Nevada family-law case summaries

This case is about whether a baby in foster care should be presumed to belong with her biological sister, even though that sister has already been adopted by another family. Baby Girl W. was born in October 2017 and was quickly placed in foster care as a child in need of protection. The Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) decided that adoption was the right long-term plan for her. Baby Girl W. has a 3-year-old biological half-sister named Vivian, who was previously adopted by Amy Mulkern in Massachusetts. DFS itself contacted Amy in early 2018 to ask whether she would adopt Baby Girl W. so the sisters could grow up together. Amy went through the interstate placement process and was approved as a possible placement. But DFS ultimately concluded that Baby Girl W. had bonded with her current foster parents - who are also willing to adopt her - and recommended she stay with them. Amy went to the Nevada district court handling the dependency case. The court allowed Amy and the foster parents to participate as "persons with a special interest," meaning they can recommend a placement and testify at the placement hearing. But the district court also ruled that, because Vivian had been adopted, she was no longer legally Baby Girl W.'s sibling for purposes of a Nevada statute - NRS 432B.550(5)(a) - that tells courts to presume placing siblings together is in a foster child's best interest. The district court therefore decided that presumption did not apply. Amy and Vivian asked the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus - a court order forcing the lower court to do something it is required by law to do. They wanted the Supreme Court to make the district court apply the sibling presumption when deciding where Baby Girl W. should live. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with Amy and Vivian on that point. The court explained that Nevada law repeatedly emphasizes keeping siblings together - in initial protective placements, in placements after parental rights are terminated, in adoptions, and in custody decisions. No Nevada statute says that adoption erases sibling status for placement purposes. Because the Legislature has stressed sibling relationships so consistently, the court concluded it would not assume - without clearer instruction - that lawmakers wanted the presumption to vanish the moment one sibling is adopted. The court therefore directed the district court to apply the rebuttable sibling presumption in NRS 432B.550(5) when deciding where to place Baby Girl W. "Rebuttable" means the presumption can still be overcome - the district court can still decide, based on evidence, that placement with the sibling is not in the baby's best interest. The court did not order any other relief, noting that the district court had already considered the Mulkerns' arguments, included Amy as a possible placement, and invited her to participate at the upcoming placement hearing. The court also added a footnote making clear that its ruling does not change separate Nevada rules about confidentiality, visitation, or inheritance after adoption, and does not require DFS to do more than its statutory duty to look for relatives.

This case arose after the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) received an anonymous hotline call in April 2010 alleging that Keaundra D.'s infant son, C.L.B., Jr., had been burned on the face. Keaundra told investigators that the burn occurred when her two-year-old daughter, A.D.L., reported that C.L.B., Jr. had "tried to kiss" a hot iron that fell off a dresser while Keaundra was in another room. DFS removed both children from Keaundra's care. One physician who examined the child in person, Dr. Neuman, found "no evidence of abuse." A different doctor, Dr. Mehta, who reviewed only photographs, opined the burn was deliberate. The juvenile court found the injury was nonaccidental and ordered Keaundra to follow a "case plan" - a list of steps she had to complete to get her children back. She maintained housing and a job, kept in touch with DFS, completed parenting classes, and finished a physical-abuse assessment and therapy. Her therapist testified that her risk of reoffending was low and that she showed none of the signs typical of an abusive parent. DFS itself reported that she had "successfully completed her case plan and has the knowledge and tools to effectively parent her children." But DFS still wanted her parental rights terminated, and the district court still terminated them, for one reason: Keaundra would not admit that she had deliberately held the iron to her son's face. Her case plan required her to "articulate" the "sequence of events" leading to the abuse "as sustained by the Court." Because she insisted the burn was accidental, the court treated her as out of compliance. DFS confirmed at trial that, had Keaundra admitted intentional abuse, it would not have sought termination. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects people from being forced to incriminate themselves, not just in criminal trials but in any proceeding where their answers might be used against them in a future criminal case. Admitting that one held a hot iron to a child's face would expose a person to prosecution for child abuse under Nevada law (NRS 200.508). The court held that a parent cannot be forced to choose between admitting a crime and losing her children - that choice is unconstitutionally coercive. The court drew a line: a juvenile court may require a parent to participate in meaningful therapy, even if therapy works better when a parent acknowledges past conduct, and a parent who refuses meaningful therapy may face consequences. But a court cannot require, as a condition of keeping parental rights, that the parent expressly admit to a crime. The court also held that the evidence did not support termination on its own merits. Nevada law presumes termination is in a child's best interest when the child has been out of the home for 14 of 20 consecutive months, and presumes a parent has made only "token efforts" in similar circumstances. The court found Keaundra rebutted both presumptions: she stayed in regular phone contact, her mother brought the children to visit, A.D.L. cried and begged to go home to her mother, Keaundra helped support the children financially, and after the first termination order the children waited 17 months in foster care before being placed with relatives. Without the presumptions, there was not substantial evidence to terminate.