Nevada family-law case summaries

This case involves a custody fight over a child identified as A.L., the youngest of three children born to Kimberly Stevens and Jefferson Davis Laney. The couple married in 2006 and divorced under a Nevada decree in 2021. Because California was the children's "home state" under an interstate custody law called the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the Nevada divorce decree said the actual custody arrangement would be worked out in California courts. In November 2021, a California court entered a judgment - based on an agreement the parties made (a "stipulation") - that gave Stevens primary physical custody and required Laney and the children to take part in "reunification therapy," a process meant to rebuild the relationship between the children and their father. The parties agreed this therapy was in the children's best interest, agreed to jointly pick the therapist, and agreed to follow the therapist's plan and schedule. Early attempts at reunification with two therapists failed, and those therapists reported that Stevens interfered with the process. The parties then jointly selected Dr. Donna Wilburn as the reunification therapist. In May 2023, after Nevada took over jurisdiction (California gave it up), the Nevada court began enforcing the existing reunification plan. The court ordered daily 7:00 a.m. video calls between Laney and the children, and specifically ordered that the children "shall have privacy alone with [Laney]" during those calls. Private investigators hired by Laney later observed Stevens positioning herself about sixteen feet from A.L. during a scheduled call, with an older daughter hidden under a picnic table about five feet from A.L. - people apparently not visible to Laney on the call. Investigators observed similar concealment on other dates. The case eventually went to a two-day evidentiary hearing in early 2025 on custody and contempt. By the time that hearing concluded, Dr. Wilburn testified that reunification had been achieved, that it went well after initial obstacles were resolved, and that she found no signs the children had been abused by either parent. As a "mandated reporter" (someone legally required to report suspected abuse), she made no abuse report. She recommended joint physical and joint legal custody of A.L. The district court found Dr. Wilburn and Laney credible and found Stevens's testimony inconsistent, evasive, and self-serving. The court held Stevens in contempt for violating the "privacy alone" order, imposing a 25-day jail sentence that she could avoid ("purge") by paying a $500 fine, complying with court orders, and paying certain attorney fees. On custody, the court found a substantial change in circumstances and, after going through the statutory best-interest factors, found most favored Laney. Even so, the court awarded joint physical and joint legal custody of A.L. (not primary custody to Laney), partly to preserve A.L.'s bond with her sisters and Stevens. On appeal, the court rejected each of Stevens's arguments. It held that "Kayden's Law" - a 2025 Nevada statute limiting court-ordered reunification therapy - did not apply, because the reunification requirement came from the 2021 California judgment, not from a Nevada order, and Nevada was required under the UCCJEA to recognize and enforce that judgment. The court also held that no improper delegation to the therapist occurred, that the contempt finding was proper, and that the custody modification was supported by substantial evidence. As for the fee award, the court dismissed that part of the appeal, explaining it lacked jurisdiction because the final fee order was entered after Stevens filed her notice of appeal and she never filed a separate appeal from that order. Because the judgment was affirmed and no remand was ordered, Stevens's request to reassign the case to a different judge was moot.

