Nevada family-law case summaries

Todd and Tracy Elwardt married in 2013. In October 2023, Tracy filed for divorce, asking the court to divide their property and to award her alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other). After a trial, the district court divided the couple's property and gave Tracy support. Among other things, the court awarded Tracy four dogs valued at $2,000, half the equity in the marital home, and half of roughly $400,000 in sales commissions Todd earned during the marriage but had not yet been paid. The court also ordered Todd to pay Tracy $4,000 per month for four years (periodic alimony) and $24,000 over two years (rehabilitative alimony, meant to help her get training or education). Todd appealed and raised several arguments. First, he said two of the dogs, Fiona and Enzo, were gifts to him and therefore his own separate property, or that the court valued the dogs incorrectly. The appeals court explained that property acquired during a marriage is presumed to belong to both spouses (community property) unless someone proves otherwise with strong evidence. Because the dogs were acquired during the marriage, and because Tracy had been caring for them while Todd had limited contact, the court concluded Todd had not proven they were his separate property. On the value, only one dog's cost ($2,000) was proven at trial, so the court accepted that figure. But the appeals court noted the decree did not make clear whether Todd received other property to make up for his share of the dogs' value, and directed the lower court to fix that on remand. Todd's main challenge concerned the connection between the commissions and the alimony. Todd is paid entirely on commission, and those commissions are not paid to him until a client pays the underlying sales contract - which can take up to three years. That means in the years right after the divorce, much of Todd's monthly income could come from commissions he earned during the marriage, half of which the court had already awarded to Tracy. The appeals court agreed the commissions counted as community property, but found the district court did not adequately account for the fact that handing Tracy her share of those commissions would reduce Todd's income while boosting Tracy's finances. Because the court did not make specific findings on how this affected Todd's ability to pay and Tracy's need, the appeals court vacated (canceled) the $4,000-per-month periodic alimony award and sent it back for the district court to reconsider with proper findings. The appeals court rejected Todd's other arguments. On the marital home, Todd argued the money should be traced back to homes he owned before or during the marriage as his separate property. The court explained that when separate property is put into a jointly owned home during marriage, it is presumed to be a gift to the community unless proven otherwise, and Todd had not overcome that presumption - the home was in joint tenancy, mortgage payments came from shared funds, and Todd himself acknowledged Tracy had "earned" being on the title. On rehabilitative alimony, the court found Tracy's testimony about the cost and time to finish her master's degree supported the $24,000 award. Finally, Todd asked that a different judge handle the case on remand, arguing the judge formed negative opinions of him (the decree mentioned Todd spoiling Tracy's medication, writing derogatory notes on support checks, and reducing the functionality of Tracy's Tesla). The court presumed judges are unbiased and found the judge's comments came from what the judge learned during the case, not from an outside source, and did not show deep-seated antagonism. Importantly, the court said the district court did not actually rely on that conduct in deciding alimony or property. So the case did not need to be reassigned.

