before a court can modify primary physical custody. Those cases do not stop a court from looking back at the facts that supported its earlier orders when it decides what is best for the child now. And they do not stop a parent who is opposing a change in custody from pointing to old evidence - including past domestic violence - to argue that changing custody is not in the child's best interest. The court emphasized that Nevada law requires judges to consider domestic violence when deciding the best interest of a child, and that there is a rebuttable presumption against giving custody to a parent who has committed domestic violence. By blocking Sandra's evidence, the district court could not properly weigh those factors when it decided what kind of custody arrangement existed, whether to modify it, and whether to allow the child to move. The Court of Appeals sent the case back so the district court could consider the previously excluded evidence - though the parties cannot simply re-fight issues the court has already decided.