Nevada family-law case summaries

Anthony Ibanez and Patamawadee Chaisawang were never married but have a child together, born in September 2021. In June 2023, Ibanez filed a court complaint asking for sole legal and primary physical custody after Chaisawang moved from Nevada to California with the child. He argued that Chaisawang had taken the child without his permission—an "abduction"—and asked that the child be returned to Nevada. Chaisawang responded, denied taking the child improperly, and formally asked the court for permission to relocate to California with the child. After a trial where both parents testified and submitted evidence—including text messages between them and a statement Ibanez gave to police the day after Chaisawang moved—the district court gave the parents joint legal custody, gave Chaisawang primary physical custody, and allowed her to relocate to California. The court also set a child support amount. Ibanez then filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its custody decision, arguing the court used the wrong legal standard when evaluating whether an abduction occurred and improperly relied on things that happened after the move. The court denied that motion and later issued a separate order setting Ibanez's monthly child support obligation at $959.33, based on a gross monthly income of $9,116.67 and a $250 reduction for transportation costs. On appeal, Ibanez raised several arguments. First, he said the court used a stricter standard of proof ("clear and convincing evidence") when deciding whether an abduction happened, when it should have used the lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard (meaning "more likely than not"). The appeals court disagreed. It explained that while the trial court had referenced a subsection dealing with a special legal presumption against parents who commit abduction, the court also analyzed the abduction question under the ordinary best-interest factor and later clarified in writing that it had applied the "more likely than not" standard. The appeals court found Ibanez did not show the wrong standard was used. Second, Ibanez argued that the evidence proved Chaisawang abducted the child and that recognizing this would have shifted other factors in his favor. The appeals court noted that the trial court repeatedly declined to find an abduction, and that its findings—based on testimony and text messages showing Chaisawang had tried to reach a custody agreement while Ibanez refused to compromise—were supported by adequate evidence. The court emphasized that weighing evidence and judging witnesses' credibility is the trial court's job, and an appeals court does not re-weigh that evidence. Third, Ibanez challenged the decision letting Chaisawang relocate to California, saying the court improperly relied on benefits that only existed because of the move (like a California school). The appeals court explained that when there is no prior custody order, a parent still needs court permission to move a child out of state, and the court must decide what is in the child's best interest. The trial court found a "sensible, good faith reason for the move"—a better school with services for the child's speech delay, nearby family, and Chaisawang's flexible remote work. The trial court also clarified that it relied on forward-looking, prospective benefits rather than benefits that had already accrued from the move. Fourth, Ibanez challenged the child support calculation, saying the court overstated his income. The appeals court found the income figure was supported by evidence: his own disclosure form showing $6,516.67, plus regular monthly transfers of at least $1,500 from his grandmother, plus $1,100 in rental income. The court also noted Ibanez received the $250 transportation reduction he had requested. Finally, Ibanez argued the court wrongly denied him attorney fees because Chaisawang caused the litigation by abducting the child. Because the appeals court had already upheld the finding that there was no abduction and no abuse of discretion in the custody decision, it found no abuse of discretion in denying attorney fees. The court affirmed all the district court's orders.

Bernadette Perez and Cornell Haywood were never married but have one child together, born in 2006. In 2011, Bernadette and the child moved to Texas, and Cornell has had limited contact with the child since. In 2017, Bernadette—with help from the Clark County District Attorney Family Support Division (DAFS), a government office that assists with child support—started a case seeking child support arrears (past-due support) for part of January 2017. The district court entered a consent order setting Cornell's monthly obligation at $462 and requiring him to pay $1,923 in arrears for January through April 2017. Bernadette did not sign that order and says she was never served with the filed copy. She later learned the order awarded only four months of arrears, rather than the maximum of four years that state law allows. In 2019, Bernadette hired a lawyer and asked the court either to modify the 2017 order or to enter a new judgment, seeking constructive arrears (past support the court can order for a period before the case was filed) going back four years. Cornell did not oppose her motion. DAFS, however, appeared and recommended denying it, saying Cornell had a right to rely on the earlier settled arrears. After objections and back-and-forth, the district court sent the matter to the hearing master for an evidentiary hearing on whether to award arrears for February 1, 2013 through December 31, 2016—the four-year window before Bernadette's 2017 support request. Before that hearing, the hearing master told Cornell to provide proof of his 2013–2016 income and told Bernadette to provide a schedule of arrears and medical expenses. Cornell did not object to Bernadette's proposed schedule and gave DAFS some tax documents but filed nothing before the hearing. At the hearing, both parties testified that Cornell provided no support for the child from 2013 to 2016. Cornell testified about his earnings: roughly $14,000 as an entertainer in 2013, about $10,855 in 2014, and around $16 an hour after starting a job in 2015 that continued into 2016. Cornell offered no argument against Bernadette's request. Neither side formally admitted the tax returns into evidence, and Bernadette submitted no additional documents. The hearing master declined to order more arrears, reasoning that Bernadette had failed to present evidence of Cornell's income or support for her medical-expense and insurance requests. Bernadette objected, and the district court affirmed. She then appealed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed for several reasons. First, it declined to consider the brief filed by DAFS because DAFS did not represent any party to the appeal, and its arguments exceeded the authority the law gives it. Second, the court noted that Cornell never filed an answering brief despite being ordered to, and the court treated that failure as a confession of error. Third—and independently—the court concluded that the hearing master's report and the district court's order were not supported by substantial evidence, because the hearing master had actually received evidence (live testimony counts as evidence) about Cornell's failure to pay support and about his income, yet failed to fully consider awarding arrears or even the statutory minimum, or directing more discovery. The court sent the case back for a new hearing to determine whether four years of retroactive child support and payment of identified medical expenses is warranted.