Nevada family-law case summaries

Norma and Raymond Newcomb married in 1993 and divorced in 2020 through a stipulated decree - a divorce agreement the parties negotiated and the court approved. The decree treated their Henderson, Nevada home as community property (property belonging jointly to both spouses), gave Norma some lump-sum alimony plus an extra $15,000 "off the top" when the home sold, and split the remaining sale proceeds evenly. The decree also said Norma would list the home for sale herself (to save on realtor fees) and would move out, after which Raymond would have exclusive possession, with Raymond agreeing to cooperate with listing and showing the home. Things did not go smoothly. Raymond changed the locks on the home in August 2020. Norma said this locked her out and prevented her from preparing and listing the home, and that Raymond would not cooperate with a realtor she tried to bring in. Raymond said Norma had moved out of state and never genuinely tried to sell the home. The home was not sold until 2023, after Raymond went to court. In 2023, Raymond asked the court to find that Norma had violated the decree by not listing the home, and he argued that the resulting delay cost him money in mortgage payments that should be taken out of Norma's share of the sale proceeds. Norma responded that Raymond should be held in contempt and should bear the mortgage payments himself, because he was the one in exclusive possession and had locked her out. After a two-day evidentiary hearing spread over several months, the home sold for roughly $575,000. The district court found that it was not possible for Norma to list the home because she had been locked out, and that requiring her to list it would have been "an act of futility and impossibility." The court also noted that the community actually benefited from the delayed sale, because the home's value rose by about $180,000. Even so, the court ordered - without explaining why or citing any legal authority - that $26,929.37 in mortgage principal be deducted from Norma's share of the proceeds and given to Raymond. The Court of Appeals focused on that unexplained deduction. It observed that although the district court made detailed findings about why Norma could not list the home, it made no findings and gave no legal reasoning for making Norma responsible for the entire mortgage principal amount. The appellate court found this especially notable because the original reason Raymond asked for repayment was Norma's supposed deliberate delay - a delay the district court itself had found was actually impossible because of Raymond's actions. Because the order lacked the findings and legal explanation needed for the appellate court to review it, the Court of Appeals reversed the part of the order dealing with the mortgage principal payments, affirmed everything else in the challenged order, and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to explain the legal basis for its ruling on the mortgage principal payments.

Raul and Rosalba Lopez married in May 2014 and have two children. In September 2022, Rosalba filed for divorce. The couple agreed on how to handle custody of their children - they would share joint legal and physical custody, and Rosalba would pay Raul child support. That left only two things for the court to decide: whether Raul should receive alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other after divorce), and whether attorney fees and costs should be awarded. At a hearing in September 2023, both Raul and Rosalba testified about their finances. Rosalba works full-time as an operations supervisor at a freight company. She testified that she supports the parties' daughter, J.L., who turned 18 during the case and continued to live with her, and that she covers her own household and medical costs, including treatment for breast cancer and a skin removal surgery that insurance did not cover. Her position was that she could not afford to pay Raul alimony. Raul testified that he has not worked since 2018 and receives Social Security Disability benefits. He said he wanted alimony so he could move out of his parents' home, where he has lived since the separation, and he argued that Rosalba exaggerated her expenses and could afford to pay him. The district court weighed the factors the law requires it to consider for alimony. It found Rosalba's net monthly income (after tax deductions) to be $5,984.27 and her expenses to be $5,477. It found Raul's gross monthly income from Social Security Disability benefits to be $1,856.90 and noted his expenses were limited. The court also noted that Raul had covered his own living expenses for about a year after moving out without Rosalba's help, and that both parties would receive an equal lump sum from selling the marital home. The court concluded that Raul did not show a need for support that outweighed the burden such payments would place on Rosalba, and that Rosalba did not have the ability to pay alimony. The court denied alimony and indicated Rosalba would be awarded attorney fees and costs, with a separate order to follow on the amount. On appeal, Raul argued that the court should not have counted Rosalba's spending on their adult daughter, that Rosalba's expenses were inflated, and that some of her medical expenses were unnecessary. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It explained that the law requires the court to consider each spouse's financial condition, which includes their expenses. Raul did not point to any legal authority showing the court could not consider these particular expenses. The appellate court also explained that Raul was essentially asking it to re-weigh the evidence - to decide which testimony was believable and how much weight it deserved - which is the job of the trial court, not the appellate court. Because the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence and Raul identified no legal error, the Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the denial of alimony. The court also addressed a few side points. It noted that Raul's challenge to the attorney fees award was premature, because the decree contemplated further proceedings to set the fee amount and no final order on fees had been properly appealed. And it treated two mistakes in the decree - a reference to Rosalba obtaining a high school diploma when she did not finish high school, and a statement that the marriage occurred in 2015 instead of 2014 - as harmless clerical errors that did not change the analysis.