Magdalena Ocasio and Jonathan Wirsz were never married but have one child together, M.W., born in 2014. Over several years they repeatedly went to court over custody. In 2020, a judge gave Wirsz primary physical custody and both parents shared joint legal custody, but with Wirsz holding "tie-breaking" authority to make decisions when they disagreed. Wirsz later asked to move with M.W. from Nevada to Idaho, saying he had a business opportunity there. Before the court ruled, the parents reached an agreement (called an "amended stipulation and order," or ASAO) that let him move and kept the existing custody arrangement. In that agreement, both parents gave up the right to reconsider or appeal the 2020 custody order or the ASAO, agreed that the winner of any future dispute about the agreement would get attorney fees, and promised to talk to each other about concerns over M.W. before taking those concerns to anyone else. Later, Ocasio claimed Wirsz tricked her into the move because he never actually took the Idaho business job. She also alleged he punished M.W. by making her eat hot sauce or hot peppers. She asked the court to change custody and move M.W. back to Nevada. An earlier appeal sent part of the case back to the trial court for a hearing on some of her claims — but that earlier decision also said Ocasio was not entitled to a hearing on her fraud claims because she had not shown the alleged fraud was a legally significant change, and had not filed the specific kind of motion (an NRCP 60(b) motion) needed to undo the ASAO. Back in the trial court, the fight expanded. Wirsz asked for sole legal custody, for Ocasio's parenting time to be reduced, and for her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. He also asked the court to hold her in contempt for accusing him of abuse without first raising it with him as the ASAO required. Ocasio tried to subpoena records about Wirsz's Idaho business to prove the alleged fraud. The court blocked those subpoenas, finding the business records irrelevant because Ocasio had never filed a motion to set aside the ASAO and had a history of misusing Wirsz's financial information. At a multi-day hearing, a psychiatrist Wirsz hired, Dr. Gregory Brown, testified that Ocasio met the criteria for narcissistic personality disorder and explained how that condition can make coparenting very difficult. Ocasio wanted to challenge that diagnosis using raw test data from another psychologist, Dr. Bradley, but Dr. Bradley did not appear to testify. Ocasio never formally asked the court to force Dr. Bradley to testify or to delay the hearing for that purpose. The court also excluded Ocasio's rebuttal expert, Wygant, because he was disclosed too late, and Ocasio never filed a written response opposing his exclusion. After the hearing, the court denied Ocasio's request to move M.W. and change custody, kept Wirsz's primary physical custody, gave Wirsz sole legal custody, and held Ocasio in contempt for making abuse claims in a 2021 declaration without first discussing them with Wirsz. The court also awarded Wirsz roughly $69,000 in attorney fees and about $86,000 in costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all of Ocasio's arguments. It held that because she never filed the proper motion to undo the ASAO, the trial court did not have to revisit the fraud claim or allow discovery about the Idaho business. It held she gave up (forfeited) her arguments about the witnesses because she did not properly raise them below. It held the court could rely on Dr. Brown's diagnosis, which was supported by the evidence, and that the court properly connected her diagnosis and her refusal to communicate to its decision to give Wirsz sole legal custody. Finally, it upheld the fee and cost awards, though it affirmed the fees on a different legal basis (NRS 125C.250) than the trial court used, and it held Ocasio lost her challenge to the costs because she filed the wrong type of paper (an opposition instead of a motion to retax) and filed it too late.

Bryce Wolfe and Taylor Mannion (now Taylor Clayton) share a young daughter, E.W., born in March 2022. According to the opinion, E.W. is nearly blind, has a growth-hormone deficiency, and has several developmental delays. In 2023, the parents mediated an agreement to share joint legal and joint physical custody, and the district court adopted that agreement, setting up a schedule where E.W. rotated between her parents every two or three days. Things changed when Taylor became engaged to a military servicemember being transferred to a base near San Diego, California. In February 2024, Taylor asked the court for primary physical custody and permission to move to California with E.W. Bryce opposed that request and asked for primary physical custody himself. By the time of the hearing, Taylor had married. At a January 2025 evidentiary hearing, both parents testified. Even though Taylor had asked for primary custody, she said she would be open to continuing to share custody, suggesting a two-weeks-on, two-weeks-off arrangement. She testified that E.W. needed regular specialist visits and twice-weekly therapy, but said she was not worried about continuity of care as long as E.W. had insurance and providers in both states. Bryce disagreed that a long-distance shared arrangement was in E.W.'s best interest, emphasizing E.W.'s need for stability, the difficulty of long car trips, and the importance of consistent therapists. At one point, Bryce told the court "it would be up to what you decide" because he "do[es]n't set custody . . . for a living." In March 2025, the district court denied both parents' requests for primary physical custody and effectively denied Taylor's request to relocate. The court found that Taylor had a good-faith reason for the move but had not shown that relocation was in E.W.'s best interest or offered an actual advantage. The court found that all of the best-interest factors were either neutral or did not apply, and concluded that both parents were fully capable of caring for E.W. The court kept joint physical custody in place, but — to address Bryce's concern about frequent travel — ordered a one-month-on, one-month-off schedule instead of the two-week rotation Taylor had suggested. On child support, the court kept the baseline obligation at $0 because the parents' incomes were similar, but ordered Taylor to pay Bryce $100 per month for transportation costs tied to her decision to relocate. Bryce asked the court to reconsider its custody and parenting-time decisions (but did not separately challenge the $100 transportation award), and the court denied that request. He then appealed. The Court of Appeals rejected each of Bryce's arguments. It held that his due process rights were not violated, because Nevada's custody statutes put him on notice that joint physical custody was a possible outcome once custody was before the court, and he had a chance to be heard on the issue. It held that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding a substantial change in circumstances (relying on a prior Nevada Supreme Court case involving a relocating military spouse) or in finding that joint custody with a monthly schedule served E.W.'s best interest — noting that much of Bryce's argument amounted to asking the appellate court to reweigh the evidence, which it does not do. Finally, it held that the court properly handled the $100 transportation award as part of the overall child support determination and that Bryce had not built a record showing the amount was inadequate. The court affirmed.

