Nevada family-law case summaries

Myisha and Ester Gray were married and share one child, born in 2017. After Myisha filed for divorce, the parties eventually agreed to share joint physical and legal custody, and the district court entered a divorce decree in 2022 adopting that agreement. The decree contained an "event" provision that let Myisha take the child to weekend events with seven days' notice, unless Ester already had plans with the child. The decree did not define "event." Ester later filed two motions to change the arrangement to give her primary physical custody. Her first motion, filed in November 2023, described a phone call from Myisha's girlfriend Rochelle reporting a domestic dispute in the child's presence (the "phone call incident"). The court declined to modify custody at that time, finding the parents had worked together in a stressful moment to keep the child's interests first. Ester's second motion, filed in November 2024, described a September 28, 2024 incident (the "soccer game incident") in which, according to Ester, Myisha pushed and hit her to separate her from the child, then grabbed the child by the arm and forced him into a vehicle as he screamed and cried. Myisha had been arrested for domestic violence in connection with that incident. Ester also said Myisha repeatedly used the "event" provision to take the child without her consent. The district court found a substantial change in circumstances based on the soccer game incident and gave Ester temporary primary physical custody. After an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, the district court granted Ester primary physical custody. It found that Myisha had committed domestic violence during the soccer game incident and had used the "event" provision to interfere with Ester's parenting time. The court reviewed the statutory best-interest factors, found by clear and convincing evidence that Myisha's conduct amounted to domestic violence (triggering a legal presumption against her having joint or sole custody), and found Myisha's testimony not credible - especially her denial of the soccer game events. The court gave Myisha parenting time each week and on the first weekend of each month, ended the "event" provision, and later awarded Ester $20,000 in attorney fees (reduced from the $46,989.25 requested, in light of the income difference between the parties). On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected each of Myisha's arguments. On the domestic violence history, the court found the record showed the district court did not use the older incidents (the gun incident and the phone call incident) to establish a "substantial change in circumstances"; instead it used them only in weighing the child's best interest, which is permitted. On the recorded phone call, the court held Myisha had objected below only on the ground that the call was recorded without consent, so her new hearsay and foundation arguments were forfeited and did not amount to plain error. On the claim that the court acted arbitrarily by revisiting the call, the court explained that credibility and weighing of evidence are left to the trial court, which used the call as one part of its overall credibility and best-interest analysis. On whether pulling the child's arm was domestic violence, the court said it did not need to decide that question because Myisha did not dispute that she committed domestic violence against Ester during the same incident, making any error harmless. On the rebuttal-evidence argument, the court held the findings were supported by substantial evidence and it would not reweigh credibility. Finally, the court upheld the fee award as within the district court's discretion.

Madison Buchanan and Corey Brewer were never married but had a child together, A.B., born in June 2020 in Las Vegas. After their romantic relationship ended in July 2022, they informally shared joint legal and physical custody of A.B. without a court order. Circumstances changed when Madison's now-husband accepted a job in Reno in June 2024 to be closer to his mother, who had been diagnosed with cancer. Madison then accepted her own job in Reno with an earlier start date, moving up her planned relocation to the end of October 2024. In response, Corey filed an amended complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody. Madison asked the court to set a temporary custody schedule and to allow her to relocate with A.B. to Reno. The parties went through mediation and agreed on some matters — they agreed to share joint legal custody and worked out schedules for holidays, vacations, and school breaks. But they could not agree on physical custody and relocation, so the district court held a trial where both parents testified. The testimony covered how they had shared custody, Corey's past drug use and his recovery efforts, the family support networks in both Las Vegas and Reno, Madison's better-paying Reno job and belief that Reno had better schools, and Madison's pregnancy and the chance for A.B. to spend more time with siblings. The district court decided that both parents were essentially equal when it came to what was best for A.B. Because the parent who wants to move must prove that moving is in the child's best interest, and because the court found the best-interest factors were evenly balanced (a "tie"), Madison did not carry that burden. The court denied her request to move and gave Corey primary physical custody. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision under an "abuse of discretion" standard — meaning it would not overturn the district court simply because it might have decided differently, but only if the decision lacked support in the evidence or was clearly wrong. The appeals court explained that because there was no prior permanent custody order in this case, the relocation statute the district court cited did not technically govern, but the district court was permitted to use that framework as a guide. The court found that the district court had properly considered whether Madison had a good reason to move (it found she did), and then weighed the child's best interest using the statutory best-interest factors. Because the district court's findings were supported by substantial evidence, and because the appeals court is not allowed to re-weigh the evidence itself, it affirmed the district court's decision.

Todd and Tracy Elwardt married in 2013. In October 2023, Tracy filed for divorce, asking the court to divide their property and to award her alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other). After a trial, the district court divided the couple's property and gave Tracy support. Among other things, the court awarded Tracy four dogs valued at $2,000, half the equity in the marital home, and half of roughly $400,000 in sales commissions Todd earned during the marriage but had not yet been paid. The court also ordered Todd to pay Tracy $4,000 per month for four years (periodic alimony) and $24,000 over two years (rehabilitative alimony, meant to help her get training or education). Todd appealed and raised several arguments. First, he said two of the dogs, Fiona and Enzo, were gifts to him and therefore his own separate property, or that the court valued the dogs incorrectly. The appeals court explained that property acquired during a marriage is presumed to belong to both spouses (community property) unless someone proves otherwise with strong evidence. Because the dogs were acquired during the marriage, and because Tracy had been caring for them while Todd had limited contact, the court concluded Todd had not proven they were his separate property. On the value, only one dog's cost ($2,000) was proven at trial, so the court accepted that figure. But the appeals court noted the decree did not make clear whether Todd received other property to make up for his share of the dogs' value, and directed the lower court to fix that on remand. Todd's main challenge concerned the connection between the commissions and the alimony. Todd is paid entirely on commission, and those commissions are not paid to him until a client pays the underlying sales contract - which can take up to three years. That means in the years right after the divorce, much of Todd's monthly income could come from commissions he earned during the marriage, half of which the court had already awarded to Tracy. The appeals court agreed the commissions counted as community property, but found the district court did not adequately account for the fact that handing Tracy her share of those commissions would reduce Todd's income while boosting Tracy's finances. Because the court did not make specific findings on how this affected Todd's ability to pay and Tracy's need, the appeals court vacated (canceled) the $4,000-per-month periodic alimony award and sent it back for the district court to reconsider with proper findings. The appeals court rejected Todd's other arguments. On the marital home, Todd argued the money should be traced back to homes he owned before or during the marriage as his separate property. The court explained that when separate property is put into a jointly owned home during marriage, it is presumed to be a gift to the community unless proven otherwise, and Todd had not overcome that presumption - the home was in joint tenancy, mortgage payments came from shared funds, and Todd himself acknowledged Tracy had "earned" being on the title. On rehabilitative alimony, the court found Tracy's testimony about the cost and time to finish her master's degree supported the $24,000 award. Finally, Todd asked that a different judge handle the case on remand, arguing the judge formed negative opinions of him (the decree mentioned Todd spoiling Tracy's medication, writing derogatory notes on support checks, and reducing the functionality of Tracy's Tesla). The court presumed judges are unbiased and found the judge's comments came from what the judge learned during the case, not from an outside source, and did not show deep-seated antagonism. Importantly, the court said the district court did not actually rely on that conduct in deciding alimony or property. So the case did not need to be reassigned.