Leslie and Paul Fassari married in California in 2012 and have no children together. They later moved to South Carolina, separated around June 2, 2024, and Leslie moved to Las Vegas. On November 5, 2024, she filed for divorce in Nevada's family court. In her complaint she asked the court not only to end the marriage but also to divide the couple's property, identify which property each owned before marriage as separate property, decide a claim of "marital waste," award her spousal support (alimony), and award her attorney fees and costs. She served Paul outside Nevada under a court rule allowing service elsewhere in the United States (NRCP 4.3(a)). Paul did not answer the complaint. Instead, he asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing the Nevada court did not have "personal jurisdiction" over him - that is, legal authority over him as an individual. Without that authority, he argued, the court could not decide property division, marital waste, or alimony. He also asked the court for his own attorney fees and costs for having to bring the motion. Leslie responded that Paul had actually submitted himself to Nevada's authority by asking for attorney fees and costs - in legal terms, by seeking "affirmative relief." She also argued that even if the court lacked authority over Paul personally, it could still simply dissolve the marriage based on its "in rem" jurisdiction (authority over the status of the marriage itself, which exists when one spouse genuinely lives in Nevada). She noted that South Carolina law would not let her file for divorce there until one year after separation. The district court dismissed the entire complaint. It found Paul had no ties to Nevada, that requesting attorney fees did not waive his jurisdiction objection, and that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him. It then declined to dissolve the marriage by itself, reasoning that splitting the divorce from the property issues is disfavored in Nevada and would create "numerous problems." The Court of Appeals reached a split result. On the personal-jurisdiction question, it agreed with the district court: Paul's request for attorney fees and costs was not "affirmative relief" and did not submit him to Nevada's authority, so the court correctly found it could not decide the property, waste, and alimony issues. But on the divorce itself, the appellate court disagreed with the dismissal. It explained that a "divisible divorce" - dissolving the marriage now while leaving the money-and-property issues for another court that has authority over both spouses - is different from the "bifurcated divorce" disfavored in older Nevada cases. The court held that if a person meets the statutory requirements for divorce (including living in Nevada at least six weeks), the district court does not have discretion to refuse the divorce. Because the district court never analyzed whether Leslie met those requirements, the appellate court sent that part of the case back for the district court to decide.

Claudia Lopez and Sergio Penaloza married in 2015 and had three children, two of whom are still minors. In 2023, Lopez filed for divorce, asking for sole legal and physical custody, alimony, child support, and back child support. She told the court there had been a history of domestic violence. Penaloza asked for joint legal custody but wanted Lopez to have primary physical custody, and he gave conflicting figures about how much money he earned. During the case, both parents repeatedly changed what they were asking for, and the court adjusted the temporary parenting-time schedule several times. Penaloza also asked to lower his child support, saying the couple's oldest child had turned 18, his income had dropped by more than 20 percent, and he could not afford his current payments. At an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented), the judge asked about domestic violence. The court learned that Lopez had obtained a protective order against Penaloza back in 2005, that Penaloza had no domestic violence conviction, and that the couple had later lived together without any new protective orders. The judge said she would not treat this as a recent history of domestic violence and would not consider it in the custody decision. The court awarded joint legal and physical custody, lowered Penaloza's child support, and decided he owed no back support because he had "been paying for so long" and the couple was "technically still married." The court also declined to award Lopez any alimony. On appeal, the higher court found several problems with the divorce decree. First, when deciding custody, Nevada law requires the judge to go through twelve "best interest" factors and write down findings connecting those factors to the custody decision. The decree here contained no such findings and did not analyze any of the factors. The court also did not make written findings about the alleged domestic violence. For those reasons, the appeals court reversed the joint physical custody award and sent it back for the judge to do the required analysis. Because custody and child support are connected, the appeals court also reversed the child support amount and sent it back to be recalculated after custody is decided. However, the appeals court upheld one specific factual finding: the judge's determination that Penaloza's gross monthly income was $5,000. Penaloza testified his higher past wage was temporary, and he backed that up with pay stubs and a letter from his employer, so the appeals court would not second-guess that finding. The appeals court found the judge made a legal mistake by wiping out Penaloza's child support arrears (past-due support). Under Nevada law, once child support payments become due, they turn into judgments that a court cannot erase or reduce after the fact. At the time of the decree, Penaloza owed $5,388.48 in arrears, so the appeals court reversed the waiver. Finally, the appeals court reversed the denial of alimony. Although the judge mentioned some of the factors the law requires her to weigh, she did not consider all of them - such as the parties' financial conditions, their earning capacities, their standard of living during the marriage, Lopez's career before the marriage, and her contribution as a homemaker. The case was sent back for the judge to consider all of the required factors.