Venus Priya Ram and Cleavon Roy Kiran married in 2008 and have two children. In 2020, Kiran filed for divorce and asked the court for sole legal and primary physical custody. Kiran had moved to California but acknowledged Nevada was the children's home state; he asked for primary physical custody so the children could live with him in California. Ram answered and asked for joint legal custody and primary physical custody. While the case was pending, the district court entered a temporary order letting the children stay with Ram in Nevada, with Kiran having parenting time every other weekend. At an evidentiary hearing, both parents testified. Kiran testified about Ram's methamphetamine use, acts of domestic violence, and arrests; about the oldest child's dietary issues (possibly related to Crohn's disease) and mental health issues; and about his own good relationship with the children. Ram testified that the children had always lived with her, that she facilitated their contact with Kiran, that she took the oldest child to therapy, and that she was working toward sobriety, while acknowledging her methamphetamine use, her criminal history, that she was on probation, and that she had failed two drug tests while on probation. Nevada law requires courts deciding custody to focus on the "best interest of the child," using a list of factors set out in statute. The district court's written decree found that six of those factors favored Kiran and none favored Ram, and it awarded Kiran primary physical custody (with joint legal custody to both parents). Ram asked the court to reconsider, arguing among other things that the court had allowed the children to be relocated to California without considering the "relocation factors" and had admitted improper evidence. The court denied reconsideration, explaining in part that it was not required to consider relocation factors because no final custody order existed before the decree, and that neither party had presented evidence about the children's wishes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected each of Ram's arguments. First, it declined to review her complaints about the evidence admitted at the hearing (testimony about her arrests and alleged hearsay) because she never objected at the hearing itself - raising the issue for the first time in a reconsideration motion was too late. Second, it rejected her claim that the judge's questioning showed bias, because Ram did not show the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Third, it held the custody award was not an abuse of discretion: the written findings were supported by substantial evidence, and an appellate court does not reweigh evidence or second-guess credibility calls. Where the judge's oral comments differed from the written decree, the written order controls. As to Ram's complaint that the court should have interviewed the children about their wishes, the appellate court noted that neither party presented such evidence and that Ram never explained what the children would have said or how it would have changed the result. Fourth, even assuming the district court should have considered the relocation factors, any error was harmless because Ram did not show a different result might reasonably have been reached. Finally, Ram's argument that the court needed to find a "substantial change in circumstances" before departing from the temporary order was never raised in the district court, so the appellate court would not consider it for the first time on appeal.