Ricky DeNoto and Alisha Babbe Hilton, who were never married, share one child, T.D., born in 2017. After both moved to Nevada, they split parenting time evenly, one week on and one week off. Although both parents stayed involved, Hilton generally handled T.D.'s medical care, insurance, appointments, and school matters, and DeNoto usually deferred to her on those issues. In early 2024, Hilton took a temporary surgical-technologist job in Hawaii. The parents, representing themselves, signed a written "Permission to Travel" agreement letting T.D. stay in Hawaii from June 6, 2024, until sometime between July 8 and July 13, 2024. According to the opinion, Hilton did not present the trip as a permanent move, though she shipped her car to Hawaii before leaving. As the return date approached, DeNoto asked for travel details; Hilton first responded, then became evasive, and then stopped communicating. T.D. never came back and has remained in Hawaii. That August, DeNoto learned from T.D. that Hilton had enrolled him in a Hawaii school without DeNoto's knowledge or consent. The next month, T.D. was struck by a vehicle in the front yard of Hilton's Hawaii home. He suffered serious injuries, was placed in a medically induced coma for three days, hospitalized until late October, treated in the ICU, and underwent major surgery. By the time of trial, T.D. had undergone multiple surgeries, resumed some activity, and been cleared to travel, but still needed ongoing care, including one more surgery. DeNoto filed a paternity case in October 2024, and Hilton answered and counterclaimed. There were no prior custody or support orders. At trial, the district court decided Nevada had jurisdiction because T.D. had lived in Nevada for years before the June 2024 departure and because DeNoto filed within months of that departure. The parents agreed to share legal custody (the right to make major decisions), and the court entered detailed rules requiring them to consult on decisions, share medical and school information, and support T.D.'s relationship with the other parent. The contested question was physical custody — where T.D. would primarily live. The court worked through the statutory "best interest of the child" factors. It found most factors neutral. It found two factors favored Hilton: the parents' ability to cooperate to meet the child's needs (because Hilton historically handled medical, insurance, and school matters and had supported T.D. financially in Hawaii), and the child's physical, developmental, and emotional needs (because of his serious injuries, ongoing medical and therapy needs, school accommodations, and Hilton's ability to keep him on medical, dental, and vision insurance). The court awarded Hilton primary physical custody in Hawaii, gave DeNoto parenting time over school breaks and long weekends plus phone contact, and set child support and related financial terms. On appeal, DeNoto argued the court mishandled several best-interest factors, downplayed Hilton's failure to return T.D. and her unilateral school enrollment, failed to resolve conflicting testimony with credibility findings, and reached conclusions unsupported by the evidence. The Court of Appeals explained that it reviews custody decisions only for "abuse of discretion" — a deferential standard that does not allow the appeals court to re-weigh evidence or re-judge witness credibility. The court agreed with DeNoto on one point: the district court's finding that one factor (whether a parent would allow the child a continuing relationship with the other parent) was "neutral" seemed inconsistent with the trial court's own findings that Hilton had "reneged on the agreement," become evasive, gone "radio silence," and enrolled T.D. in school without consent. But the appeals court concluded the trial court did not ignore that conduct — it acknowledged the conduct and weighed it against other evidence, such as the parents' long history of co-parenting, DeNoto's phone access, and his extended visits. The appeals court held that even if that factor was weighed improperly, it would not change the result, because DeNoto did not meaningfully dispute the finding about T.D.'s serious medical and educational needs, which strongly supported placing him with Hilton. Because the district court considered the required factors, made findings adequate for review, and reached a decision supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Leslie and Paul Fassari married in California in 2012 and have no children together. They later moved to South Carolina, separated around June 2, 2024, and Leslie moved to Las Vegas. On November 5, 2024, she filed for divorce in Nevada's family court. In her complaint she asked the court not only to end the marriage but also to divide the couple's property, identify which property each owned before marriage as separate property, decide a claim of "marital waste," award her spousal support (alimony), and award her attorney fees and costs. She served Paul outside Nevada under a court rule allowing service elsewhere in the United States (NRCP 4.3(a)). Paul did not answer the complaint. Instead, he asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing the Nevada court did not have "personal jurisdiction" over him - that is, legal authority over him as an individual. Without that authority, he argued, the court could not decide property division, marital waste, or alimony. He also asked the court for his own attorney fees and costs for having to bring the motion. Leslie responded that Paul had actually submitted himself to Nevada's authority by asking for attorney fees and costs - in legal terms, by seeking "affirmative relief." She also argued that even if the court lacked authority over Paul personally, it could still simply dissolve the marriage based on its "in rem" jurisdiction (authority over the status of the marriage itself, which exists when one spouse genuinely lives in Nevada). She noted that South Carolina law would not let her file for divorce there until one year after separation. The district court dismissed the entire complaint. It found Paul had no ties to Nevada, that requesting attorney fees did not waive his jurisdiction objection, and that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him. It then declined to dissolve the marriage by itself, reasoning that splitting the divorce from the property issues is disfavored in Nevada and would create "numerous problems." The Court of Appeals reached a split result. On the personal-jurisdiction question, it agreed with the district court: Paul's request for attorney fees and costs was not "affirmative relief" and did not submit him to Nevada's authority, so the court correctly found it could not decide the property, waste, and alimony issues. But on the divorce itself, the appellate court disagreed with the dismissal. It explained that a "divisible divorce" - dissolving the marriage now while leaving the money-and-property issues for another court that has authority over both spouses - is different from the "bifurcated divorce" disfavored in older Nevada cases. The court held that if a person meets the statutory requirements for divorce (including living in Nevada at least six weeks), the district court does not have discretion to refuse the divorce. Because the district court never analyzed whether Leslie met those requirements, the appellate court sent that part of the case back for the district court to decide.

