Nevada family-law case summaries

Irina and Donovan Hansen married in 2007 and have one child. During the marriage Donovan worked as a firefighter (later a battalion chief) for the city of North Las Vegas, while Irina initially worked as a real-estate agent, became a stay-at-home mother, and later obtained a cosmetology license and opened a salon using a home-equity loan. When the marriage broke down, Donovan filed for divorce in 2019. The case went to trial in 2021, where Donovan had a lawyer and Irina represented herself. The trial court divided the couple's property, set child support and alimony, and awarded joint legal custody with Irina having primary physical custody. Irina appealed, arguing the trial court got several financial issues wrong and was biased against her. The Court of Appeals of Nevada rejected each argument and affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decision. On child support, Irina argued the court used inaccurate figures for Donovan's income. The appeals court explained that trial judges decide disputed facts and weigh witness credibility, and appellate courts do not second-guess those calls when they are supported by adequate evidence. Donovan's pay stubs, tax documents, and testimony supported the court's finding that his gross monthly income was $15,376.19, which produced a child support order of $1,445 per month. On alimony, Irina wanted at least $6,000 per month rather than the $3,000 per month for 60 months she received. The appeals court noted trial courts have broad discretion to award alimony that is "just and equitable." The trial court found Irina could earn about $3,000 per month from her cosmetology work and salon, that her reasonable post-divorce expenses were about $5,500, and considered her child support - and concluded $3,000 per month for five years was appropriate. The appeals court found this supported by the evidence. On property division, Irina argued Donovan got an unequal share without proper findings, that she should have kept the marital home, and that Donovan wasted community assets. The appeals court explained that community property is generally split equally, that the trial court found much of Irina's testimony about asset values not credible, that selling the marital home made sense given the mortgage and home-equity loan on it, and that Irina had not proven waste. It also upheld the finding that money in Donovan's deferred compensation account before the marriage ($87,992.62) was his separate property. On the pension issue, Irina wanted to be named the survivor beneficiary on Donovan's PERS (Public Employees' Retirement System) benefits. The appeals court explained that under Nevada law a divorce decree does not have to give a former spouse a survivor beneficiary interest, and the trial court permissibly let Donovan choose his survivor beneficiary at retirement while still splitting the community interest in the pension equally. On attorney fees, Irina argued she should have received an amount matching what Donovan spent. The trial court noted both sides spent substantial sums, that some of Irina's spending reflected her "stated intent to drag this case out for her financial advantage," but that there was a significant income disparity, and awarded her $10,000. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in declining to award more. Finally, on the bias claim, the appeals court held Irina had not shown the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" required to establish bias.

Amr and Huriyeh Hosny married in 1989 in Macau and moved to the United States in 2004, where they ran businesses and held assets together. They separated in 2018, and Huriyeh filed for divorce. After a 2020 trial, the family court entered a divorce decree that, among other things, ordered Amr to pay Huriyeh $5,000 per month in lifetime alimony (ongoing financial support), reimburse her $6,000 for an expert witness, pay a $38,000 loan Huriyeh had taken from her sister (in part to cover her attorney and expert fees), and pay off a U.S. Bank credit card. Amr appealed. The Court of Appeals found several problems with how the trial court reached its decisions. On alimony, the appeals court concluded that the trial court's factual findings were "contradictory, unclear, and not supported by substantial evidence." The trial court noted that Amr's income was $120,000 in 2017 but had dropped to $72,000 by 2019, yet it never settled on which income figure it actually used to set the alimony amount. The appeals court said the trial court appeared to assume Amr could keep earning what he historically had, without accounting for the downturn in his business tied in part to the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial court also divided rental properties between the spouses, which means Amr will collect less rental income going forward — a fact the appeals court said the trial court did not properly factor in when deciding how much support Amr could afford to pay or how much Huriyeh actually needed. The appeals court also identified erroneous findings about how much Amr paid to support the couple's adult children and how much he was already paying Huriyeh during the case. On the demonstrative exhibits (exhibits 5 and 14, which were charts or summaries the trial court relied on), the appeals court held it was error to admit them because the expert who apparently prepared them never testified to establish the foundation for the financial information they contained. The exhibits also contained mathematical errors and information inconsistent with other admitted evidence. Because the trial court leaned on these flawed exhibits in setting alimony and dividing debts, the appeals court found the error prejudicial. On the $6,000 in expert witness fees, the appeals court explained that under Nevada law, an expert generally must testify in order to recover more than $1,500 in fees. Because this expert did not testify, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees above that threshold. The appeals court reversed the district court's judgment and sent the case back for further proceedings consistent with its order. On remand, the trial court will need to reassess the full division of community property and debt (including the promissory note, the Bank of America card, and the U.S. Bank card) when deciding alimony, and ensure Huriyeh does not receive a "double recovery" for fees and costs already covered through debts assigned to Amr.

