Nevada family-law case summaries

Alexander Posey and Margaret Bond, who were previously married, share a minor son referred to as L.P. Under an earlier custody arrangement they agreed to, the parents shared "joint legal custody" - meaning both parents together make major decisions about the child - except that Bond alone made decisions about the child's religious upbringing. In June 2024, Bond asked the court for permission to take L.P. to a child psychiatrist. According to her motion, in April 2024 the child had made troubling statements such as "I want to die and not go to heaven" and "I don't deserve to be alive," although the next day he said he "wanted to live for a thousand years." Bond said the child's former therapist recommended a child psychiatrist, that a teacher reported the child was struggling to focus in class, and that the child's pediatrician indicated a July 10 psychiatry appointment might be the best option. Posey opposed. He agreed the child should see a mental health provider, but he wanted the child to see a new therapist first and let that therapist decide whether a psychiatrist was needed. He said that if the new therapist recommended a psychiatrist, he would follow that recommendation. Because the parents could not agree, Bond asked the court to "break the tie" - a reference to a Nevada Supreme Court case, Kelley v. Kelley, that lets a court decide a health-care question when parents with joint legal custody disagree. While the motion was pending, the parents temporarily agreed to take L.P. to a therapist, and the child attended five sessions. But the dispute over the psychiatrist continued. The district court then issued an order that went further than resolving the psychiatrist question: it gave Bond sole legal custody over the child's mental health generally, including taking him to a psychiatrist, and it ordered that Posey could not make decisions about the child's mental health treatment or obstruct it. The Court of Appeals split its decision. It upheld the part of the order that let Bond take L.P. to a child psychiatrist and any recommended follow-up appointments, finding the district court acted within its discretion because the evidence - including recommendations from the prior therapist and the pediatrician - supported that this was in the child's best interest, and because Posey did not show why a therapist rather than a psychiatrist was better for the child. But the court found that the broader part of the order - giving Bond sole legal custody over all of the child's mental health decisions - went beyond what Bond had actually asked for. Bond's motion sought only the limited authority to take the child to a psychiatrist and follow-ups; she even acknowledged she never sought to strip Posey of his right to be involved in the child's care. Because the court granted this broader control without warning Posey that a wider change to legal custody was being considered, it deprived him of notice and a chance to be heard, violating his due process rights. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated (canceled) that broader part of the order while keeping the psychiatrist authorization intact.

This case is about what a parent must prove before a Nevada court can let that parent move out of state with a child over the other parent's objection. Teshome and Jiru were never married but share one young child, A.N.T., born in March 2021. In August 2022, the district court entered an initial custody order giving the parents joint legal and physical custody on a week on/week off schedule. Before that order, Teshome had asked for primary custody so he could move to Georgia, but the court denied that request, finding joint custody was in the child's best interest. After the order was entered, Teshome decided not to move to Georgia because he did not want to give up joint custody, and the parents followed the alternating-week schedule for about seven months. In March 2023, Jiru asked the court to give her primary custody and let her move with A.N.T. to Richmond, Virginia, where she had previously lived and had friends and a godmother, and where she believed she and the child would have a support network and the child could learn about his Ethiopian heritage. After a hearing, the district court granted her request. It found she had a sensible, good-faith reason for the move, that the move was not intended to cut into Teshome's parenting time, that "what is best for [Jiru] is best for [A.N.T.]," and that Jiru's mental health would improve in Virginia. The Court of Appeals reversed. Nevada law (NRS 125C.007(1)) requires a relocating parent to prove three threshold things: a sensible, good-faith reason for the move that is not intended to deprive the other parent of parenting time; that the move serves the child's best interests; and that both the child and the relocating parent will gain an actual advantage from the move. The appellate court agreed that the district court's findings on the first factor - Jiru's good-faith reason - were supported by the evidence. But it held that the district court failed on the other two. On the child's best interests, the district court said only that A.N.T. "will be fine regardless of where he resides" and that what is best for Jiru is best for the child. The Court of Appeals called these "conclusory statements" - broad conclusions without the specific, factor-by-factor findings the law requires. The district court never evaluated the statutory best-interest factors in NRS 125C.0035(4), even though its own earlier custody order had found that Teshome was more likely to foster the child's relationship with Jiru and that "each parent" was bonded with A.N.T. The court also did not weigh evidence that the move could affect Jiru's ability to provide for the child - higher rent, state income tax, no daycare lined up, and a job change from a roasting-plant position paying $21.82 per hour to a barista job with different pay. On the "actual advantage" requirement, the district court found only that Jiru's mental health would improve. It made no findings that the child would benefit, and the Court of Appeals noted that Jiru herself had stated her mental health struggles did not affect her parenting - so her advantage from moving "is not automatically an actual advantage for A.N.T." Because the threshold requirements were not properly analyzed, the appellate court reversed and sent the case back to the district court. It declined Teshome's request to assign the case to a different judge, concluding he had not shown the judge was biased.