Brian and Bryanna Ho were married for nearly seven years and had two young children. Both filed for divorce in October 2022, and their cases were combined. During the marriage, Bryanna stayed home to care for the children while Brian, a registered nurse, was the primary earner. The couple agreed on joint legal and physical custody of the children, so custody and child support were not part of this appeal. The appeal focused on two money issues: how the court divided the couple's property and how it calculated alimony (support payments from one former spouse to another). The first issue involved a Fidelity retirement account. During the marriage, Brian took out about $24,000 from that account (in two withdrawals of $12,500 and $17,500) and moved the money into the couple's joint Wells Fargo account. He testified he used the money to pay off shared credit card debt, and Bryanna did not dispute that. After the withdrawals, the account was worth roughly $2,486.31. The trial judge, however, found there was "no proof" of where the money went, called the withdrawals "unilateral and unsupported," and decided to treat the account as though it still held its pre-withdrawal value of $30,000 when dividing the property. To keep the split even, the court then shifted $10,686 of the marital home's equity from Brian to Bryanna. Notably, the same court also expressly found that neither spouse had committed "marital waste." The Court of Appeals held this was contradictory. If the court found no waste, then the withdrawn money was presumed spent for the benefit of the marriage (here, to pay off community debt). A community asset must be valued as of the date the divorce decree is entered - which was about $2,486.31, not the pre-withdrawal $30,000. By valuing the account at $30,000 without finding waste, the court effectively penalized Brian for waste it had said did not exist. The appellate court reversed this part and sent it back for a proper valuation and recalculation of the property division. The second issue was alimony. Bryanna asked for alimony so she could finish her education, explaining she had stayed home by agreement during the marriage. The trial court awarded her $1,650 per month for three years. In doing so, it decided Brian was capable of earning $12,680 per month - the monthly average from his 2022 tax return - even though his most recent 2023 financial disclosure showed a much lower gross monthly income of $7,271.16 plus small, occasional overtime. The court found Brian's explanation for why he stopped working overtime (the end of pandemic bonuses, more nurses hired, and his new custody schedule) not credible, and concluded he was reducing his income to lower his support obligations. The Court of Appeals agreed the trial court could award alimony and had properly analyzed the required statutory factors. But it found the *amount* was not supported by substantial evidence. The court had effectively added about $5,000 per month of "imputed" (assumed) income to Brian's figure without identifying how much of that was supposed to be overtime versus regular pay, and without evidence showing Brian could actually work that much overtime given the end of pandemic conditions and his new parenting duties. The appellate court also pointed out a factual mistake: the trial court described Brian's parenting time as a flexible "visitation" schedule, when in fact he had been awarded joint physical custody, which limited his availability to pick up extra shifts. Because the trial court did not properly account for Brian's changed circumstances or his actual ability to pay, the appellate court reversed the alimony amount and sent it back for reconsideration. Because it reversed the underlying rulings, the court also reversed the order requiring Brian to pay $4,245 of Bryanna's attorney fees.

Tarik Hacham and Dounia Sebai married in 2011 and had two children. In 2020, during a period of marital strain, the family took an extended trip that ended in Morocco. There, after a heated argument, Tarik took Dounia's and the children's passports and refused to return them. Tarik filed for divorce in a Moroccan court, which denied his requests to bar the children from leaving Morocco and ordered him to return the passports or face a daily fine. He did neither. Dounia, meanwhile, filed for divorce in Nevada and obtained an emergency order allowing her to get temporary replacement passports; she returned to Las Vegas with the children. The Moroccan court later issued a divorce decree awarding Dounia primary custody. Back in the United States, Tarik at first lived in Arizona and, according to the opinion, exercised less than his agreed parenting time or none at all before moving to Las Vegas in September 2022. During the Nevada divorce case, a discovery commissioner found that most of Tarik's responses to Dounia's requests for financial information were inadequate and that he had not acted in good faith. The commissioner ordered him to fully comply by a deadline or face a "negative inference" penalty - meaning that any information he withheld would be treated as supporting Dounia's side of the case. The district court adopted that order without objection from either party. After a trial, the district court awarded the parties joint legal custody but gave Dounia primary physical custody, finding that the statutory "best interest of the child" factors were either neutral or favored her. The court also ordered the Moroccan apartment sold with the proceeds split equally, and ordered Tarik to pay Dounia an equalization payment of roughly $51,000 because about $102,000 of the $160,000 he had withdrawn from his 401(k) retirement account - money both sides agreed belonged to the marital community - could not be traced to legitimate community expenses. Throughout the case, the court repeatedly questioned Tarik's credibility, noting contradictory statements and testimony belied by documents in evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Tarik's challenges. First, it refused to consider his argument that the Moroccan decree - which he claimed favored Dounia solely because she is the children's mother - violated his equal protection rights, because he never raised that argument in the district court and did not cogently argue it on appeal. In any event, the court concluded the custody decision rested on a comprehensive best-interest analysis in which the Moroccan decree was only one factor. Second, the court held the negative inference did not violate Tarik's due process rights, because he had specific notice at the discovery hearing that withheld information would be construed against him and had time to comply before the penalty took effect; and it held the district court properly treated the Moroccan apartment as community property, since Tarik's only support for his separate-property claim was a bare statement that he "bought a condo in 2008 prior to the marriage," with no documentation. Third, the court upheld the 401(k) ruling, because Tarik's evidence traced only about $57,000 of the $160,000 to community obligations, leaving roughly $102,000 unaccounted for. The court also held that Tarik waived his argument about the tax consequences of the 401(k) withdrawal by not raising it at trial.