Claudia Lopez and Sergio Penaloza married in 2015 and had three children, two of whom are still minors. In 2023, Lopez filed for divorce, asking for sole legal and physical custody, alimony, child support, and back child support. She told the court there had been a history of domestic violence. Penaloza asked for joint legal custody but wanted Lopez to have primary physical custody, and he gave conflicting figures about how much money he earned. During the case, both parents repeatedly changed what they were asking for, and the court adjusted the temporary parenting-time schedule several times. Penaloza also asked to lower his child support, saying the couple's oldest child had turned 18, his income had dropped by more than 20 percent, and he could not afford his current payments. At an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented), the judge asked about domestic violence. The court learned that Lopez had obtained a protective order against Penaloza back in 2005, that Penaloza had no domestic violence conviction, and that the couple had later lived together without any new protective orders. The judge said she would not treat this as a recent history of domestic violence and would not consider it in the custody decision. The court awarded joint legal and physical custody, lowered Penaloza's child support, and decided he owed no back support because he had "been paying for so long" and the couple was "technically still married." The court also declined to award Lopez any alimony. On appeal, the higher court found several problems with the divorce decree. First, when deciding custody, Nevada law requires the judge to go through twelve "best interest" factors and write down findings connecting those factors to the custody decision. The decree here contained no such findings and did not analyze any of the factors. The court also did not make written findings about the alleged domestic violence. For those reasons, the appeals court reversed the joint physical custody award and sent it back for the judge to do the required analysis. Because custody and child support are connected, the appeals court also reversed the child support amount and sent it back to be recalculated after custody is decided. However, the appeals court upheld one specific factual finding: the judge's determination that Penaloza's gross monthly income was $5,000. Penaloza testified his higher past wage was temporary, and he backed that up with pay stubs and a letter from his employer, so the appeals court would not second-guess that finding. The appeals court found the judge made a legal mistake by wiping out Penaloza's child support arrears (past-due support). Under Nevada law, once child support payments become due, they turn into judgments that a court cannot erase or reduce after the fact. At the time of the decree, Penaloza owed $5,388.48 in arrears, so the appeals court reversed the waiver. Finally, the appeals court reversed the denial of alimony. Although the judge mentioned some of the factors the law requires her to weigh, she did not consider all of them - such as the parties' financial conditions, their earning capacities, their standard of living during the marriage, Lopez's career before the marriage, and her contribution as a homemaker. The case was sent back for the judge to consider all of the required factors.

Cheyenne Soldo-Allesio and Kevin Alan Ferguson were never married but share a young child, E.F. After their final separation in February 2022, Soldo-Allesio obtained a temporary protective order (TPO) - a short-term court order intended to protect a person from alleged abuse - against Ferguson based on allegations of domestic violence and moved with E.F. to Florida. Ferguson then filed for primary physical custody in Nevada. Soldo-Allesio responded that Ferguson had a long history of domestic violence, attaching exhibits including the TPO and its extension, police reports, and photos of injuries. At trial, the district court excluded all of Soldo-Allesio's exhibits, mainly because she disclosed her trial exhibit list only three days before trial. Soldo-Allesio still testified about several incidents of alleged abuse. The court ultimately found there was no "clear and convincing evidence" of domestic violence and largely awarded the custody outcome Ferguson requested. Soldo-Allesio asked the court to reconsider, arguing it had used the wrong burden of proof on the domestic violence question and had wrongly thrown out all her exhibits. The district court denied that motion. The Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that Nevada law uses two different burdens of proof when domestic violence comes up in a custody case. To trigger the legal "rebuttable presumption" - a starting assumption a parent can try to overcome - that an abuser should not get custody, the abuse must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence" (a high standard). But when the court is simply weighing domestic violence as one of the statutory "best interest" factors used to choose a custody arrangement, the standard is the lower "preponderance of the evidence" (more likely than not). The district court used the higher standard for both purposes, which the Court of Appeals held was legal error. The Court of Appeals also held that the district court was wrong to suggest Soldo-Allesio needed to show Ferguson had been criminally convicted of domestic violence. A criminal conviction is not required to prove domestic violence in a civil custody case; a victim's testimony alone can be enough. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that excluding all of Soldo-Allesio's exhibits effectively was a discovery sanction, and the district court did not follow the rules (NRCP 16.205(g) and NRCP 37(c)) governing such sanctions - rules that require the court to consider whether the failure to disclose was justified or harmless and whether exclusion is an appropriate penalty. That mattered especially because some of the excluded exhibits had already been served on Ferguson earlier in the case, and because the Nevada Supreme Court has said courts must hear "all information regarding domestic violence" when deciding what is best for a child. The case was sent back to the district court to apply the right legal standards and reconsider the evidence.