This case is a dispute between two divorced parents, Tiffany and Christian Olson, over who should have physical custody of their two children, A.O. (born October 2006) and L.O. (born November 2010). When they divorced in 2014, they shared joint legal custody and Tiffany had primary physical custody. Over the following years both parents remarried and Christian's work situation changed. In December 2021, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that circumstances had changed and that it was in the children's best interest for Christian to have primary physical custody. The court later ordered Tiffany to pay approximately $900 per month in child support. Less than four months later, in mid-April 2022, Tiffany filed an emergency motion asking the court to temporarily change custody. She claimed Christian had physically abused A.O. two days earlier during a confrontation over A.O.'s cellphone, and that Christian told A.O. to lie to police about it. The district court denied the emergency (ex parte) request but treated the filing as a request for a change of custody and set a hearing. At the January 2023 hearing, the witnesses told very different stories. A.O. testified that her father grabbed her by the chin, straddled her, pulled her hair, hit her in the face with a closed fist, held his arms around her neck, twisted her arm, and threatened her. Christian testified that after he tried to unlock A.O.'s phone using facial recognition, A.O. grabbed his wrist, he lost his balance and fell on her, and she then punched, kicked, and scratched him; he said he moved her to the floor and pinned her wrists until she calmed down, and he denied striking her or touching her neck. Christian's wife Jennifer, the only eyewitness, said she saw A.O. punching, kicking, and scratching Christian and did not see him strike A.O. or put his hands on her neck. The physical evidence and reports were also inconsistent. A.O.'s first written statement to police, made the night of the incident, described her father grabbing her face and arms but did not mention being punched, choked, or having her arm twisted. A second report, made two days later after A.O. spoke with her mother, described punching, hair-grabbing, choking, and an arm-breaking threat. The deputy who took the second report testified he saw only "minute" bruising and no evidence of choking or a punch to the face. A.O. admitted she did not write and had not fully read the affidavit attached to her mother's motion before signing it. Child Protective Services investigated and found the claims unsubstantiated, and Christian was never arrested or charged. A.O. told the CPS worker she felt safe at her father's home and did not think anything like the incident would happen again, and testified nothing similar had happened in the nine months between the incident and the hearing. The district court denied the motion. It found that although Christian and A.O. did have a physical altercation, Christian did not use unlawful force, the incident did not amount to domestic violence, and it was an isolated event that did not qualify as a "substantial change in circumstances." The court concluded the existing custody arrangement remained in the children's best interest. On appeal, the Court of Appeals explained that trial courts have broad discretion over custody, and appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or reassess who was more believable. Because the district court considered all the evidence, judged the witnesses' credibility, and supported its findings with adequate evidence, the appellate court held there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed.

Jamie Armstrong and Duane Ball were never married but have one child together, N.B., born in June 2019. In October 2021, Duane filed a petition asking the court to establish custody, requesting sole legal and physical custody. Jamie had a lawyer during much of the case, but her attorney withdrew in April 2022, after which Jamie represented herself. A dispute arose over whether Jamie was properly told when the trial would take place. In July, Duane's lawyer filed an "application for trial setting"—a document requesting a date for trial—stating that trial would begin September 26. But according to the court, that filing had no certificate of service (proof it was delivered to Jamie), and it did not show that the district court had officially approved and endorsed that date. Jamie said repeatedly at trial that she only learned about the September 26 trial date a few days beforehand. The district court noted that the trial had been set for months but did not make any findings about whether Jamie had actually received timely notice, and it let the trial go forward. Because of the short notice, Jamie said she could not submit her exhibits on time, and only some were admitted. She also tried to bring witnesses on the second day of trial, but the court refused to allow them because she had not disclosed them in advance. After the two-day trial, the court entered an order giving the parties joint legal custody and Duane primary physical custody. The court found that Jamie had removed and concealed N.B. from Duane between late September and early November 2021. It concluded that this triggered a legal presumption under Nevada law (NRS 125C.0035(7))—a rule that assumes it is not in a child's best interest to give custody or unsupervised time to a parent who has committed "any act of abduction against the child." Interestingly, the court found that the presumption against Jamie having unsupervised parenting time had been overcome (rebutted), partly because Duane himself had asked that Jamie get unsupervised time. But the court still applied the presumption against Jamie when it came to physical custody, and it set up a schedule of supervised parenting time that could increase over time with clean drug tests. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the district court did not properly apply the abduction presumption because it did not make the required findings to invoke the presumption by clear and convincing evidence, and it applied the presumption to the physical custody decision without the necessary findings—even after finding the presumption had been rebutted regarding parenting time. The court also concluded that Jamie's lack of notice of the official trial date likely made the problem worse and affected her constitutional right to fair procedures (due process), because she had only a few days to prepare, represented herself, and could not call her witnesses. For these reasons, the court reversed and sent the case back for new proceedings that give both sides adequate time to prepare.

