Nevada family-law case summaries

Bart and Bonnie Mahoney married in 2000 and had two children. When Bart filed for divorce in 2016, the couple reached an agreement that was merged into the divorce decree. Under the decree, Bonnie received primary physical custody of the children, and Bart agreed to pay child support, cover the children on his medical insurance, pay monthly alimony for five years, pay Bonnie 25% of his annual bonuses (rising to 35% if he failed to give her his annual W-2 tax forms), and pay her attorney fees and costs from the divorce. According to the opinion, Bart did not pay the child support, alimony, or attorney fees, did not pay Bonnie a share of his bonuses, and did not provide his W-2 forms. In May 2019, Bonnie asked the district court to reduce the arrearages (the unpaid amounts) to a judgment—that is, to convert what Bart owed into an enforceable court judgment—with interest and penalties, and to review child support and award her attorney fees. The case wound its way through several hearings. Bart's attorney withdrew in 2020 because Bart had never formally retained him and had stopped communicating. After that, Bart represented himself. The evidentiary hearing was rescheduled several times and ultimately set for December 3, 2020. Notice of that hearing was mailed to Bart's last-known address on file with the court, and Bonnie's attorney also emailed Bart pretrial filings—containing the hearing's date and time—at the same email address Bart had previously used to correspond with that attorney. Bart did not show up at the December 3, 2020, hearing. The district court proceeded with only Bonnie and her attorney present, took evidence including Bart's income and bonus records obtained by subpoena, and granted Bonnie's motion. It found Bart owed child support, alimony, and attorney fees and costs from the divorce, and—because Bart never provided his W-2 forms—awarded Bonnie 35% of his bonuses. It also awarded Bonnie the attorney fees and costs of bringing the motion, setting the amount in January 2021 after Bonnie filed a detailed memorandum of her fees and costs. Bart then moved to set aside the orders under NRCP 60(b), claiming he was never notified of the hearing, but filed his notice of appeal before the district court ruled on that motion. The appeal was still properly before the Court of Appeals under NRAP 4(a)(6), which treats the premature notice as filed on the date the district court denied the set-aside motion. However, because Bart's briefs did not address the denial of that motion, any challenge to it was waived. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected all three of Bart's arguments. First, it held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Bart was properly notified of the hearing: notice was mailed to his last-known address (which under the court rules completes service upon mailing), and he also had actual notice via emails from Bonnie's attorney. Bart pointed to nothing in the record—such as a sworn affidavit—showing he did not actually receive notice, and the onus was on him to keep the court updated with his address. Second, the court held that Bart's challenges to the arrearage findings were waived because he never raised those specific arguments in the district court, despite multiple opportunities to do so. Third, the court held that the fee award was not an abuse of discretion: the award was authorized by statute, and the district court made detailed findings under the four-factor test from Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank for evaluating the reasonableness of attorney fees.

Christina and Mitchell divorced in 2008 and had two children together, M.S. (17 at the time of the opinion) and E.S. (14). This appeal concerned only the physical custody of M.S.; the parents continued to share joint legal custody of both children and joint physical custody of E.S., and those arrangements were not challenged. In August 2019, Mitchell asked the court to let the children decide for themselves whether to spend custodial time at Christina's home ("teenage discretion"), saying the children did not want to go there because of fights with Christina. Christina opposed this and asked the court to hold Mitchell in contempt for keeping the children from her. After several hearings, the court ordered the parents back onto a week-on/week-off schedule and directed that custody exchanges happen at a supervised visitation center called "Donna's House." The center and child-interview reports indicated the children refused to participate in exchanges with Christina. The court then found there was enough reason ("adequate cause") to hold an evidentiary hearing - a trial-like proceeding with testimony - to decide whether custody should change. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from both children, Mitchell, and Christina. Both children said they preferred to live with Mitchell because of turmoil when with Christina. M.S. described two physical fights with Christina - one in May 2019 (Christina allegedly tackled her, pulled her hair, and hit her) and one in August 2019 (Christina allegedly scratched her, pulled her hair, and pushed her). E.S. said he saw and heard parts of these altercations. M.S. also testified about hurtful language Christina used about her, her stepmother, and her half-sibling. The district court decided it was in M.S.'s best interest for Mitchell to become her primary physical custodian, largely because of the conflict between M.S. and Christina. The court found that Christina had engaged in acts of domestic violence against M.S. under one of the "best interest" factors listed in the statute, but it noted the incidents were softened by the fact that M.S. was an active participant, that it was hard to tell who started them, and that any injuries were minor. Importantly, the court did not use the higher "clear and convincing evidence" standard, did not cite the separate statute that creates a legal presumption against giving custody to a domestic-violence perpetrator, and did not apply any such presumption. On appeal, Christina argued the court should have used the clear-and-convincing standard and allowed her to rebut that presumption. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the district court never applied the domestic-violence presumption against Christina in the first place, so she was not harmed by not being given a chance to rebut it - and she had in fact testified about the incidents. The court also said the ordinary standard for civil child-custody matters is "preponderance of the evidence," not clear and convincing, unless the legislature says otherwise, and Christina cited no authority requiring the higher standard just to consider domestic-violence allegations among the best-interest factors. Finally, the court held that even if the district court had made a mistake about the domestic-violence framework, the error was harmless because the district court gave many other reasons - M.S.'s own wish (at nearly 18) to live with her father, and the fractured relationship between M.S. and Christina - that independently supported the custody change. Because those findings were supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

This case asks a question that Nevada's appellate courts had not previously answered head-on: can a court terminate a parent's rights to her child when the parent is so mentally ill that she would not be considered competent to stand trial in a criminal case? The Nevada Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances here, yes - the trial may go forward. The mother in this case had been diagnosed with schizoaffective bipolar disorder. Shortly after her son was born, hospital staff alerted the Department of Family Services because the mother insisted the baby was not hers and tried to take a different child. Two months later she brought the baby to the hospital claiming the infant had told her, in full sentences, that he had an earache. The child was placed in protective custody, adjudicated neglected, and made a ward of the court. The mother received a case plan focused on her mental health, but DFS observed that her condition did not improve. While the termination case was pending, she was arrested for allegedly boarding a bus and trying to take another child she believed was hers, and she was repeatedly found incompetent to stand trial in that criminal case. The district court did several things to protect the mother's interests. It appointed a guardian ad litem (a person appointed to look after the legal interests of someone who cannot represent themselves) under Rule 17(c) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. It granted multiple continuances - delays - hoping the mother would regain competence. When that did not happen, the court ultimately conducted the termination trial without her present in September 2015, with her guardian ad litem in attendance, and terminated her parental rights. On appeal, the mother argued that proceeding without her violated her constitutional right to due process. She pointed to a U.S. Supreme Court case, Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires courts to balance the private interest, the risk of an inaccurate result, and the government's interest before depriving someone of an important right. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that challenge. It explained that, unlike criminal cases, civil cases - including termination cases - do not require a court to wait indefinitely for a party to regain mental competence. Nevada law actually allows mental illness itself to be a basis for finding parental fault, so it would be inconsistent to also require the court to halt the case forever because of that same illness. The court noted that children have a powerful interest in stability and permanency, and that holding a child "in limbo" until a parent might one day be well enough to participate is not what Nevada law contemplates. The district court had given the mother many chances and had effectively considered all the factors that due process required. The mother also argued that the State had improperly served her by publication (publishing notice in a newspaper rather than handing it to her directly) when it actually knew or could have known where she was. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the State's conduct was proper, but ruled that the mother's lawyer never raised this objection in the district court, so the issue was waived and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The court therefore affirmed the order terminating her parental rights.