Nevada family-law case summaries

Antonecia Moore and Christopher Moten have three children together. Under a partial parenting agreement and a custody order signed in June 2022, the two shared joint legal and physical custody of the children. After an incident at the children's school, Moore was arrested for domestic violence against Moten. Moten then asked the court to hold Moore in contempt for violating the parenting agreement, and Moore filed her own request to hold Moten in contempt. In his response, Moten also asked the court to give him primary physical custody, arguing that the domestic violence and Moore's withholding of the children amounted to a "substantial change in circumstances" - a legal threshold that must be met before a court will reconsider an existing custody arrangement. The district court denied both contempt requests and set an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where each side presents testimony and evidence) on whether to change custody. At that hearing, both parents represented themselves without lawyers. Neither side had properly prepared or exchanged exhibits ahead of time, so the court used documents each side had already filed with their earlier motions. Neither parent objected to the court using those earlier documents. Moore did object to one item - a video of the alleged domestic violence at the school - saying it was tied to her pending criminal case. The court reviewed the video after confirming Moore had earlier received a copy by email. The district court issued a thirty-page order giving Moten primary physical custody. It found that Moten had shown a "substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the children" based on Moore's withholding the children and her act of domestic violence committed in front of them. Analyzing the best-interest factors, the court found clear and convincing evidence that Moore committed domestic violence, that the parents could not co-parent, and that Moore was less likely to support the children's relationship with their siblings. On appeal, Moore raised two main complaints. First, she said the court improperly considered evidence that had not been properly disclosed and relied on hearsay (out-of-court statements). Second, she said that because the judge led the questioning at the hearing, she was denied her right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, which she framed as a constitutional violation. The appeals court rejected both arguments. On the evidence issue, the court explained that Moore did not object at the hearing to most of the evidence or the alleged hearsay, so she gave up (waived) the right to raise those complaints on appeal. As for the video - the one item she did object to - her objection at the hearing was that it related to her criminal case, but on appeal she argued something different: that it was improperly disclosed under a court rule. Because a party cannot switch to a new argument on appeal, the court would not consider it. On the confrontation and due process argument, the court held that the Confrontation Clause - part of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution - applies only to criminal prosecutions, not civil proceedings like this custody case. The court also noted that Moore never argued she lacked adequate notice of the hearing, never tried to cross-examine Moten, and never objected to how the hearing was run, so those points were waived as well. The court therefore affirmed the custody decision.

Adam and Chalese Solinger married in May 2012 and had two young children. Adam filed for divorce in January 2019, and the case took nearly three and a half years to resolve. Trial was held over five nonconsecutive days between May 2021 and March 2022, and eight witnesses testified, including a court-appointed custody evaluator, a rebuttal expert Chalese hired, a private investigator, family members, and both parents' romantic partners. After the trial ended but before the divorce decree was entered, Chalese's boyfriend became violent at the home they shared during her parenting time - he broke a television and threatened to keep her from leaving. Chalese took the children, left, and called the police; the boyfriend was arrested for domestic violence, and Chalese obtained a temporary protection order. Chalese asked to present testimony about this incident, which Adam did not oppose, and the district court considered it in deciding custody. The final decree gave the parents joint legal and joint physical custody on a week-on/week-off schedule, ordered Adam to pay child support, required Adam to pay all of the children's health insurance and 65 percent of their other medical, educational, and extracurricular costs, divided the couple's assets and debts, and awarded attorney fees to Chalese. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Adam on several money-related points but not on custody. The court affirmed the joint physical custody arrangement. Even though it agreed that two of the district court's findings (about alleged domestic violence by Adam and his supposed lack of financial support for Chalese) were mistaken, it concluded those mistakes did not change the outcome because the district court had done a thorough analysis of the child's best-interest factors and a majority still favored Chalese - yet the court still gave Adam joint physical custody. The court also explained that the statute Adam relied on for considering a partner's violent behavior applies to parents or others seeking custody, and Chalese's boyfriend was neither; but the district court was still allowed to consider the boyfriend's behavior as part of the broader best-interest analysis, and it did. The court found several errors in the financial parts of the decree. On child support, the district court said it used Adam's financial disclosure form and his own statements to find his income, but the number it used ($9,799 per month) did not match the figures in the record (Adam reported about $7,839.86 per month, and both sides agreed he earns roughly $94,000 a year). So the court sent the child support calculation back to be redone, with credit for any overpayments. On the 65 percent share of the children's medical, educational, and extracurricular costs, the court found the district court had not adequately explained its reasoning, especially since Adam already pays 100 percent of the children's health insurance and both parents had asked to split unreimbursed medical costs equally. Without a real explanation, the appeals court could not review the decision, so it reversed and sent it back. On the pension, the district court had awarded Chalese a "survivorship interest" in Adam's future state pension (PERS) and required him to choose a payout option that keeps paying a beneficiary after his death. The Court of Appeals explained that a survivorship interest is not itself community property, and giving Chalese this benefit was an unequal division of property because Adam would keep paying into the account for years after the marriage ended while Chalese contributed nothing. The district court had not made the findings needed to justify that unequal division - including why Chalese should be preferred over a possible future spouse or child - so the court reversed that award. Because the attorney-fee award (about $200,875) rested partly on the district court calling Chalese the "prevailing party," and because parts of the decree were being reversed, the court vacated the fee award so it could be reconsidered on remand. The court did reject one of Adam's fee arguments now, holding that Chalese's fee requests complied with the rules because her firms filed memorandums of fees and costs before final judgment. The court declined to reach Adam's other fee-related arguments at this time. On expert witness fees, the court reversed the $4,750 award for Chalese's rebuttal expert because the district court did not properly address all the required factors, particularly given that a neutral expert had already been appointed by the court. Finally, the court refused to order that a different judge handle the case on remand, explaining that a judge's rulings and actions during official proceedings are not, by themselves, grounds for disqualification.