Cherlyn and Robert Oshiro married in 1999 in Las Vegas. Robert had served in the military, including four years in the Vietnam War, and received a service-connected injury. Throughout the marriage, the couple lived in part on Robert's military disability benefits. After Cherlyn stopped working in 2007 following a car accident and Robert retired in 2013, the couple lived on Robert's military disability benefits and their combined Social Security benefits, with Cherlyn serving as Robert's primary caretaker as his disability worsened. Cherlyn filed for divorce in 2023. The parties resolved how to split their shared property on their own, leaving only the question of alimony - ongoing financial support paid from one ex-spouse to the other - for the trial judge. At the time of trial, Robert received $3,946.25 per month in military disability benefits and $2,071 per month in Social Security benefits; Cherlyn received $998 per month in Social Security benefits. Cherlyn asked for $3,400 per month. Robert argued the court could only look at the couple's Social Security benefits and proposed $536.50 per month. The district court awarded $2,000 per month. Robert appealed. His main argument was that a Nevada statute, NRS 125.165, forbids courts from dividing a veteran's military disability benefits when setting alimony, and that the statute also forbids courts from even considering those benefits in the calculation. He argued the $2,000 award - which would require him to hand over about 96.6 percent of his Social Security income - effectively divided his disability benefits in disguise. The Nevada Supreme Court rejected that reading. The court held that NRS 125.165 prohibits direct actions against the benefits themselves - attaching, levying, seizing, assigning, or dividing them - but does not prohibit a court from considering that those benefits exist and contribute to a divorcing veteran's overall financial picture. The court relied on the plain text of the statute, the legislative history (an earlier draft contained the word "consider" but the legislature deliberately removed it), and the rule that words in a list take meaning from their neighbors - here, all the prohibited verbs describe collection actions, not passive consideration. The court also distinguished two U.S. Supreme Court cases Robert cited, Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, explaining that those cases involved community property division and waivers of military retirement pay, not alimony. The court noted that Howell expressly left state courts free to take a veteran's disability benefits into account when evaluating need for alimony, and that the overwhelming majority of state courts allow consideration of such benefits in alimony determinations. Reviewing the $2,000 award itself for abuse of discretion, the court found substantial evidence supported it - the trial court considered both spouses' financial conditions, earning capacities, ages, health, home contributions, and standard of living. The court acknowledged that the award came "just up to that line" because Robert would have to pay nearly all of his Social Security benefits to satisfy it, but observed that the district court did not order him to pay from his disability benefits. The court expressly reserved for another day the harder question of whether NRS 125.165 would invalidate an alimony award that could only be paid by drawing from military disability benefits.