Edgar and Maria married in 2014 and have two young children. In September 2020, the couple had an altercation during which, according to the opinion, an intoxicated Edgar accused Maria of infidelity, called her derogatory names, and hit her arm while she held both children. Maria called the police, Edgar was arrested for battery related to domestic violence (though no formal charges were filed), and Maria obtained a temporary protection order (a TPO, which is a court order intended to protect a person from further harm) that was extended several times. Edgar then filed for divorce and asked for joint physical custody (an arrangement where both parents share significant time with the children). In January 2021, the district court entered a temporary order giving Edgar parenting time on weekends and requiring him to pay $415 per month in child support, based on the income he reported at the time. After a trial spread over four days between October 2021 and February 2022, the district court issued a 58-page divorce decree. The court gave Maria primary physical custody, subject to Edgar's weekend parenting time on three weekends per month. In doing so, the court applied a legal presumption in Nevada law that weighs against joint physical custody when a parent has committed domestic violence. The court found that Maria proved, by clear and convincing evidence (a high standard of proof), that Edgar committed multiple acts of domestic violence, including pushing, hitting, slapping, grabbing her by the neck, and sexual assault on at least one occasion. The court also gave Maria the child tax credit, found that Edgar had been dishonest about his income when the earlier $415 support figure was set, raised his ongoing child support to $1,118 per month, and declined to make Maria repay Edgar half of the COVID-19 stimulus money she had received. On appeal, Edgar argued the custody ruling lacked adequate evidentiary support, that joint custody was appropriate, that Maria failed to prove domestic violence, that the temporary support amount was wrong, that the income assigned to Maria was too low, that the tax credit should have been split, that he should have gotten half the stimulus money, and that the judge was biased. The Court of Appeals rejected all of these arguments. A recurring reason was that Edgar did not file the trial transcripts with the appellate court, even though he had requested them. Under Nevada law, when the person appealing fails to provide necessary parts of the record, the appellate court assumes the missing material supports the lower court's decision. The court also found that some of Edgar's arguments were either raised too late (never presented to the trial court) or not supported by developed reasoning. On the bias claim, the court explained that disagreeing with a judge's conclusions is not enough; a party must show bias rooted in something outside the case or a deep-seated hostility making a fair decision impossible, which Edgar did not do. The court affirmed the divorce decree in full.

Parviz and Fatemeh Eivazi were married in Las Vegas in 2001 (after an earlier marriage in Iran). Fatemeh filed for divorce in 2016. The case was hard-fought, with many motions and a multi-day trial. After trial, the judge asked both spouses to submit proposed final orders. The judge then signed Fatemeh's 61-page proposed decree word-for-word, without changing anything. That decree required Parviz to pay Fatemeh more than $400,000 - including ten years of alimony at $5,000 a month, attorney fees, expert fees, repayment for "wasted" community money, and the proceeds from selling the marital home. Parviz appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals used this case to send a strong message about a common practice: judges sometimes ask the winning party's lawyer to write up the order. The court did not ban the practice. It said adopting a party's proposed order word-for-word is not, by itself, an abuse of discretion - but judges who do so take on the risk that any mistakes in the document will be their mistakes. The court urged judges to read proposed orders carefully and lawyers to make sure those drafts are accurate and legally sound. Turning to the decree itself, the court found a number of problems. On "marital waste" (the idea that one spouse improperly spent community money), the trial court had treated any spending Fatemeh did not know about as waste, and required Parviz to disprove waste by clear and convincing evidence. The Court of Appeals said this flipped the burden the wrong way and used too broad a definition of waste. Under Nevada Supreme Court precedent (Kogod), waste generally means using marital money for a selfish purpose unrelated to the marriage, typically when the marriage is already breaking down. The trial court grouped together years of unexplained checks and cash and called it all waste - that was an abuse of discretion. On alimony, the court found the trial judge had gone through the statutory list of factors only superficially. Among other problems, the judge calculated Parviz's income from a website printout that was never actually admitted into evidence; failed to evaluate Fatemeh's earning capacity (not just her current lack of income); inconsistently described Parviz's ability to pay; and improperly leaned on Parviz's alleged misconduct in the divorce when deciding alimony, which Nevada law forbids. On attorney fees, the trial court had reconsidered an earlier order and awarded Fatemeh all her fees from the very beginning of the case - even fees that had already been ruled on in earlier orders, and costs that Fatemeh had not even asked for in her motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and told the trial court to limit any reconsideration to the fees actually at issue. A separate $59,000 award to "reimburse" Fatemeh for money she borrowed to fund the litigation was reversed because the decree contained no findings explaining it and it appeared to overlap with the attorney fee award. A $7,450 award for translation services as an expert fee was reversed because the trial court did not justify exceeding the statutory cap. The court affirmed two parts of the decree: an award for interim spousal support arrears and the division of insurance proceeds from Fatemeh's car accident. It also affirmed the order to sell the marital home, because Parviz himself had asked the trial court to order the sale - he could not complain on appeal about an outcome he invited. The unequal split of community debt, by contrast, was reversed because the decree gave no reason for the inequality. The case goes back to the trial court to redo the parts that were reversed.

