Nevada family-law case summaries

This case involves two parents who divorced in 2023 and originally agreed to share custody of their two young children fifty-fifty (called "joint physical custody"). They had lived together in Fallon, Nevada. After the divorce, the father, Camron, moved to Elko County. Because of the long distances involved, exchanging the children for parenting time became difficult, and the parents encountered challenges arising from the older child's behavioral and medical issues. In 2025, Camron asked the district court to give him primary physical custody — meaning the children would live mainly with him. The mother, Hannah, opposed that request, said it was not in the children's best interest, and asked the court to adjust the parenting-time schedule to account for the distance between the parents. The court held an evidentiary hearing where both parents testified, along with several of the older child's care providers, both grandmothers, and a court-appointed investigator who had prepared a custody evaluation. After the hearing, the court denied Camron's request and instead awarded Hannah primary physical custody, while keeping joint legal custody (the parents still share major decision-making). The court gave Camron one weekend of parenting time per month, with exchanges in Winnemucca, daily phone calls, a holiday and vacation schedule, and five weeks of parenting time during summer break. On appeal, Camron raised two main arguments. First, he said his right to due process — his right to fair notice and a chance to be heard — was violated because Hannah never actually asked for primary physical custody; she wanted to keep the joint arrangement. The Court of Appeals rejected this. It explained that when a parent asks a court to change custody, Nevada law requires the court to decide the matter based on the children's best interest, and that an award of primary custody to the other parent is one of the possible outcomes. Because Camron himself put custody in front of the court and had a full chance to testify and present his position at the hearing, he had both notice and an opportunity to be heard. Second, Camron argued the court's factual findings were not backed by adequate evidence. He pointed to claims that Hannah did not consult him about the children's medical and educational issues, did not always ensure he got his parenting time, and had mental health difficulties. The Court of Appeals explained that it does not re-weigh the evidence or second-guess which witnesses the trial judge found believable. It reviewed the district court's findings — including the older child's medical treatment in Fallon, Hannah's role as the day-to-day caregiver and coordinator of that treatment, the children's close bond with their maternal grandmother, and the presence of a younger half-sibling — and concluded those findings were supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept. The court had reviewed the statutory best-interest factors, found six favored Hannah and the rest neutral or irrelevant, and connected those findings to its custody decision. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Craig and Catherine Doan married in 1985 and later divorced. Craig worked as an air traffic controller for the FAA for more than 23 years and earned federal retirement benefits. During the divorce, both spouses filed sworn financial statements indicating they had retirement accounts or pensions, and Catherine's pretrial memorandum specifically identified Craig's federal retirement benefits as property earned during the marriage. After their lawyers withdrew shortly before trial, the couple settled their property division themselves at a conference with the judge. The final divorce decree, entered in August 2003, divided one retirement asset (a voluntary thrift savings plan) but said nothing about Craig's FAA retirement benefit. Six years later, in June 2009, Catherine asked the court to divide the FAA retirement benefit, arguing it had been left out of the decree and should now be split. The district court first denied her motion, finding the benefit had been fully disclosed during the divorce. But after Catherine asked the court to reconsider, the court changed course: it found the benefit had been left out of the decree by "mutual mistake" and divided it using a federal formula. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It explained that under NRCP 60(b) - a rule of court procedure allowing a party to ask for relief from a final judgment - a motion based on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or fraud must be filed within six months of the judgment. Catherine waited more than six years, so her motion was too late. The court then asked whether her request could instead be treated as an "independent action" - a separate lawsuit seeking relief in equity, which is not subject to the six-month deadline but requires a much higher showing: it is available "only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice." The court held that Catherine could not meet that standard. Nevada law recognizes that when a marital asset was never litigated or decided in the divorce - for example, because neither party mentioned it - it can be divided later through an equitable action. But here, the FAA retirement benefit was disclosed and discussed throughout the divorce proceedings: it appeared in Craig's pay statements, W-2 forms, and financial affidavit, and Catherine's own pretrial memorandum named it as property to be divided. The district court even found that the benefit was considered in setting the length of alimony. The Supreme Court explained that the key question is whether the asset was actually litigated and decided in the divorce, not simply whether it was written into the decree. Because the benefit was before the court in the original divorce, it was not an "omitted asset," and leaving it out of the written decree was not the kind of exceptional circumstance that justifies reopening a final judgment years later. Whether Nevada should have a law allowing courts to divide property merely left out of a decree - as California does - is, the court said, a question for the Legislature.