Dory and Eli Mizrachi divorced in 2012. In their divorce, the court gave both parents joint legal custody (shared authority over major decisions) and joint physical custody (roughly shared parenting time) of their son, J.M., who was born in 2008. In 2020, Eli asked the court to change the custody arrangement so he would have primary physical custody. He said J.M. reported that Dory had physically struck him, used inappropriate language, and had inappropriate conversations with him, and that Dory sometimes left the home at night, leaving J.M. unsupervised. Eli argued this amounted to a "substantial change in circumstances" affecting J.M.'s welfare and that giving him primary physical custody was in J.M.'s best interest. Dory disagreed, denied mistreating J.M., raised claims of domestic violence she said Eli committed during the marriage, and asked to keep the existing shared arrangement. The case moved through several stages. In March 2022, the court entered an order reflecting a temporary agreement letting J.M., who was older by then, use some discretion about how long he stayed with each parent. Later, the judge originally handling the case, Judge Mary Perry, recused herself (stepped aside) after acknowledging she had improperly asked Dory's attorney to help her courtroom clerk with a court issue. Eli asked her to recuse; Dory did not object. The case was reassigned to Judge Dawn Throne, who reviewed the record and video recordings of prior testimony rather than starting the whole hearing over. Neither party wanted to recall witnesses. After hearing evidence, including testimony from J.M. and both parents, Judge Throne found there had been a substantial change in circumstances, chiefly the serious deterioration of the relationship between J.M. and Dory. The court reviewed the statutory "best interest" factors and concluded it was in J.M.'s best interest to give Eli primary physical custody, while keeping joint legal custody and giving Dory scheduled parenting time. On appeal, Dory made six arguments. The Court of Appeals rejected all of them. It held: the March 2022 order was temporary, not final, so the court could keep holding hearings; Dory waived her complaint about Judge Perry's recusal because she did not object at the time; Judge Throne was sufficiently familiar with the record and did not have to restart the hearing; the custody modification was supported by substantial evidence and was not an abuse of the court's discretion; even if the court was wrong to exclude testimony about pre-divorce domestic violence, Dory did not show that error affected the outcome (so it was "harmless"); and the exclusion of the child's new therapist's testimony was proper under the "law-of-the-case doctrine" because a prior judge had already decided that issue and Dory did not show a reason to revisit it.

Brian and Bryanna Ho were married for nearly seven years and had two young children. Both filed for divorce in October 2022, and their cases were combined. During the marriage, Bryanna stayed home to care for the children while Brian, a registered nurse, was the primary earner. The couple agreed on joint legal and physical custody of the children, so custody and child support were not part of this appeal. The appeal focused on two money issues: how the court divided the couple's property and how it calculated alimony (support payments from one former spouse to another). The first issue involved a Fidelity retirement account. During the marriage, Brian took out about $24,000 from that account (in two withdrawals of $12,500 and $17,500) and moved the money into the couple's joint Wells Fargo account. He testified he used the money to pay off shared credit card debt, and Bryanna did not dispute that. After the withdrawals, the account was worth roughly $2,486.31. The trial judge, however, found there was "no proof" of where the money went, called the withdrawals "unilateral and unsupported," and decided to treat the account as though it still held its pre-withdrawal value of $30,000 when dividing the property. To keep the split even, the court then shifted $10,686 of the marital home's equity from Brian to Bryanna. Notably, the same court also expressly found that neither spouse had committed "marital waste." The Court of Appeals held this was contradictory. If the court found no waste, then the withdrawn money was presumed spent for the benefit of the marriage (here, to pay off community debt). A community asset must be valued as of the date the divorce decree is entered - which was about $2,486.31, not the pre-withdrawal $30,000. By valuing the account at $30,000 without finding waste, the court effectively penalized Brian for waste it had said did not exist. The appellate court reversed this part and sent it back for a proper valuation and recalculation of the property division. The second issue was alimony. Bryanna asked for alimony so she could finish her education, explaining she had stayed home by agreement during the marriage. The trial court awarded her $1,650 per month for three years. In doing so, it decided Brian was capable of earning $12,680 per month - the monthly average from his 2022 tax return - even though his most recent 2023 financial disclosure showed a much lower gross monthly income of $7,271.16 plus small, occasional overtime. The court found Brian's explanation for why he stopped working overtime (the end of pandemic bonuses, more nurses hired, and his new custody schedule) not credible, and concluded he was reducing his income to lower his support obligations. The Court of Appeals agreed the trial court could award alimony and had properly analyzed the required statutory factors. But it found the *amount* was not supported by substantial evidence. The court had effectively added about $5,000 per month of "imputed" (assumed) income to Brian's figure without identifying how much of that was supposed to be overtime versus regular pay, and without evidence showing Brian could actually work that much overtime given the end of pandemic conditions and his new parenting duties. The appellate court also pointed out a factual mistake: the trial court described Brian's parenting time as a flexible "visitation" schedule, when in fact he had been awarded joint physical custody, which limited his availability to pick up extra shifts. Because the trial court did not properly account for Brian's changed circumstances or his actual ability to pay, the appellate court reversed the alimony amount and sent it back for reconsideration. Because it reversed the underlying rulings, the court also reversed the order requiring Brian to pay $4,245 of Bryanna's attorney fees.

Stephanie and Garrett Hatcher were married and have one child together. When Stephanie filed for divorce, both parents asked for joint legal custody, and each wanted to be the parent the child primarily lives with (called "primary physical custody"). In January 2021, the district court granted the divorce and decided the custody arrangement. The court found that Garrett had communicated with Stephanie in an inappropriate manner, so it gave Stephanie primary physical custody and limited Garrett to supervised parenting time on Saturdays and Sundays from 10:00 a.m. to noon. That supervised time was to be run by an agency called Family First Services at Garrett's expense until he could show, through a communications app called Talking Parents, that he could communicate properly with Stephanie. The court also entered a "behavior order" telling both parents not to use abusive or foul language. In 2022, Stephanie asked the court to change the arrangement. She wanted sole legal custody, wanted Garrett's parenting time further restricted because he had attended few of his scheduled visits, and asked the court to hold Garrett in contempt (a finding that a person disobeyed a court order) for using inappropriate language, for claiming the child on his federal taxes, and for leaving the former marital home in poor condition. She also asked the court to make Garrett pay her attorney fees. Garrett opposed her request and filed his own motion asking for unsupervised parenting time. He explained that he had temporarily moved to California for financial reasons and could not visit in person during that period, that he tried to talk to the child by phone but said Stephanie would not help make that happen, and that after returning to Nevada the high cost of supervised sessions limited how often he could see the child. He said he wanted more time, and unsupervised time, to build his relationship with the child. After hearings in August and October 2023, the district court reviewed the parties' testimony and their Talking Parents messages. The court found that the most recent objectionable message from Garrett was in January 2023 and that his communications had been appropriate since then. Because the supervised-time requirement had been put in place due to his poor communication, and because Garrett had shown he could now communicate properly, the court found supervised visits were no longer necessary and posed no safety risk to the child. The court kept Stephanie as the primary physical custodian and kept joint legal custody, but gave Garrett unsupervised parenting time of two days per week, including one overnight. The court did not find Garrett's testimony that money was the only reason he missed visits to be credible, declined to hold him in contempt because he had improved his communication, and denied Stephanie's request for attorney fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that it does not re-decide the facts or re-weigh whether one witness was more believable than another; instead it checks whether the trial court had solid enough evidence to support its findings and whether it decided for the right legal reasons. Applying that limited review, the court concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on any of the four issues Stephanie raised. The court therefore affirmed.

