Nevada family-law case summaries

Michael Martinelli and Michelle Lucero Del Real were in a romantic relationship that began in 2013, shortly after Del Real's son was born. Martinelli is not the child's biological father. The relationship ended in 2022 after, according to the opinion, Martinelli committed an act of domestic violence against Del Real in the presence of the child. In 2022, Martinelli filed a petition asking the court to grant him "nonparent visitation" - that is, court-ordered time with a child by someone who is not the child's parent. He claimed he had lived with the child, had a meaningful relationship with the child, acted as a de facto father, and that Del Real had unreasonably refused to let him see the child. Del Real opposed the petition. The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing (a hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is presented) and set deadlines for discovery (the pretrial process of exchanging information). Before the hearing, Martinelli asked the court to stop Del Real from mentioning his arrests and domestic-violence incidents, and asked to reopen discovery to gather more information about the child's schooling and medical issues. Del Real, by then represented by free (pro bono) lawyers, opposed those requests, and separately asked the court to declare Martinelli a "vexatious litigant" - someone who misuses court proceedings to harass another person. The court denied Martinelli's two pretrial motions and held the evidentiary hearing, giving each side 90 minutes. Witnesses included two of the child's teachers, a family friend, and both Martinelli and Del Real. Del Real testified about an incident in which Martinelli slammed a door into her in front of the child (a video of this was shown to the court), about verbal abuse, and about Martinelli being arrested in Arizona for driving under the influence while the child was in the car. She also described the child's chronic medical condition (chronic pancreatitis) requiring frequent hospitalizations. The child's recorded interview indicated the child did not wish to visit Martinelli. The court ruled against Martinelli. Under Nevada law, when a parent has denied visitation, there is a legal presumption that giving visitation to a nonparent is not in the child's best interest, and the person seeking visitation must overcome that presumption with strong proof ("clear and convincing evidence"). The court found Martinelli did not meet that burden, citing the lack of positive emotional ties, his history of abusive behavior and addiction, the conflict in the relationship, and the child's stated preference not to continue a relationship with him. The court also found that Martinelli had filed the case to harass Del Real and had abused the discovery process, declared him a vexatious litigant, and ordered him to pay $5,000 in attorney fees to the Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada. After Martinelli filed a motion to set aside the judgment and a motion for a new trial, the court denied both and ordered an additional $500 in attorney fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld every part of the trial court's decision. It found the trial court acted within its discretion on the discovery and evidence rulings, that substantial evidence supported the denial of visitation, that Martinelli had in fact been given a chance to oppose the vexatious-litigant request (he filed a written opposition), and that he had not shown the judge was biased.

This case comes out of a divorce that was finalized in 2014. Years later, two competing requests were before the family court at the same time: Matthew's request to change the child custody arrangement, and Melissa's request for permission to relocate with the couple's minor child. The family court issued an order that denied Matthew's request to modify custody. But that same order did not finish the job — it stated that a further evidentiary hearing (a hearing where evidence is presented) should be scheduled to consider Melissa's request to move away with the child. In other words, the custody-related questions in the case were not fully wrapped up. Matthew tried to appeal the denial of his custody-modification request. Before deciding the merits, the appellate court examined whether it even had the authority — its "jurisdiction" — to hear the appeal at this stage. Generally, a party can only appeal after a court issues a decision that fully resolves the matter, not a decision that leaves parts of the dispute still pending. This is meant to avoid "piecemeal" appeals, where a single case produces multiple separate trips to the appellate court. Matthew argued the order he was challenging was the final judgment in the case and therefore appealable. Melissa argued the order was not appealable and the appeal should be dismissed. The court agreed with Melissa. It explained that the true final judgment in the case was the 2014 divorce decree, and that both parties' later requests were "post-judgment" motions. While a decision denying a request to change custody can sometimes be appealed as a "special order entered after final judgment," that was not possible here because the order did not resolve everything — Melissa's relocation request was still awaiting a hearing. The court also addressed Matthew's worry that dismissing the appeal would leave him with no way to challenge the custody ruling. It disagreed, explaining that once the family court fully resolves all the pending custody issues, including Melissa's relocation request, Matthew can challenge the denial of his motion at that later point, in an appeal that includes the relocation decision.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.

Thomas and Svetlana Potter married in 1994, had a child in 1995, and divorced shortly after the child was born. Svetlana was initially awarded primary physical custody, but in 1996 the parents agreed by stipulation to share joint physical and legal custody - meaning both parents shared responsibility for the child's day-to-day care. According to the record, the arrangement worked without custody problems from 1996 to 2003, with both parents actively involved. In 2003, Svetlana received a job offer from a California hospital for a registered nurse position at a higher salary than she was earning in Las Vegas, and she wanted to pursue a nurse anesthesiologist degree from a California school - a program not available in Las Vegas. She filed a petition under NRS 125C.200, Nevada's relocation statute, asking for permission to move to Corona, California with the child. Thomas opposed it, arguing that the Legislature amended the relocation statute in 1999 so that it no longer applied to joint physical custody arrangements, and that Svetlana would first have to win primary physical custody before she could seek relocation. The district court treated the case as an ordinary relocation petition under NRS 125C.200, analyzed the relocation factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz, granted Svetlana's petition, awarded her primary physical custody, and provided for significant contact and visitation between Thomas and the child. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that NRS 125C.200 does not apply when parents share joint physical custody. The statute's current text speaks only of "custodial" and "noncustodial" parents; an earlier version of the statute (formerly NRS 125A.350) had expressly covered "a parent having joint custody," but the Legislature removed that language. The court found the legislative history confirmed that the statute was intended to apply only to primary physical custody situations. Instead, the court explained the correct procedure: when a parent who shares joint physical custody wants to move out of Nevada with the child, that parent must file a motion for a change of custody under NRS 125.510(2), seeking primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating. The district court then decides, under the "best interest of the child" standard, whether the child is better off living outside Nevada with the relocating parent as primary physical custodian, or living in Nevada with the non-moving parent as primary physical custodian. The moving parent bears the burden of proving that living out of state with him or her serves the child's best interest. Because the district court applied the wrong statute, did not use the factors from Truax v. Truax, and made no finding that the move was in the child's best interest, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for the district court to decide whether it is in the child's best interest to live in California with Svetlana or in Nevada with Thomas.