Robert Draskovich is a criminal defense lawyer who has been practicing since 1997. When he married Laurinda in 2012, he was already a 65% partner in a law firm called Turco & Draskovich (T&D), where he had his own clients, staff, and pay separate from his only partner. Laurinda did not bring significant assets to the marriage and was a homemaker. In December 2018, T&D dissolved. The next month, Robert formed a new corporation called the Draskovich Law Group (DLG), which he wholly owned. According to uncontested testimony, DLG was "the very same practice" as Robert's share of T&D - same office, same clients, same staff, same assets. Only the letterhead and the name on the firm vehicles changed. By the time the divorce began in 2022, DLG was worth roughly $1,210,000. The trial judge ruled that because DLG was incorporated during the marriage, it was presumed to be community property (property owned jointly by both spouses) under Nevada law, and that Robert had not produced clear and convincing evidence of a separate property value. So the judge treated the entire firm as community property. The judge also denied Laurinda's request for alimony, partly because she would receive enough community assets to generate over $3,000 per month in passive income. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the community property ruling. It held that simply incorporating a business during a marriage does not automatically make the business community property. Courts must look at the "totality of the circumstances" to decide whether a business is genuinely a new acquisition or just a continuation of a pre-marriage enterprise under a new corporate name. Here, every meaningful aspect of Robert's law practice continued unchanged from T&D into DLG, so DLG is the continuation of his pre-marriage practice and is his separate property. That does not end the analysis. A separate-property business can still grow during a marriage because of the working spouse's labor or because of community resources, and the community is entitled to a fair share of that kind of growth. On remand, Laurinda will have the chance to prove by clear and convincing evidence what portion (if any) of DLG's increase in value during the marriage is attributable to community sources, such as Robert's "toil or talent" during the marriage. If she makes that showing, the district court must apportion DLG's value between separate and community interests. Because the alimony decision rested partly on how community property was distributed, and because that distribution will change once DLG is reanalyzed, the Supreme Court also vacated the alimony ruling and sent it back for fresh consideration.