Alan and Brianna Barber were married in 2013 and have two children. After one of the children told Brianna that Alan had been sexually assaulting her over an extended period, Brianna contacted law enforcement, Alan was arrested, and Brianna obtained a temporary restraining order. Alan was later released while the criminal case proceeded, but Brianna did not know where he was. Brianna filed an amended complaint for divorce seeking sole custody of the children with no parenting time for Alan, child support, and division of the couple's community property. Rather than serving Alan personally, her attorney delivered the summons and amended complaint to Ryan Helmick, the lawyer representing Alan in the pending criminal case. Helmick apparently signed the acceptance of service. Alan never responded, the court clerk entered a default (a finding that a party failed to answer), and after a "prove-up" hearing at which Brianna testified, the district court entered a divorce decree by default. The decree gave Brianna 100 percent of the marital home. When Brianna later asked the court clerk to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the home, Alan learned of the divorce proceedings, hired a lawyer, and asked the court to set aside the decree. He said he had never authorized Helmick to accept service for him, so he was never properly served. The district court denied his request. Although the court acknowledged at the hearing that it did not "have enough information" about the service issue, it did not find the service invalid, and it declined to consider Alan's other arguments because his motion did not invoke the specific grounds listed in NRCP 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect). The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that "[a] default judgment not supported by proper service of process is void and must be set aside," and that the mere fact that a Nevada-licensed attorney signed an acceptance of service does not by itself show the attorney was authorized to accept service for the client. Alan's sworn assertion that Helmick was not authorized to accept service was uncontradicted, which created a factual dispute the district court was required to resolve. The Court of Appeals sent the case back with instructions: the district court must decide whether Helmick actually had Alan's consent to accept service. If service was improper, the default decree must be voided and a new decree considered. If service was valid, the district court must then evaluate, under a proper NRCP 60(b) analysis, Alan's remaining arguments about custody, child support, and the property division.