Jesusa and Wayne Conte married in 1986 and divorced in 2012. Their divorce decree required Wayne, a military veteran whose only income comes from a retirement pension, supplemental security income, and veterans' disability income, to pay Jesusa $1,000 per month in alimony for 15 years. According to the opinion, Wayne refused to voluntarily pay, so Jesusa repeatedly had to go to court to garnish his pension (garnishment means taking money directly from a source of income under a court order). Over the years, courts entered judgments confirming what Wayne owed, including a December 2014 judgment for $16,307.50 in unpaid alimony (which the parties agree was later paid off) and a February 2021 judgment for $45,680.68. In February 2023, with the help of a pro bono attorney, Wayne asked the district court to eliminate or reduce his alimony. Among other things, he argued that a Nevada statute, NRS 125.165, barred the court from counting his veterans' disability payments as income when figuring out alimony. He also asked for sanctions under NRCP 11 - a court rule allowing penalties for improper filings - based on statements Jesusa made in her written opposition to his motion. Without holding a hearing, the district court granted both requests in January 2024. It refused to count Wayne's $4,456.22 per month in veterans' disability benefits as income, concluded that Jesusa's net income exceeded Wayne's, terminated the alimony, and made the termination retroactive to August 2022. On its own, the court also went back through a decade of the case's history, decided that the December 2014 order had "overcharged" Wayne by $6,698, credited that amount against his arrears, and imposed $5,000 in sanctions against Jesusa and/or her counsel based on its own review of past filings - not on the four arguments Wayne had actually made in his sanctions motion. The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. First, it held that NRS 125.165 only forbids courts from attaching, levying, or seizing veterans' disability benefits to satisfy alimony - it does not stop a court from considering those benefits when calculating how much alimony a veteran can afford to pay. Federal law does not forbid such consideration either. If the district court had counted the disability benefits, Wayne's net monthly income would have been over $300 higher than Jesusa's, rather than negative, so the error could have changed the outcome. Second, the appellate court held that the district court should not have gone back and recalculated arrears from the 2014 order on its own. Wayne never asked for that, Jesusa had no notice or chance to respond, and the 2014 judgment was final and could not be reopened under the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) - the rule that a valid, final judgment ends the dispute it resolved. Third, the court vacated the $5,000 sanctions award because the district court never addressed the arguments Wayne actually raised in his NRCP 11 motion and instead sanctioned Jesusa based on its own investigation of her filings over many years, without giving her the required notice and opportunity to respond. Finally, given these circumstances, the Court of Appeals directed that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand "to ensure fairness in the ongoing proceedings."

Burke Hall and Vanessa Marie Loftis were married and had three minor children. Their youngest child died in a tragic accident, drowning in a swimming pool while Loftis failed to provide adequate supervision. Loftis was convicted of a felony count of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment in connection with that accident and placed on probation. (After she was discharged from probation, her conviction was reportedly reduced to a gross misdemeanor, but the amended judgment of conviction was not in the record before the appeals court.) Loftis then started this court case, asking for "separate maintenance" (financial support while remaining married) and for joint legal and physical custody of the two remaining children. Hall responded by asking for a divorce and for sole legal and physical custody of the children. The district court granted the divorce early on but waited to decide the heavily contested custody dispute. Both sides made serious accusations against each other, including claims of abuse, domestic violence, mental health problems, and withholding the children. After a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the district court awarded Loftis sole legal custody and primary physical custody, with discretion to let Hall have supervised parenting time. The court explained that this arrangement was in the children's best interest. It found that although Loftis committed an act of child abuse or neglect connected to the child's death, she afterward took every step possible to redeem herself and become a proper parent. By contrast, it found that Hall bore extreme animosity toward Loftis that harmed the children, refused to cooperate, interfered with the children's relationship with their half-siblings, showed potential mental health issues while refusing to obtain a psychological examination, and committed an act of abduction without just cause. On appeal, Hall first argued the district court had no power (jurisdiction) to grant a divorce because Loftis had only asked for separate maintenance, not divorce. The appeals court rejected this because Hall himself filed a counterclaim for divorce, and Nevada law allows a court to grant a divorce to either party when grounds exist. Hall also argued that a separate divorce case he had previously filed blocked the court's jurisdiction, but he had agreed to dismiss that separate case, and the court found no legal authority creating such a barrier. Hall next challenged the custody decision on three main points. He said the court ignored Loftis's role in the child's death; the appeals court disagreed, noting the court did find Loftis committed abuse or neglect but treated the factor as "neutral" because she had worked to redeem herself, a conclusion supported by evidence including her testimony and the guardian ad litem's testimony. Hall argued the court should have applied a legal presumption against giving custody to a person who commits domestic violence; the appeals court held the drowning did not amount to "domestic violence" under the statute's definition, so the presumption never applied. Hall also argued the court had no jurisdiction to make findings about child abduction because that is a criminal matter; the appeals court held that the family court does have jurisdiction over custody proceedings and that the best-interest statute specifically requires it to consider whether a parent committed an act of abduction. Finally, Hall raised complaints about the district court striking materials he had submitted. The appeals court agreed the district court was correct that exhibits are not evidence until admitted, but said striking them on that basis was an abuse of discretion because the rules contemplate filing exhibits not yet admitted. Even so, the court held any error was harmless because there was a full evidentiary hearing where both sides could offer their materials. Because appellate courts do not reweigh evidence or credibility, and substantial evidence supported the district court's conclusions, the appeals court affirmed. It noted that Hall remains free to seek parenting time and is not barred from revisiting the parenting-time arrangement.