Milan Rupel and Theresa Galten married in 2001. In July 2017, Galten filed for divorce, raising only issues about how to divide the couple's debts and assets. The case went to a five-day bench trial (a trial decided by a judge rather than a jury) in 2019. After the original judge retired, a new judge entered a divorce decree in February 2021 that largely repeated the earlier findings. Both sides appealed. Several disputes were at the center of the case. First, Rupel had transferred $90,550 he inherited from his mother into a shared "community" bank account. At trial, both spouses agreed (stipulated) that this money had become community property - meaning property owned jointly by the marriage. But the district court instead labeled the transfer "marital waste" (spending or destroying marital money for a selfish purpose unrelated to the marriage) and awarded Galten half of that amount ($45,275) as a separate award. The Court of Appeals found this was a mistake: because the money was community property to be split evenly, giving Galten a separate $45,275 award and then also splitting the account meant she effectively received an extra $45,275. The court reversed that award and directed the district court to simply divide the account equally. Second, the couple disputed the value of an investment called the Kai-Zen Plan, a premium-financed retirement plan whose future value could only be estimated. Each side's financial expert gave a value - Galten's expert said about $405,531, Rupel's expert said about $143,714 (or $148,714, as also stated in the opinion). The district court instead used $554,902, a figure that came from a years-old projection on a trial exhibit that itself said the value was not guaranteed. The Court of Appeals held that relying on that outdated estimate was an error and sent the valuation back to the district court for more fact-finding. Third, there was a bank account in Galten's name that held $63,789.67 before the marriage. Community funds were later added to it. The district court found the pre-marriage amount was Galten's separate property, but it wrote $67,789.67 in the decree - $4,000 more than the record supported. The Court of Appeals agreed this was a clerical error and sent it back to be corrected, but otherwise upheld the finding that the original amount was Galten's separate property. The court rejected the parties' other arguments. It held that money Rupel spent maintaining his separate vehicles, and cash he withdrew after the divorce filing for meals, haircuts, massages, and similar expenses, was not marital waste, because there was enough evidence supporting the district court's findings. It held that the district court was correct not to enforce a supposed agreement to end the community on December 31, 2019, because the emails and testimony showed the spouses never actually agreed on the essential terms. It held that Galten did not prove Rupel earned an extra $100,246 in 2016, since Rupel and his accountant testified that figure resulted from a reporting error later corrected. And it rejected Galten's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction, concluding the decree was a final judgment.

Matthew and Chelsea Carlson were divorced. After the divorce, they continued to fight in court over issues involving their two minor children, including custody, support, medical expenses, and which school the children would attend. Matthew filed a motion asking the court to address several of these issues. At a September 2018 hearing, Matthew told the court that the only issue he actually wanted to take to an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where evidence and testimony are presented) was his request to change the children's school. Even so, according to the opinion, he kept pursuing discovery — the formal process of gathering information and documents — on other issues he no longer intended to litigate. Chelsea eventually asked the court to rule in her favor without a trial (a motion for summary judgment) on all the claims. Matthew then tried to withdraw several of his requests, but the district court found he had not done so in time, which forced Chelsea to spend money filing her summary judgment motion to get those requests dismissed. The court ruled in Chelsea's favor on those requests but allowed the school-choice issue to go forward to the evidentiary hearing. On the second day of that hearing, the parties settled, and Matthew ultimately agreed to the school Chelsea had wanted. Chelsea then asked the court to make Matthew pay her attorney fees and costs. The court awarded her $45,503.17. Matthew appealed. The first time, the appellate court sent the case back because it could not tell exactly why the district court awarded the fees. On remand, the district court explained its reasoning more fully and again awarded the same amount. In this second appeal, Matthew argued the district court made several mistakes: that it wrongly treated Chelsea's summary judgment win as proof his claims were frivolous; that fees to a "prevailing party" are only allowed in cases involving money judgments; that filing his withdrawals late was not the same as frivolous litigation; and that Chelsea's original sworn statement supporting her fee request was defective. The Court of Appeals disagreed with each point and affirmed the fee award.