Tarik Hacham and Dounia Sebai married in 2011 and had two children. In 2020, during a period of marital strain, the family took an extended trip that ended in Morocco. There, after a heated argument, Tarik took Dounia's and the children's passports and refused to return them. Tarik filed for divorce in a Moroccan court, which denied his requests to bar the children from leaving Morocco and ordered him to return the passports or face a daily fine. He did neither. Dounia, meanwhile, filed for divorce in Nevada and obtained an emergency order allowing her to get temporary replacement passports; she returned to Las Vegas with the children. The Moroccan court later issued a divorce decree awarding Dounia primary custody. Back in the United States, Tarik at first lived in Arizona and, according to the opinion, exercised less than his agreed parenting time or none at all before moving to Las Vegas in September 2022. During the Nevada divorce case, a discovery commissioner found that most of Tarik's responses to Dounia's requests for financial information were inadequate and that he had not acted in good faith. The commissioner ordered him to fully comply by a deadline or face a "negative inference" penalty - meaning that any information he withheld would be treated as supporting Dounia's side of the case. The district court adopted that order without objection from either party. After a trial, the district court awarded the parties joint legal custody but gave Dounia primary physical custody, finding that the statutory "best interest of the child" factors were either neutral or favored her. The court also ordered the Moroccan apartment sold with the proceeds split equally, and ordered Tarik to pay Dounia an equalization payment of roughly $51,000 because about $102,000 of the $160,000 he had withdrawn from his 401(k) retirement account - money both sides agreed belonged to the marital community - could not be traced to legitimate community expenses. Throughout the case, the court repeatedly questioned Tarik's credibility, noting contradictory statements and testimony belied by documents in evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Tarik's challenges. First, it refused to consider his argument that the Moroccan decree - which he claimed favored Dounia solely because she is the children's mother - violated his equal protection rights, because he never raised that argument in the district court and did not cogently argue it on appeal. In any event, the court concluded the custody decision rested on a comprehensive best-interest analysis in which the Moroccan decree was only one factor. Second, the court held the negative inference did not violate Tarik's due process rights, because he had specific notice at the discovery hearing that withheld information would be construed against him and had time to comply before the penalty took effect; and it held the district court properly treated the Moroccan apartment as community property, since Tarik's only support for his separate-property claim was a bare statement that he "bought a condo in 2008 prior to the marriage," with no documentation. Third, the court upheld the 401(k) ruling, because Tarik's evidence traced only about $57,000 of the $160,000 to community obligations, leaving roughly $102,000 unaccounted for. The court also held that Tarik waived his argument about the tax consequences of the 401(k) withdrawal by not raising it at trial.

Robert Draskovich is a criminal defense lawyer who has been practicing since 1997. When he married Laurinda in 2012, he was already a 65% partner in a law firm called Turco & Draskovich (T&D), where he had his own clients, staff, and pay separate from his only partner. Laurinda did not bring significant assets to the marriage and was a homemaker. In December 2018, T&D dissolved. The next month, Robert formed a new corporation called the Draskovich Law Group (DLG), which he wholly owned. According to uncontested testimony, DLG was "the very same practice" as Robert's share of T&D - same office, same clients, same staff, same assets. Only the letterhead and the name on the firm vehicles changed. By the time the divorce began in 2022, DLG was worth roughly $1,210,000. The trial judge ruled that because DLG was incorporated during the marriage, it was presumed to be community property (property owned jointly by both spouses) under Nevada law, and that Robert had not produced clear and convincing evidence of a separate property value. So the judge treated the entire firm as community property. The judge also denied Laurinda's request for alimony, partly because she would receive enough community assets to generate over $3,000 per month in passive income. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the community property ruling. It held that simply incorporating a business during a marriage does not automatically make the business community property. Courts must look at the "totality of the circumstances" to decide whether a business is genuinely a new acquisition or just a continuation of a pre-marriage enterprise under a new corporate name. Here, every meaningful aspect of Robert's law practice continued unchanged from T&D into DLG, so DLG is the continuation of his pre-marriage practice and is his separate property. That does not end the analysis. A separate-property business can still grow during a marriage because of the working spouse's labor or because of community resources, and the community is entitled to a fair share of that kind of growth. On remand, Laurinda will have the chance to prove by clear and convincing evidence what portion (if any) of DLG's increase in value during the marriage is attributable to community sources, such as Robert's "toil or talent" during the marriage. If she makes that showing, the district court must apportion DLG's value between separate and community interests. Because the alimony decision rested partly on how community property was distributed, and because that distribution will change once DLG is reanalyzed, the Supreme Court also vacated the alimony ruling and sent it back for fresh consideration.