Eric and Lynita Nelson were married. Ten years into the marriage, in 1993, they signed a "separate property agreement" (the SPA) — a written contract dividing what had been shared marital property (community property) into each spouse's own separate property. That separate property was placed into two separate trusts. In 2001, they converted those trusts into "self-settled spendthrift trusts" (SSSTs) — a special kind of trust that, under Nevada law, is designed to shield the assets inside it from most creditors, even the person who created and benefits from the trust. Eric had his trust (the Eric L. Nelson Nevada Trust) and Lynita had hers (the Lynita S. Nelson Nevada Trust). In 2009, Eric filed for divorce. Because the couple's wealth was locked inside these trusts, the trusts were later added to the divorce case as necessary parties, and Lynita brought various claims against Eric's trust. The family court judge issued a detailed divorce decree. Among other things, the judge concluded that even though the SPA and the trusts were validly created, the real intent behind them was to protect assets from creditors — not to permanently split up the property in the event of divorce. Based largely on testimony from Eric and Lynita, the judge treated much of the trust property as if it were still shared, ordered the two trusts' assets "equalized" (roughly $8.7 million shifted around so each side ended up with a comparable amount), ordered Eric's trust to pay Lynita's spousal support, child support arrears, and legal and expert fees, and imposed "constructive trusts" (a court-created ownership arrangement used as a remedy) over two properties. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the family court on some points and disagreed on many others. It ruled that the family court did have the power (subject-matter jurisdiction) to hear the trust issues inside the divorce — the case was fundamentally a divorce, not a probate matter, so it did not have to be heard by a probate judge. It also ruled that both the SPA and both trusts were valid and clearly written. But the court held the family court made several errors. Because the SPA and the trusts were clear and unambiguous, the judge was not allowed to rely on the spouses' testimony about what they "really" intended (this is called "parol evidence" — outside evidence used to explain or contradict a written document). The court also held that Nevada's spendthrift-trust statutes do not let a court shuffle assets between two such trusts to equalize them, and do not let a court order one spouse's trust to pay that spouse's personal debts — including child support and spousal support — when those debts were not known at the time the trust was created. The court explained that Nevada, unlike states such as Florida, South Dakota, and Wyoming, has deliberately chosen not to allow child- and spousal-support claims to reach spendthrift trust assets, and that changing that policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts. The court affirmed the actual dissolution of the marriage and affirmed the $800,000 lump-sum alimony award as an amount, but held it must be collected from Eric personally, not from his trust. It vacated the "unjust enrichment" findings because that claim had been dismissed and was never properly revived, and vacated the constructive trusts over the Russell Road and Lindell properties. It also directed that the family court must actually "trace" the trust assets — track where the money and property came from — to determine whether any true community property still exists inside the trusts, because only community property (not each spouse's separate property) can be divided by the court. Finally, the court noted one important qualifier: to the extent community property is found inside a trust, the non-beneficiary spouse's share of that community property is not shielded by the spendthrift protections, so the court can divide that community-property portion.

Eric and Lynita Nelson married, and ten years into the marriage they signed a "separate property agreement" (SPA) that converted their shared marital property into separate property belonging to each spouse individually. They then placed each spouse's separate property into his or her own trust. In 2001, they converted those trusts into "self-settled spendthrift trusts" -- a type of trust that, under Nevada law, shields the assets from most creditors. Eric was the beneficiary of his trust; Lynita was the beneficiary of hers. In 2009, Eric filed for divorce. The family court eventually issued a divorce decree that, among other things, treated the two trusts as if their contents needed to be balanced out: it ordered roughly $8.7 million in trust assets to be equalized between the two trusts, ordered Eric's trust to pay Lynita $800,000 in lump-sum alimony, ordered Eric's trust to pay child-support arrears, and imposed "constructive trusts" (a court-created ownership interest) over two properties (the Russell Road and Lindell properties) held in the trusts. The court reasoned that Eric had effectively run both trusts, breached fiduciary duties, and unjustly enriched himself. The Nevada Supreme Court took the case and ruled mostly in favor of Eric's trust, while leaving the divorce itself and certain personal obligations of Eric in place. The court held: - The family court did have authority (subject-matter jurisdiction) to decide trust-related claims that came up in a divorce. Eric's trust had argued that only a probate court could hear them. - The SPA was a valid, clear written agreement that converted the couple's community property into separate property, and the court could not use outside testimony to contradict its plain terms. - Both spendthrift trusts were validly created under Nevada law. Even if Eric had broken trust formalities, the remedy was a lawsuit against the trustee -- not invalidating the trust. - The family court should have "traced" the assets in the trusts to figure out whether any community property had crept back in. Without that tracing, it could not rely on the parties' conflicting testimony about what was separate or community. - Nevada law strongly protects spendthrift-trust assets from court orders. The family court was wrong to "equalize" trust assets between the two trusts and wrong to make Eric's trust pay Eric's personal obligations like child support and alimony. Nevada -- unlike Florida, South Dakota, and Wyoming -- has no exception allowing spendthrift trusts to be tapped for child or spousal support that arose after the trust was created. - The lump-sum alimony award of $800,000 was within the trial court's discretion as to amount and form, but it should have been ordered against Eric personally, not against his trust. - The "unjust enrichment" claim had been dismissed earlier and never re-pled, so the family court could not base relief on it. Likewise, the constructive trusts on the Russell Road and Lindell properties had to be vacated because imposing a constructive trust on assets inside a valid spendthrift trust violates Nevada's statutory protections. - The June 8, 2015, follow-up order was vacated to the extent it tried to enforce parts of the decree being reversed, but kept in place for matters like health-care costs for the son, insurance costs, removal of a security gate, and attorney fees for contempt. The dissolution of the marriage itself stays in place. The case goes back to the family court to redo the property division and related rulings consistent with the opinion.