Herman and Nadine Williams married in 2004 and have four children - three boys (currently 9, 12, and almost 14) and a daughter, A.W., who is the oldest and turns 18 in October 2022. During the marriage, Nadine took out student loans and earned a master's degree in nursing and now works as a nurse. Herman works as a tow truck driver for a company called Copart, earning a fee for each completed tow. Tensions began in 2018. Nadine hit A.W. with a piece of PVC pipe, leaving a scar on the child's head, which led to a Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation that closed on the understanding that the children would be in Herman's care. Nadine also committed an act of domestic violence against her own mother, Phyllis Gayle. In March 2019, Herman took the children and left the marital home; Gayle then moved in with Herman, paying him $700 per month in rent. Nadine soon filed for divorce. Before trial, the district court gave Herman temporary physical custody, with Nadine getting weekend time that gradually increased. Over time, A.W. came to prefer living with Nadine, even running away from Herman to be with her, and she stayed with Nadine by her own choice; Herman last spent parenting time with A.W. in January 2020. Interviews conducted by the Family Mediation Center (FMC) showed the children's ratings of Nadine improved over time, reportedly after Nadine stopped using physical punishment when the court told her to do so. The case went to trial in February 2021. The district court decided several issues. On custody, it applied a legal presumption against Nadine because of her acts of domestic violence (a "rebuttable presumption" is a starting assumption that can be overcome by evidence), but concluded she overcame that presumption because she stopped using corporal punishment and the children reported improved relationships with her. The court ordered joint physical custody of all four children. On alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other), the court found neither party credible about their income and calculated their incomes from bank records and pay information. It found Herman's income was actually higher on a monthly basis and refused to award him alimony, describing the income gap as "negligible." On debts, the court treated Herman's roughly $75,000 in medical bills and Nadine's roughly $76,000 in student loans as community debt and offset them against each other, assigning each spouse their own debt. It did not divide Nadine's master's degree. Herman appealed. He narrowed his custody challenge to just the three boys, conceding he was not seeking custody of A.W. The appellate court reached four conclusions. First, it upheld the joint physical custody order for the boys, finding no abuse of discretion. Second, it declined to decide whether Nadine's master's degree should have been divided, because Herman never raised that issue at trial - only later in a post-judgment motion - so the point was not preserved for appeal. Third, it found the district court appears to have made an error in calculating Herman's income by counting some money twice: Herman moved money between his checking and savings accounts, and those internal transfers were mistakenly counted as additional income. Because that error may have affected the alimony decision, the court vacated (canceled) the alimony determination and sent it back for a recalculation. Fourth, it declined Herman's invitation to reexamine the district court's credibility findings, explaining that appellate courts generally defer to the trial court, which actually sees and hears the witnesses.

Matthew and Chelsea Carlson divorced under a stipulated (agreed-upon) divorce decree. Afterward, disputes arose. Matthew filed a motion asking for several things, including a request to change the school the couple's two minor children attended. Chelsea opposed that motion and made her own requests, including asking to be reimbursed for some of the children's medical expenses. Chelsea then asked the court for summary judgment - a ruling deciding claims without a full trial - on all the claims raised in the parties' motions. Matthew tried to withdraw several of his requests, but the district court granted summary judgment for Chelsea on those requests anyway, reasoning that Matthew did not withdraw them in time and that Chelsea should not have had to file for summary judgment. The court let the school-selection and medical-expenses issues, which Matthew still contested, go forward to an evidentiary hearing. On the second day of that hearing, the parties settled. They agreed the children would stay in their current school zone and that Matthew would pay Chelsea $700 to resolve the medical expenses. Turning that settlement into a written order proved difficult, with disagreements and delays, so Chelsea eventually asked the court to enter the stipulation and order without Matthew's signature, which the court did without objection from Matthew. Because that order left the question of attorney fees and costs for the court to decide later, Chelsea asked for $54,098.69 in fees and costs. The district court awarded her $45,503.17. On appeal, the Court of Appeals said it could not tell exactly why the district court awarded the fees. The trial court cited several legal provisions but made only one substantive finding - that Matthew's behavior, especially trying to withdraw requests only after Chelsea moved for summary judgment, multiplied the litigation. The appellate court noted that a fees award used as a sanction is supposed to be proportionate to the misconduct, and it was not clear how a $45,503.17 award (about 84 percent of what Chelsea sought) matched up with the specific conduct the court identified. The court also could not tell whether the trial judge was concerned only with the timing of Matthew's withdrawal or believed the requests were meritless from the start - a distinction that matters because some of the cited provisions require a finding that a claim lacked any reasonable basis when filed, and the district court made no such finding. Because the reasons for the award were unclear, the Court of Appeals reversed the order and sent the case back (remanded) for the district court to make additional findings. The court also noted that Chelsea had not yet supported her fee request with an affidavit from her counsel confirming the fees were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable.