Nevada family-law case summaries

Norman and Stamper married in 2014 and have three minor children. Stamper filed for divorce in 2023 and asked for primary physical custody of the children. Norman filed a counterclaim also seeking primary physical custody. Both parties initially had lawyers, but Norman's counsel withdrew, and Norman began representing himself (pro se, meaning without a lawyer). The couple negotiated a settlement outside of court. Stamper sent Norman a "global settlement offer" under which the parties would share joint physical and legal custody, Norman would pay $550 per month in child support, they would split the children's medical costs, the children would stay on Norman's health insurance, and Stamper would receive 35 percent of Norman's CalPERS retirement funds instead of alimony. The parties added a term about Stamper returning a set of diamond earrings, then signed the agreement and told the court they had settled. Before the settlement conference, Stamper mailed Norman an updated financial disclosure form (a document, called an FDF, that lists a person's income and finances) on August 23, 2023, but did not file a copy with the court. That form showed Stamper had been hired at a law firm and expected to make about $75,000 a year. Norman testified he received it on August 26. On August 28, Stamper emailed Norman a draft of the divorce decree that included both parties' income figures updated to reflect her new job. On August 29, the court held a settlement conference. Both parties confirmed they had settled and testified that they had enough time to consider the terms, understood they were giving up their right to a trial, believed the terms were fair, and believed the agreement was in the children's best interest. The court signed the decree, which listed gross monthly incomes of $7,374 for Stamper and $10,509.36 for Norman. Norman did not appeal the divorce decree. About six months later, on March 4, 2024, Norman filed a motion under NRCP 60(b)(3) — a rule that lets a court relieve a party from a judgment that resulted from fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. He argued Stamper had not timely filed her updated financial disclosure, that this information was material to his decision to settle, and that there was therefore no genuine "meeting of the minds" on child support, alimony, or the children's health insurance. He also argued the decree did not comply with an administrative rule requiring child support stipulations to list the guideline amount, and that opposing counsel's conduct violated his due process rights. The district court denied the motion. It found the motion was untimely because Norman knew about the alleged fraud before the settlement and the entry of the decree and did not seek relief quickly or file an appeal. The court also found that, even if timely, the motion would fail because Norman knew about Stamper's new job and income before he settled and relied on that information when he agreed. The court found his other arguments did not show fraud and would have been better raised in an appeal from the decree. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the district court. The court noted that Norman's own sworn testimony showed he knew by August 26 that Stamper was making or expected to make at least $75,000 a year, and had her exact income figure on August 28 — the day before the settlement conference. Despite this, he agreed to pay $550 a month in child support and agreed to keep the children on his own health insurance without raising any concern with the court or filing an appeal. The court found nothing in the record showing he ever asked about Stamper's health insurance. As a result, these points did not justify setting aside the decree. The court declined to consider Norman's argument that he was forced into the settlement because his counsel abandoned him, because he had not raised that argument below in the way he framed it on appeal. The court also treated his remaining arguments (about the administrative child-support rule, whether Stamper's income was supported by the record, alleged child abuse, and temporary orders) as waived because he did not address on appeal the specific reasons the district court gave for rejecting them.

Rochelle Mezzano and John Townley signed a prenuptial agreement before marrying. Among other things, the agreement said that property titled in one spouse's name would be that spouse's separate property, and that the couple intended to "acquire no community property (unless title to property acquired after marriage is specifically taken as community property or joint tenancy property with right of survivorship) during their marriage and that all property acquired during marriage shall be owned by the acquiring party or the person contributing the acquisition funds." The agreement also spelled out specific ways the couple could create community property - property owned jointly by both spouses - such as taking title jointly or designating property as community in a signed writing. Townley filed for divorce in 2019 and initially obtained a default divorce decree, but the Nevada Supreme Court held that decree void because of improper service and sent the case back. On remand, Mezzano filed an answer, a counterclaim (with causes of action including divorce, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, abuse of process, breach of contract, and breach of good faith and fair dealing), and a crossclaim for conversion. Mezzano then failed to respond to discovery requests, failed to appear for her deposition, and failed to make required disclosures. As a sanction, the district court barred her from "introducing any document she failed to produce in discovery; or as required by NRCP 16.1 or 16.2; and she is precluded from offering any testimony or evidence in support of her affirmative claims and defenses, particularly any claim of damages against Mr. Townley." The court also granted Townley summary judgment - a ruling without trial because no facts were genuinely in dispute - on Mezzano's second through sixth causes of action, and, on its own initiative, on paragraphs 11-13 of her divorce cause of action. At trial over the division of assets and debts, one key dispute involved the Yellowstone properties, two Reno real properties in which Mezzano acquired an interest during the marriage. Mezzano said they were her separate property because the deeds were in her name (along with a third party); Townley testified he did not know the source of the purchase money and that there was no proof community funds were not used. The district court found that "Mezzano did not provide the court clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption her interest acquired during the marriage is community property. Therefore, the presumption controls." After dividing the assets, the court ordered Mezzano to pay Townley $740,647 as an equalization payment. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling on the Yellowstone properties. Even though both sides pointed to competing provisions of the prenuptial agreement - and the district court itself found "the prenuptial agreement is valid and enforceable" - the district court made no findings and offered no discussion of the agreement when deciding whether the community had an interest in those properties; instead it appeared to rely on Nevada's default community property presumption. Because the district court did not analyze the prenuptial agreement on this issue, the Court of Appeals concluded it abused its discretion and sent that portion of the case back for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals rejected Mezzano's other arguments. It held that the discovery sanctions were not "case concluding" because no dismissal occurred and excluding evidence does not amount to a case-concluding discovery sanction; given her failures to appear for deposition and respond to discovery, the sanction was within the district court's discretion. And because the sanction already barred her from introducing evidence supporting any affirmative claim, she could not show she was prejudiced by the court's sua sponte summary judgment on paragraphs 11-13 of her divorce counterclaim, so that ruling was affirmed.