Erika and Michael Kragen have three minor children. The family lived in California before moving to Nevada in early August 2022. By January 31, 2023, Erika had moved back to California with the children while Michael stayed in Nevada. Michael then filed for divorce in Nevada; two days later, Erika filed for legal separation and a domestic violence restraining order in California. Both sought custody, which raised the question of which state's courts had the power to decide custody. That question turns on a law called the UCCJEA (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which Nevada has adopted). Under that framework, the children's "home state" - generally, the state where the children lived for at least six consecutive months before the case started - has first priority to decide custody. Here, the exact date the family moved to Nevada mattered enormously: if they arrived on August 1, 2022, the children may have lived in Nevada for the required six months; if they arrived on August 3 or 4, they did not. The parties' paperwork conflicted. Michael's filings and a U-Haul receipt suggested an August 1 move; Erika's filings, a different U-Haul receipt, text messages, and a bank statement suggested the family left California on the night of August 3 and arrived in Nevada on August 4. Erika had originally filed a declaration in the California case stating the move date as August 1, but she later amended it to say August 3. The Nevada district court found that the family had lived in Nevada from August 2022 through January 2023 - six months - and concluded it had home state jurisdiction. It based that decision on the parties' declarations, treating Erika's original California declaration (with the August 1 date) as binding. Before determining jurisdiction, the court had also issued a temporary custody order giving both parents joint legal and physical custody on a week-on/week-off schedule - even though a California court had already entered a restraining order temporarily giving Erika sole legal and joint physical custody and limiting Michael to supervised visits. The Nevada court did not take testimony and said it would not consider Erika's domestic violence allegations until trial. The Court of Appeals granted Erika's petition for a writ of mandamus - a court order compelling a lower court to do something it is required to do. The appellate court held that Erika's original California declaration was not a binding "judicial admission" because it was filed in a different case and was later amended; it could be considered as evidence, but it was not conclusive on the disputed move date. Because the evidence about the move date conflicted, the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing - a proceeding where witnesses testify and evidence is formally presented - before deciding whether it had jurisdiction. The appellate court also held that the district court lacked authority to issue a temporary custody order before determining it had jurisdiction, and that granting joint custody without any findings on the children's best interest, despite Erika's domestic violence allegations, "was a manifest abuse of discretion." The district court must now vacate its jurisdictional orders, hold an evidentiary hearing, and - if it finds it has jurisdiction - reconsider temporary custody in light of any supported domestic violence allegations.

Trisha and Joshua Rowberry divorced in 2012. Trisha received primary physical custody of their two children, and both parents shared joint legal custody. Joshua had weekly parenting time. In 2019 Trisha married Trevyn, a U.S. Air Force officer stationed near Phoenix, Arizona. Trisha asked the court for permission to move the children to Arizona; the district court granted that request in March 2020, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in a 2021 ruling. Not long after, in July 2020, Trevyn received military orders to report to a base near San Antonio, Texas. Trisha and Trevyn moved to Texas. At the time Trisha moved, the children were physically staying with Joshua in Nevada for the summer. Trisha notified Joshua of the move by email, and Joshua initially disagreed. Trisha filed an emergency motion to have the children returned to her, but Joshua relented and let the children go to Texas, so that motion became unnecessary. The children then enrolled in school in Texas. A series of motions followed. At one point the district court told Trisha she needed to file a second relocation motion (to move from Arizona to Texas). Trisha challenged that requirement in the Nevada Supreme Court, but the Court of Appeals denied her challenge because of a recent Nevada Supreme Court decision, Pelkola v. Pelkola, which held that a parent needs permission even when moving from one state outside Nevada to another state outside Nevada. Trisha then filed her second relocation motion. Joshua filed a countermotion asking for primary physical custody in Nevada. At a May 2022 evidentiary hearing, the court heard testimony from Trisha, Joshua, and Trevyn, including testimony about alleged domestic violence in the Texas home involving Trisha, Trevyn, and the older child, T.R. Those incidents had been investigated by Texas child protective services (which reached an "unable to determine" finding), the Air Force (which found the allegation did not meet its criteria), and local law enforcement (which filed no charges). T.R. told a Las Vegas interviewer he preferred to live with Joshua; the younger child, A.R., said she preferred to live with her mother in Texas. After the hearing, the district court issued a 28-page order and a formal decision. It found that Trisha had "relocated from Arizona to Texas without permission," treated that as effectively violating a criminal statute (NRS 200.359), excluded the evidence she had gathered after moving to Texas, and granted Joshua primary physical custody, finding it in the children's best interest. The Court of Appeals reversed. It found several errors. First, the court held that the criminal statute Trisha was accused of violating did not apply to her, because when she moved, the children were with Joshua in Nevada, not in her physical custody, and both Joshua and the court knew about the move before the children were relocated. Because she did not violate that criminal statute, the court also held that the evidence-exclusion rule tied to that statute should not have been used against her, meaning her post-relocation evidence about the children's schooling and activities was wrongly excluded. Second, the court found that the district court analyzed the evidence improperly. It compared the children's grades in Texas to their grades in Nevada, but the relevant comparison in a second relocation case would be between Arizona (where they had been authorized to live) and Texas. The court also found the district judge had improperly revisited and rejected findings from the earlier 2020 relocation decision, which is barred by a rule called "law of the case." Third, the court found several of the district court's factual findings were not supported by the evidence, including findings that Trisha would not comply with visitation orders, that she refused to file a relocation motion, and that she violated the criminal statute. However, the court found that the district court's finding about Joshua's motives in opposing relocation was adequately supported. Fourth, the court found the district court wrongly handled A.R.'s stated preference. A.R. was nearly 13-and-a-half when interviewed and expressed a clear wish to stay in Texas with her mother, but the district court decided she lacked the maturity to form an intelligent preference, based partly on her answers to a question about three wishes (she said she wanted to stop having migraines and to have mind-reading superpowers). The Court of Appeals found the district court applied the wrong legal standard and improperly combined A.R.'s situation with T.R.'s, even though A.R. was not involved in the alleged domestic violence and had a closer relationship with her mother. Finally, the court declined Trisha's request to limit the Pelkola decision for military families. It explained that it is bound to follow the Nevada Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, and that any change for military families would have to come from the Legislature, Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, or the Nevada Supreme Court. The case was sent back to the district court for a new determination on Trisha's motion to relocate with A.R. and Joshua's countermotion for primary custody.

Milan Rupel and Theresa Galten married in 2001. In July 2017, Galten filed for divorce, raising only issues about how to divide the couple's debts and assets. The case went to a five-day bench trial (a trial decided by a judge rather than a jury) in 2019. After the original judge retired, a new judge entered a divorce decree in February 2021 that largely repeated the earlier findings. Both sides appealed. Several disputes were at the center of the case. First, Rupel had transferred $90,550 he inherited from his mother into a shared "community" bank account. At trial, both spouses agreed (stipulated) that this money had become community property - meaning property owned jointly by the marriage. But the district court instead labeled the transfer "marital waste" (spending or destroying marital money for a selfish purpose unrelated to the marriage) and awarded Galten half of that amount ($45,275) as a separate award. The Court of Appeals found this was a mistake: because the money was community property to be split evenly, giving Galten a separate $45,275 award and then also splitting the account meant she effectively received an extra $45,275. The court reversed that award and directed the district court to simply divide the account equally. Second, the couple disputed the value of an investment called the Kai-Zen Plan, a premium-financed retirement plan whose future value could only be estimated. Each side's financial expert gave a value - Galten's expert said about $405,531, Rupel's expert said about $143,714 (or $148,714, as also stated in the opinion). The district court instead used $554,902, a figure that came from a years-old projection on a trial exhibit that itself said the value was not guaranteed. The Court of Appeals held that relying on that outdated estimate was an error and sent the valuation back to the district court for more fact-finding. Third, there was a bank account in Galten's name that held $63,789.67 before the marriage. Community funds were later added to it. The district court found the pre-marriage amount was Galten's separate property, but it wrote $67,789.67 in the decree - $4,000 more than the record supported. The Court of Appeals agreed this was a clerical error and sent it back to be corrected, but otherwise upheld the finding that the original amount was Galten's separate property. The court rejected the parties' other arguments. It held that money Rupel spent maintaining his separate vehicles, and cash he withdrew after the divorce filing for meals, haircuts, massages, and similar expenses, was not marital waste, because there was enough evidence supporting the district court's findings. It held that the district court was correct not to enforce a supposed agreement to end the community on December 31, 2019, because the emails and testimony showed the spouses never actually agreed on the essential terms. It held that Galten did not prove Rupel earned an extra $100,246 in 2016, since Rupel and his accountant testified that figure resulted from a reporting error later corrected. And it rejected Galten's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction, concluding the decree was a final judgment.

Matthew and Chelsea Carlson were divorced. After the divorce, they continued to fight in court over issues involving their two minor children, including custody, support, medical expenses, and which school the children would attend. Matthew filed a motion asking the court to address several of these issues. At a September 2018 hearing, Matthew told the court that the only issue he actually wanted to take to an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where evidence and testimony are presented) was his request to change the children's school. Even so, according to the opinion, he kept pursuing discovery — the formal process of gathering information and documents — on other issues he no longer intended to litigate. Chelsea eventually asked the court to rule in her favor without a trial (a motion for summary judgment) on all the claims. Matthew then tried to withdraw several of his requests, but the district court found he had not done so in time, which forced Chelsea to spend money filing her summary judgment motion to get those requests dismissed. The court ruled in Chelsea's favor on those requests but allowed the school-choice issue to go forward to the evidentiary hearing. On the second day of that hearing, the parties settled, and Matthew ultimately agreed to the school Chelsea had wanted. Chelsea then asked the court to make Matthew pay her attorney fees and costs. The court awarded her $45,503.17. Matthew appealed. The first time, the appellate court sent the case back because it could not tell exactly why the district court awarded the fees. On remand, the district court explained its reasoning more fully and again awarded the same amount. In this second appeal, Matthew argued the district court made several mistakes: that it wrongly treated Chelsea's summary judgment win as proof his claims were frivolous; that fees to a "prevailing party" are only allowed in cases involving money judgments; that filing his withdrawals late was not the same as frivolous litigation; and that Chelsea's original sworn statement supporting her fee request was defective. The Court of Appeals disagreed with each point and affirmed the fee award.

Jashawn Prevost and Keilah Gronvold met in 2013 and had a child together in 2014. The family moved to Las Vegas in 2015 and lived there until the parents separated in 2020. After the separation, Gronvold moved to Mississippi while Prevost stayed in Las Vegas with the child. Prevost then filed a court case (representing himself) asking for custody, and Gronvold answered and filed her own counterclaim, also representing herself. The parties could not agree through mediation, so the case went to trial in April 2021. Both appeared virtually for a trial that lasted a single afternoon. Prevost called the child's teacher as a witness, who testified that the child had struggled in school until Gronvold left and that the child improved after Prevost became more involved. Prevost testified that he was the best parent and accused Gronvold's current partner of being a "pedophile and sex trafficker." By his own testimony, however, Prevost based those accusations only on what Gronvold had told him ("per her"). Gronvold testified that she wanted joint physical custody and to be able to see her child in Mississippi. She said she never told Prevost the things he used to support his accusations against her partner. She also described a relationship marked by repeated domestic violence, including beatings that required staples in her head, a black eye, being shot with a pellet gun, and threats to kill her. Neither party formally moved to admit their evidence during the trial. Before closing arguments, the judge asked whether the parties would agree to let her review each side's evidence. Prevost first objected, saying he could not open documents Gronvold sent through an app called OurFamilyWizard and that she should have sent them in another format, such as hard copy. The judge noted his objection but asked again whether he agreed to her reviewing the evidence, and Prevost answered, "Yes, ma'am." A few days later, the district court issued its decision. It found Gronvold credible, noted photographs showing her bruised and bloodied face, and found that Prevost had committed one or more acts of domestic violence proven by clear and convincing evidence resulting in severe injuries. Because of that finding, the court applied a legal presumption (an assumption the law makes unless proven otherwise) that Prevost should not receive joint or primary custody, and it found Prevost did not overcome that presumption. The court awarded primary physical custody to Gronvold and, applying the statutory factors, found the child's move to Mississippi to be in the child's best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Prevost's arguments. It found that the record did not show the judge forced or "strongarmed" him into agreeing to the evidence review; she heard his objection, then asked again, and he agreed. The court also concluded that any problem with how Gronvold shared her documents was minor and did not change the outcome, especially because Gronvold's own credible testimony established the domestic violence. The court also held that the district court did not ignore Prevost's accusations against Gronvold's partner. Because those accusations rested entirely on what Prevost said Gronvold told him, and Gronvold denied ever making those statements, the trial judge was entitled to decide whom to believe. Finally, the court declined Prevost's request to reweigh witness credibility, explaining that trial courts, which see and hear the witnesses, are the ones who make those calls, and appellate courts do not second-guess them from a transcript. The court affirmed the custody decree.