This case is a custody dispute between two parents, William Christensen and Vanessa Lovett, who share one child. Over the years, the arrangement changed several times. In 2016, a court gave Christensen sole legal and physical custody, noting that the child had been in the care of a state agency (the Division of Child and Family Services, or DCFS), that the child was doing better after being placed with Christensen, and that Lovett had unaddressed mental-health concerns. In 2020, the parents agreed to share joint legal custody, with Christensen having primary physical custody and Lovett getting weekends and alternating weeks in the summer. The 2020 arrangement also required Christensen to take the child to the dentist at least twice a year and to a doctor at least once a year. In 2021, Lovett asked the court to change custody again. She said the parents were actually splitting time roughly equally, that Christensen had recently been jailed on a probation violation (leaving her caring for the child during that time), that the child was not well cared for at Christensen's home, that the child developed a dental abscess requiring an extraction because Christensen did not provide dental care, and that Christensen refused to share medical and school information with her or cooperate as a co-parent. After an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where the judge listens to testimony and reviews evidence), the district court sided with Lovett. The court found that even though the paperwork said Christensen had primary physical custody, in practice the parents were sharing custody roughly equally, because Lovett had the child for just over 146 days in the prior year. The court found many problems: Christensen's incarceration, his failure to follow the court's orders about the child's medical and dental care, his failure to follow orders about joint legal custody, his hostility toward Lovett, and his inability to co-parent. The court also noted Christensen made derogatory comments about Lovett's sexuality and worried he might put down her relationship in front of the child. Weighing the legal "best interest" factors, the court decided the child should live primarily with Lovett. Christensen appealed. The Court of Appeals explained that it does not second-guess a trial judge's custody call unless the judge abused their discretion, and it will uphold the decision if it is supported by "substantial evidence" — evidence a reasonable person would accept as adequate. The appeals court rejected each of Christensen's arguments. On the claim that the parents were not really sharing time equally, the court said the record showed the district judge considered testimony, the existing order, spring break, and the period of Christensen's incarceration, and reasonably concluded the parents were practicing a de facto (in-practice, even if not on paper) joint custody arrangement. On the claim that his jail time was only temporary and therefore not a lasting change, the court noted that Christensen cited no authority requiring the change to be permanent, and that the judge based the change on many factors, not just the incarceration. On the claim that the judge wrongly excluded a DCFS report about Lovett's past mental health and drug use, the court said the report was properly excluded because Christensen did not disclose it on time, and that the judge did consider the history of the case through testimony anyway. On the CASA argument, the court said Christensen never raised it below, so he waived it. On the bias claim, the court said Christensen never sought to disqualify the judge below and, in any event, his complaints came from what the judge learned during the case itself — which does not establish legal bias. Because none of Christensen's arguments succeeded, the appeals court affirmed the custody modification.

Janea Calkins and Waylon Huber married in 2010 and had twin children two years later. They divorced in Nevada in 2016. As part of their divorce, they agreed to share both legal and physical custody of the children, and Huber agreed that Calkins could temporarily move with the children to Boise, Idaho, for two years so she could finish her education. Later, after a series of events, the district court held an evidentiary hearing in July 2020 and entered an order that temporarily gave Huber sole physical custody and gave Calkins supervised parenting time. As the opinion notes, that temporary order did not set a hearing date or specify an event that would make it permanent, though the court said it would revisit the arrangement if Calkins moved back to Nevada. In March 2021, Calkins - representing herself without a lawyer (pro se) - filed a motion asking that the children be returned to her custody in Idaho. In May 2021, Huber filed an opposition to her motion and also filed a cross-motion (his own request for relief) asking for permanent custody. Just days later, without holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Calkins's motion and granted Huber's request, converting the temporary custody order into a permanent one. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided it did not need to address most of the issues Calkins raised. It focused on one problem: the district court did not follow the proper procedure before entering a permanent custody order. The court had ruled too quickly - it treated the matter as ready for decision only two days after Huber filed his papers and entered its order just seven days after Huber filed, even though the applicable court rule allows a party 7 days to respond to an opposition and 14 days to respond to a motion. That meant Calkins did not get her chance to reply to Huber's opposition or to oppose his cross-motion for permanent custody. The Court of Appeals also found that the district court skipped a required step before making custody permanent. The lower court applied the standard from a prior Nevada case for modifying custody and concluded Calkins had not shown a substantial change in circumstances - but it did not first apply the threshold test from another case that governs whether an evidentiary hearing is needed. Because the district court did not hold a hearing that would have let both parties present evidence about what is best for the children, the Court of Appeals said it could not tell whether such a hearing was necessary. It sent the case back so the district court, which is familiar with the parties, could decide that question first. The appellate court reversed the district court's judgment and returned the case for further proceedings consistent with its order.