Daniel and Stephanie Rubidoux married in 2014 and had one daughter, born in 2016. Their relationship was turbulent; they separated and reconciled several times before their final separation in November 2019. Stephanie filed for divorce in early 2020, describing several incidents she said involved domestic violence. One incident happened in early 2019 in the garage of the family home, where a surveillance camera recorded a fight. Daniel, who was intoxicated, tried to stop Stephanie from leaving, ripped items from her hand, pushed her against the garage door, and advanced toward her. Stephanie tried to push him off and at one point held a child's picnic table between them to keep her distance. Stephanie later showed the video to law enforcement, and Daniel was charged with domestic violence. Daniel entered a deferred adjudication, completed the required conditions, and the justice court dismissed the case. The parties disputed whether Daniel had pleaded "guilty" or "no contest," but the court found this difference immaterial because, even without a formal conviction, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that domestic violence occurred - and no one challenged that specific finding on appeal. During the 14 months the couple was separated and sharing custody under temporary court arrangements, the record showed no violence or fighting. Their exchanges of the child were peaceful, even though Stephanie at times kept the child during Daniel's scheduled parenting time because of the COVID-19 pandemic. At a two-day trial, both parents testified. Stephanie raised numerous domestic violence allegations and voiced concern about the child's safety around Daniel when she was not present. Daniel testified that Stephanie actively participated in the fighting and often antagonized him, and he offered evidence suggesting she was not afraid of him. Stephanie acknowledged that Daniel never physically harmed the child and that the child loves him. The district court found that Stephanie was generally not afraid of Daniel and often participated in and antagonized the conflicts, but it also found that the garage fight rose to the level of domestic violence and that no antagonizing remark could justify how Daniel physically handled Stephanie. Because of that finding, the court applied a legal presumption under NRS 125C.0035(5) - a starting assumption that giving Daniel joint or sole physical custody would not be in the child's best interest. The court then concluded that Daniel had overcome (rebutted) that presumption, pointing to the parties' successful shared parenting during their 14-month separation, the absence of violence after they separated, and evidence that many of the fights were two-sided. The court awarded joint physical custody and granted the divorce. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It declined Stephanie's request to require a domestic-violence perpetrator to first complete something like an anger management course or a 12-step program before being allowed to rebut the presumption, noting that Nevada - unlike California - does not require such a condition. The court acknowledged the district court's order was imperfect, including that it seemed to blend together two parts of the statute and did not clearly tie the domestic-violence factor to the child's best interest. But given the deferential standard the appellate court applies, and because the violence was not directed at the child, Stephanie was not injured, and the child had a good relationship with both parents, the court found no abuse of discretion. It also concluded the order was not internally contradictory and that it satisfied the statute's requirement to make findings protecting the parent and child, because it maintained the same exchange protocol that had produced 14 months of safe, peaceful interactions.

This case involves a parent who asked a trial court to change an existing child custody arrangement. The trial court in Humboldt County said no, denying that request. The parent, Ashlee Jackson, then took the matter to the Nevada Court of Appeals. Before the appeal could be decided on its merits, the Court of Appeals raised a question on its own: on March 23, 2022, it issued what is called an "order to show cause" - a directive asking the appealing party to explain why the appeal should not be thrown out as "moot," meaning no longer a live dispute the court needs to resolve. The court gave the appellant a choice: either explain why the case should continue, or file paperwork voluntarily ending the appeal after obtaining the appellant's consent. In response, the appellant chose to end the appeal. She filed a motion to voluntarily withdraw it and stated that she had consented to that withdrawal. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. The court did not decide who was right or wrong about the underlying custody question; it simply ended the appeal at the appellant's request.