Herman and Nadine Williams married in 2004 and have four children - three boys (currently 9, 12, and almost 14) and a daughter, A.W., who is the oldest and turns 18 in October 2022. During the marriage, Nadine took out student loans and earned a master's degree in nursing and now works as a nurse. Herman works as a tow truck driver for a company called Copart, earning a fee for each completed tow. Tensions began in 2018. Nadine hit A.W. with a piece of PVC pipe, leaving a scar on the child's head, which led to a Child Protective Services (CPS) investigation that closed on the understanding that the children would be in Herman's care. Nadine also committed an act of domestic violence against her own mother, Phyllis Gayle. In March 2019, Herman took the children and left the marital home; Gayle then moved in with Herman, paying him $700 per month in rent. Nadine soon filed for divorce. Before trial, the district court gave Herman temporary physical custody, with Nadine getting weekend time that gradually increased. Over time, A.W. came to prefer living with Nadine, even running away from Herman to be with her, and she stayed with Nadine by her own choice; Herman last spent parenting time with A.W. in January 2020. Interviews conducted by the Family Mediation Center (FMC) showed the children's ratings of Nadine improved over time, reportedly after Nadine stopped using physical punishment when the court told her to do so. The case went to trial in February 2021. The district court decided several issues. On custody, it applied a legal presumption against Nadine because of her acts of domestic violence (a "rebuttable presumption" is a starting assumption that can be overcome by evidence), but concluded she overcame that presumption because she stopped using corporal punishment and the children reported improved relationships with her. The court ordered joint physical custody of all four children. On alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other), the court found neither party credible about their income and calculated their incomes from bank records and pay information. It found Herman's income was actually higher on a monthly basis and refused to award him alimony, describing the income gap as "negligible." On debts, the court treated Herman's roughly $75,000 in medical bills and Nadine's roughly $76,000 in student loans as community debt and offset them against each other, assigning each spouse their own debt. It did not divide Nadine's master's degree. Herman appealed. He narrowed his custody challenge to just the three boys, conceding he was not seeking custody of A.W. The appellate court reached four conclusions. First, it upheld the joint physical custody order for the boys, finding no abuse of discretion. Second, it declined to decide whether Nadine's master's degree should have been divided, because Herman never raised that issue at trial - only later in a post-judgment motion - so the point was not preserved for appeal. Third, it found the district court appears to have made an error in calculating Herman's income by counting some money twice: Herman moved money between his checking and savings accounts, and those internal transfers were mistakenly counted as additional income. Because that error may have affected the alimony decision, the court vacated (canceled) the alimony determination and sent it back for a recalculation. Fourth, it declined Herman's invitation to reexamine the district court's credibility findings, explaining that appellate courts generally defer to the trial court, which actually sees and hears the witnesses.

Matthew and Chelsea Carlson divorced under a stipulated (agreed-upon) divorce decree. Afterward, disputes arose. Matthew filed a motion asking for several things, including a request to change the school the couple's two minor children attended. Chelsea opposed that motion and made her own requests, including asking to be reimbursed for some of the children's medical expenses. Chelsea then asked the court for summary judgment - a ruling deciding claims without a full trial - on all the claims raised in the parties' motions. Matthew tried to withdraw several of his requests, but the district court granted summary judgment for Chelsea on those requests anyway, reasoning that Matthew did not withdraw them in time and that Chelsea should not have had to file for summary judgment. The court let the school-selection and medical-expenses issues, which Matthew still contested, go forward to an evidentiary hearing. On the second day of that hearing, the parties settled. They agreed the children would stay in their current school zone and that Matthew would pay Chelsea $700 to resolve the medical expenses. Turning that settlement into a written order proved difficult, with disagreements and delays, so Chelsea eventually asked the court to enter the stipulation and order without Matthew's signature, which the court did without objection from Matthew. Because that order left the question of attorney fees and costs for the court to decide later, Chelsea asked for $54,098.69 in fees and costs. The district court awarded her $45,503.17. On appeal, the Court of Appeals said it could not tell exactly why the district court awarded the fees. The trial court cited several legal provisions but made only one substantive finding - that Matthew's behavior, especially trying to withdraw requests only after Chelsea moved for summary judgment, multiplied the litigation. The appellate court noted that a fees award used as a sanction is supposed to be proportionate to the misconduct, and it was not clear how a $45,503.17 award (about 84 percent of what Chelsea sought) matched up with the specific conduct the court identified. The court also could not tell whether the trial judge was concerned only with the timing of Matthew's withdrawal or believed the requests were meritless from the start - a distinction that matters because some of the cited provisions require a finding that a claim lacked any reasonable basis when filed, and the district court made no such finding. Because the reasons for the award were unclear, the Court of Appeals reversed the order and sent the case back (remanded) for the district court to make additional findings. The court also noted that Chelsea had not yet supported her fee request with an affidavit from her counsel confirming the fees were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable.

Matthew and Melissa Arcella divorced in 2009 and share joint legal and physical custody of their two children. They had agreed to send the kids to a small private secular school. When their older daughter R.A. was finishing elementary school in 2016, both parents agreed she should move to a larger middle school - but they could not agree on which one. Matthew wanted Faith Lutheran, a religious private school; Melissa wanted Bob Miller Middle School, a highly ranked public school closer to home, and she objected on religious grounds to her daughter receiving a religious education. The family court, without holding an evidentiary hearing or making detailed findings, picked Bob Miller. The only explanation it gave was that it was "taking into consideration [Melissa's] religious objection." Matthew appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that when divorced, joint-custody parents disagree about whether a child should attend a religious or non-religious school, the family court must focus on the child's best interest - not on either parent's religious preference. Treating one parent's religious objection as the deciding factor, the court explained, actually disfavors religion and runs into the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which requires the government to be neutral between religion and non-religion. The Court also faulted the family court for two procedural failures: it did not hold an evidentiary hearing even though Matthew's filings established "adequate cause" for one, and it did not make the kind of specific factual findings about R.A.'s best interest that Nevada law requires. To help guide family courts facing these school-choice disputes, the Court listed ten illustrative factors a judge should consider, including the child's wishes (if old enough), each school's ability to meet the child's educational, medical, and extracurricular needs, the quality of instruction, the commute, whether changing schools would disrupt academic progress, and whether one school choice might alienate the child from a parent. The list is a starting point, not an exhaustive checklist. The case was sent back to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings about which school is best for R.A. specifically.