Cecil Estein, Jr., and Mia Ward were never married but have one child together, D.W., born in 2013. According to the opinion, Ward was the primary caretaker for the child during his first nine years, until Estein concluded his service in the United States military in 2018. After that, the parents worked together to increase Estein's parenting time, and they reached a partial agreement in which they agreed to share joint legal custody (the right to make major decisions for the child) and set out holiday and vacation plans. The parents could not agree, however, on physical custody (where the child primarily lives) or on New Year's parenting time. Estein went to district court asking for joint physical custody and a 50/50 split of parenting time. After motions and a trial before a judge (rather than a jury), the district court weighed the "best interest of the child" factors listed in Nevada law and decided that Ward should have primary physical custody, with Estein having parenting time on weekends. Estein appealed that decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, meaning it left the district court's decision in place. The appellate court explained that it reviews custody decisions only for an "abuse of discretion" - that is, it does not decide the case over again from scratch. It will accept the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence, and it will not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess the trial judge's assessments of who was credible. The court noted that Estein's main argument was not that the district court failed to make adequate findings or that its findings lacked support in the evidence. Instead, he argued that the trial court reached the wrong conclusion from the evidence. Because the appellate court does not re-weigh evidence on appeal, that kind of argument was not a basis for reversal. Estein also argued that the district court should have applied a legal presumption in favor of joint physical custody. But the opinion states that the district court had a specific reason for not applying that presumption - the parents had reached a verbal arrangement before trial giving Ward primary physical custody - and Estein did not challenge that reasoning on appeal. Because he did not challenge it, the court treated that argument as waived (given up).

Justin and Sarah Maurice divorced in 2015 under an agreed ("stipulated") divorce decree. That decree gave them joint legal custody of their two children, but gave Sarah primary physical custody, with Justin having the children on alternating weekends. In 2020, Justin asked the family court to change the arrangement to joint physical custody. He gave several reasons: his job and work schedule had changed, Sarah's work schedule had changed, he was now available to care for the children himself while Sarah worked (rather than having third parties watch them), more than five years had passed since the divorce, the children had bonded with their stepsiblings, and, he said, the change was in the children's best interests. He also pointed out that during the COVID-19 pandemic he had been the parent primarily helping the children with school, that the parties had actually been following a different schedule than the decree required, and that the children had expressed a preference to spend more time with him. The family court turned down Justin's request without holding a hearing to take evidence. Its main reason was that a change in work schedule, by itself, is not a "substantial change in circumstances" — the legal threshold a parent must cross to change primary physical custody. Justin asked the court to reconsider; the court again refused and ordered Justin to pay $1,500 of Sarah's attorney fees. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the family court on two points. First, it explained that a change in a parent's work schedule can count as a change in circumstances if it affects the children's welfare, so the family court was wrong to reject the motion based mainly on the idea that a work-schedule change never qualifies. Second, the court said the family court gave no specific explanation for why Justin had not shown "adequate cause" for an evidentiary hearing — a hearing where witnesses and evidence are presented — and nothing in the record suggested his claims were just repetitive or only meant to discredit Sarah. Because Justin had presented enough to justify a hearing, the family court should have held one before deciding whether to change custody. The appeals court reversed the family court's decision and sent the case back for further proceedings. Because it undid the underlying ruling, it also canceled ("vacated") the $1,500 attorney-fee award.

