Nevada family-law case summaries

This is a divorced-parents custody fight over an eleven-year-old boy, H.R. The mother (Maggie) and father (Jason) had shared the child equally for years under a 2017 stipulated order. In 2020, Maggie asked the court to give her primary custody, saying H.R. had become aggressive and disrespectful toward her, which she blamed in part on Jason's influence. Jason countered with his own request for primary custody. A court-appointed therapist who evaluated the family thought Jason might be engaging in "parental alienation" - turning the child against the other parent - and recommended keeping the week-on/week-off schedule. The court initially adopted that recommendation. Things then got worse. On two occasions, H.R. was taken into police custody for hitting Maggie - once after Maggie's mother called police, once after Jason called. After those incidents, the district court entered an emergency order giving Jason "sole physical custody" temporarily, restricting Maggie to six hours of parenting time per week and reunification therapy with a specific therapist, Dr. Sunshine Collins. Later, the court tightened the restrictions further: Maggie could have no contact with H.R. except through Dr. Collins's therapy sessions. Because Dr. Collins was outside Maggie's insurance and required individual sessions before any joint sessions with H.R., and because Maggie struggled to afford it, the practical effect was that Maggie had no contact with her son for six months. After a March 2022 evidentiary hearing, the district court labeled its final order "primary physical custody" to Jason but limited Maggie's parenting time to cards, texts, and phone calls - no in-person time at all - with any expansion left to Dr. Collins to decide. The court also ordered Maggie to pay Jason over $11,000 in attorney fees because he was the "prevailing party." The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to change custody (because there was enough evidence of a substantial change in circumstances - the deteriorating relationship and H.R.'s wishes), but reversed the parenting-time portion and vacated the fees. The court used this case to define "sole physical custody" for Nevada law for the first time: it is an arrangement where the child lives with only one parent and the other parent has "no significant in-person parenting time." The court explained that calling something "primary physical custody" does not change what it actually is - if a parent has only cards and phone calls, that is sole physical custody. The court held that before a judge enters a sole physical custody order, the judge must either find the noncustodial parent unfit, or make specific written findings explaining why primary physical custody is not in the child's best interest. The judge must then choose the least restrictive parenting arrangement possible, and if a less restrictive option (like supervised visits) is available but rejected, the judge must explain why on the record. The district court here did none of those things. The court also held that the trial judge improperly delegated decision-making power to Dr. Collins by letting the therapist decide when Maggie's parenting time could be expanded. Under Nevada law, only the court itself can decide substantive custody questions. The opinion further faulted the final order's specificity: it incorporated only an oral mid-hearing statement called "the March 11, 2022, Order," which was never reduced to writing in detail, making the order unenforceable. The attorney-fee award was vacated because being the "prevailing party" alone is not enough to justify fees in a custody case - the court must make additional findings under the relevant statute, and the trial judge did not. Finally, the Court of Appeals took the unusual step of directing that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand. The court pointed to multiple statements by the trial judge that, in the appellate court's view, raised reasonable doubts about her impartiality - including comments that children listen better to men because of "fisticuffs," that being a stepmother is harder than being a biological mother, and statements indicating the judge had made up her mind before Maggie put on her case.

Richard and Eleni Kilgore married in 1992, both worked for Clark County (Richard as a marshal, Eleni as a teacher), and both earned retirement benefits through Nevada's PERS system. They divorced in 2013. The decree said how each spouse's PERS benefits would be split when the time came, but it did not address vacation pay or sick pay either spouse had built up during the marriage. In 2015, Eleni asked the district court to make Richard start paying her share of his PERS benefits, because Richard had reached the age and years-of-service combination that made him eligible to retire (he became eligible in 2011, when he turned 50, after more than 20 years as a marshal). She also asked for half of the vacation and sick pay Richard had accumulated during the marriage. Richard wanted to keep working to maximize his pension and argued he should not have to pay Eleni anything until he actually retires. The district court agreed that Eleni was entitled to her community-property share dating back to her March 2015 motion. It calculated that, had Richard retired, Eleni would have received $2,455 per month from PERS. Adding up the period from March 2015 to early 2017, the court found Richard owed Eleni $56,575.76 and reduced that to a judgment Eleni could collect by lawful means. But after looking closely at Richard's finances - his child-support obligation, basic living expenses, and what garnishment law would allow - the court ordered Richard to pay only $350 per month toward that judgment, rather than the full $2,455. The court also ordered Richard to pay Eleni half of the vacation and sick pay he had accrued during the marriage (after taxes). Both sides appealed. Richard argued the court should not have ordered any pre-retirement payment. Eleni argued she should have received the full $2,455 per month. Richard also argued vacation and sick pay are not community property and that it was too late to raise them. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed everything. On the pension question, the court explained that under its prior decision in Gemma v. Gemma, a non-employee spouse can ask for her share of pension benefits once the employee spouse is first eligible to retire, even if he keeps working. But the Legislature later passed NRS 125.155, which gives the district court discretion to deny - or, the Supreme Court reasoned, reduce - such pre-retirement payments. The district court here used that discretion fairly: it preserved Eleni's full community-property interest by entering a judgment for the full amount owed, while letting Richard pay it down at $350 per month given his finances. On the vacation and sick pay, the court explained that a 2015 statute, NRS 125.150(3), lets either spouse come back within three years of discovering a mistakenly omitted asset and ask the court to divide it. Eleni did so within that window. The court held that vacation and sick pay earned during the marriage are a form of deferred compensation and therefore community property, even though they may be cashed out later.