Nevada family-law case summaries

This case involves a divorce between Donald and Cheryl Schricker, a couple who dated beginning in 1998, bought and shared property over many years, and married in 2005 before Cheryl filed for divorce in 2019. Their dispute centered on several pieces of real estate and money. The first property was a lakefront property at Lake Almanor in northern California, which the couple bought in 1998 before marrying, and later shared ownership of with friends (the Whittenburgs) through a partnership. The couple's interest in this property became a major point of contention. The district court ordered Donald to buy out Cheryl's share. The second property was a home on Tapadero Trail in Reno, bought in 2010 for $350,000 using money Cheryl inherited from her father. Cheryl said she wanted this to be her own separate property, but Donald's name ended up on the deed. She claimed he added his name secretly; he said she watched the documents being signed. The district court found this home was community property (property belonging to both spouses) rather than Cheryl's separate property. There was also a deed of trust - a document that puts a lien on property to secure a debt - on a separate property Donald owned in Reno, naming Cheryl as beneficiary for $119,000. Cheryl testified she did not know about it until after she filed for divorce and never had a promissory note (the document that normally records the actual loan). Donald said he never borrowed money from her. The district court still found Donald owed Cheryl $119,000 based on the deed of trust because it had never been canceled. During the litigation, Donald did not fully respond to Cheryl's discovery requests and did not file certain tax returns as ordered. As a result, the district court imposed sanctions: he could not present documents he had not disclosed, certain requests for admission were treated as admitted, and the court could draw negative inferences from questions he did not answer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals largely upheld the district court. It held the Nevada court had authority to decide the case, that the Whittenburgs did not have to be added as parties, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the Almanor property or in imposing discovery sanctions. It rejected Cheryl's arguments that the Tapadero home should have been her separate property and that Donald committed fraud or breached a fiduciary duty. The one point on which the appellate court reversed involved the value of the Tapadero property. The written decree valued it at $407,000, but the trial transcript showed both parties actually agreed on $704,000. The court concluded the $407,000 figure was not supported by the evidence and appeared to be a clerical error, so it sent the case back to correct the valuation and update the related payment.

Edwin Griffith, a Reno resident, married Gabriela Gonzales-Alpizar, a citizen of Costa Rica, in Costa Rica in 1999. Before the wedding, the couple signed a premarital agreement that, among other things, waived any claim for alimony (spousal support) unless a divorce would leave one spouse eligible for public assistance. The couple lived in Reno with Gonzales-Alpizar's daughter Nicolle and their son Anthony, but the marriage deteriorated. In 2003, during a family trip to Costa Rica, Gonzales-Alpizar refused to return to Reno, and Griffith came home alone. In 2005, while Griffith was in Costa Rica to discuss a divorce settlement, he was allegedly served with a "Demand for Alimony," which under Costa Rican law covers both spousal and child support. The parties tell very different stories about what happened - Gonzales-Alpizar says Griffith understood he was being served and angrily threw the papers to the floor; Griffith says a stranger read something aloud in Spanish that he could not understand and he left with no paperwork. When Griffith did not respond, a Costa Rican court entered a default judgment ordering him to pay $180 per month in spousal support and $235 per month in child support for each of the two children. Gonzales-Alpizar never told the Costa Rican court about the premarital agreement. In 2007, a Costa Rican court granted Gonzales-Alpizar a divorce, with service made only by publication in Costa Rica even though she knew Griffith lived in Nevada. Griffith also filed for divorce in Nevada. The Nevada district court decided the parties had already been effectively divorced in Costa Rica, refused to enforce the spousal support and child custody provisions of the 2007 Costa Rican decree because service in that proceeding was invalid, but found that Griffith had been served in the 2005 support proceeding. The district court said the 2005 support order could be enforced if it was valid under Costa Rican law, and directed the parties to litigate Griffith's defenses in Costa Rica. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court addressed two questions of first impression. First, it examined the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a law codified in NRS Chapter 130 that lets Nevada courts enforce support orders from other "states," including foreign countries in certain circumstances. The court held that Costa Rica does not qualify as a "state" under any of the three methods in the statute: it has not been declared a foreign reciprocating country under federal law; Nevada's Attorney General has not declared it a "state"; and Gonzales-Alpizar failed to show that Costa Rica has procedures for enforcing foreign support orders that are "substantially similar" to UIFSA. Comparing how Nevada and Costa Rica calculate child support, the court explained, is not the relevant inquiry - what matters is whether Costa Rica has laws allowing foreign judgments to be recognized (that is, reciprocity). Second, the court considered "comity" - a principle of courtesy under which one jurisdiction's courts may give effect to another jurisdiction's judgments out of deference and respect. The court adopted Section 482 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which lists reasons a foreign judgment may or must be refused recognition, such as lack of due process, lack of jurisdiction, or fraud. Applying that framework, the court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Griffith was properly served with the Demand for Alimony, so due process did not bar enforcement. But because Gonzales-Alpizar purposefully failed to tell the Costa Rican court about the premarital agreement - which the court concluded was enforceable and which governed spousal support - the court declined to recognize the spousal support award as a matter of comity. The child support award, however, was a different matter, because the premarital agreement said nothing about child support. Griffith claimed the child support award was procured through fraud - that Gonzales-Alpizar misrepresented his parental relationship with Nicolle (who is not his biological child, with a dispute over whether he adopted her under Costa Rican law) and misrepresented his income and properties. The district court had made no findings on those claims, instead saying Costa Rica was the only forum for resolving them. The Supreme Court remanded for the district court to make findings under the Restatement approach and decide whether the child support portion of the order should be enforced as a matter of comity.