Dawnette and Christopher Davidson divorced in 2006. Their divorce decree said that Dawnette would sign over her interest in the marital home to Christopher (using a "quitclaim deed," which is a document transferring whatever ownership rights one person has in property to another). In exchange, Christopher was supposed to pay Dawnette half of the equity in the home, based on a 2006 appraisal. About two weeks after the divorce, the two reconciled and lived together in the home until 2011, though they never remarried. Dawnette signed and delivered the quitclaim deed in 2006. Christopher says he later refinanced the home and paid Dawnette her share; Dawnette says he never paid her. In 2014 - eight years after she delivered the deed - Dawnette filed a motion in the family court asking the court to enforce the decree and order Christopher to pay her. Christopher argued that her claim was too old: Nevada has a six-year deadline (a "statute of limitations") for actions to enforce a court judgment, and that deadline had passed. The district court agreed with Christopher and denied her motion without deciding whether Christopher had actually paid. On appeal, Dawnette made two main arguments. First, she said that family courts have a special, unlimited power to enforce divorce decrees under NRS 125.240, so the six-year deadline should not apply. Second, she said even if the deadline did apply, the clock should not have started running until 2011, when the couple finally separated for good - because while she was still living in the house, it was not reasonable to expect her to demand payment. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected both arguments and affirmed the district court. The Court explained that NRS 125.240 applies to "separate maintenance" cases (a different kind of family law action), not to divorces. The Court also pointed out that when the Legislature has wanted to exempt certain family-law claims from a deadline, it has said so explicitly - for example, NRS 125B.050 says there is no time limit on collecting back child support. Because the Legislature has not done that for property-division provisions in divorce decrees, the ordinary six-year deadline in NRS 11.190(1)(a) applies. As to when the clock starts, the Court held that under NRS 11.200 and a long-standing 1892 Nevada decision, Borden v. Clow, the statute of limitations began running when Dawnette delivered the quitclaim deed in 2006. That was the moment Christopher's debt to her arose. Because she did not file her motion until 2014, more than six years later, her claim was too late. The Court also noted that Dawnette could have used NRS 17.214 to renew the judgment and avoid this problem, but did not. The Court acknowledged Dawnette's concern that this rule could give an ex-spouse a "windfall" by simply waiting out the deadline, but said the Legislature has also chosen not to let people "sit" indefinitely on potential claims.

Craig and Catherine Doan married in 1985 and later divorced. Craig worked as an air traffic controller for the FAA for more than 23 years and earned federal retirement benefits. During the divorce, both spouses filed sworn financial statements indicating they had retirement accounts or pensions, and Catherine's pretrial memorandum specifically identified Craig's federal retirement benefits as property earned during the marriage. After their lawyers withdrew shortly before trial, the couple settled their property division themselves at a conference with the judge. The final divorce decree, entered in August 2003, divided one retirement asset (a voluntary thrift savings plan) but said nothing about Craig's FAA retirement benefit. Six years later, in June 2009, Catherine asked the court to divide the FAA retirement benefit, arguing it had been left out of the decree and should now be split. The district court first denied her motion, finding the benefit had been fully disclosed during the divorce. But after Catherine asked the court to reconsider, the court changed course: it found the benefit had been left out of the decree by "mutual mistake" and divided it using a federal formula. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under NRCP 60(b) - a rule of court procedure allowing a party to ask for relief from a final judgment - a motion based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be filed within six months of the judgment. Catherine waited more than six years, so her motion was too late. The court then asked whether her request could instead be treated as an "independent action" - a separate lawsuit seeking relief in equity, which is not subject to the six-month deadline but requires a much higher showing: it is available "only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." The court held that Catherine could not meet that standard. Nevada law recognizes that when a marital asset was never litigated or decided in the divorce - for example, because neither party mentioned it - it can be divided later through an equitable action. But here, the FAA retirement benefit was disclosed and discussed throughout the divorce proceedings: it appeared in Craig's pay statements, W-2 forms, and financial affidavit, and Catherine's own pretrial memorandum named it as property to be divided. The district court even found that the benefit was considered in setting the length of alimony. The Supreme Court explained that the key question is whether the asset was actually litigated and decided in the divorce, not simply whether it was written into the decree. Because the benefit was before the court in the original divorce, it was not an "omitted asset," and leaving it out of the written decree was not the kind of exceptional circumstance that justifies reopening a final judgment years later. Whether Nevada should have a law allowing courts to divide property merely left out of a decree - as California does - is, the court said, a question for the Legislature.