Audria Ruscitti and Ian Druckman had a child together but never married. Shortly after the child's birth, Ian signed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity — a legal document that establishes a man as a child's father without going to court. The couple lived together and raised the child jointly, and even discussed moving out of Nevada together, but they separated before doing so. After Ian moved out, Audria moved to California with the child for better job opportunities — without Ian's knowledge or consent. Ian then asked a Nevada court to order the child's return and to give him joint legal and primary physical custody. Audria asked the court to award her sole legal and primary physical custody and to let the child stay in California with her. The district court gave both parents joint legal custody, awarded Audria primary physical custody, and approved her relocation. Ian appealed. The central question was what custody rights unmarried parents have when paternity has been legally established but no court has ever issued a custody order. The Nevada Supreme Court held that in that situation, both parents have equal custody rights. Quoting the statute, the court emphasized that "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." NRS 126.031(1). The court also addressed Nevada's relocation statute, NRS 125C.200, which requires a custodial parent to get the other parent's consent or court permission before moving a child out of state. Because no court had ever awarded either parent primary physical custody, that statute technically did not apply. But the court held that its policy should still guide these situations: when parents have equal custody rights, one parent may not move the child out of state over the other parent's objection without a court order. The proper course is to file a motion for primary physical custody along with a request to relocate. A parent who moves the child unlawfully faces consequences — for example, the court deciding custody should not consider anything about the child's new life in the other state (new school, friends, or routine) when deciding what is best for the child. To get permission to relocate, a parent must first show "a sensible, good faith reason for the move." If that showing is made, the court then decides custody and relocation based on the child's best interest, incorporating five factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz — factors such as whether the move will improve the child's and parent's quality of life, whether each parent's motives are honorable, and whether the parent staying behind will have a realistic opportunity to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Applying these rules, the majority concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court had found a good-faith reason for the move (Audria's job opportunities in California and the parties' earlier plans to move out of state together), had considered the relevant best-interest and Schwartz factors, and had not relied on any facts arising from the child's time in California. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the custody and relocation rulings. However, it reversed the award of attorney fees imposed on Ian as a sanction for a supposedly frivolous motion to stay, concluding his motion "was based on reasonable grounds because he sought stability for his child," and remanded that issue for reconsideration. The court rejected as meritless Ian's additional arguments that the district court improperly limited his evidence and that the judge should be disqualified for bias. Two justices dissented. They agreed unmarried parents have equal custody rights, but argued Audria's removal of the child without Ian's consent or court permission was wrongful, that the district court should have weighed that conduct against her, and that the case should be sent back for a new custody determination.

Shinichi and Yoko Ogawa married in Japan in 1997 and moved several times between Japan and the United States, buying a home in Henderson, Nevada. Their three children were all born in Japan. In June 2004, the children traveled from Nevada to Japan. The parents told very different stories about that trip: Yoko said it was only a summer vacation and that Shinichi refused to send the children back in August 2004; Shinichi said the whole family had planned to live in Japan permanently. Either way, the children stayed in Japan with Shinichi. About eight months after the children left, in February 2005, Yoko filed for divorce in Nevada and asked the Nevada court to order the children's immediate return, calling their retention in Japan an international abduction. The Nevada court agreed with Yoko, ordered the children returned, later held Shinichi in contempt when they were not returned, and ultimately - after a hearing at which Shinichi's lawyer appeared but Shinichi personally did not - entered a "default" divorce decree. That decree gave Yoko sole legal and physical custody with "no contact" for Shinichi, all of the community property (including a share of a house in Japan), spousal and child support, and attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court decided three questions. First, did the Nevada court have power to decide custody at all, given that the children had been out of Nevada for eight months when the case was filed? Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) - a law that generally gives custody-deciding authority to a child's "home state" - a child's temporary absences from a state do not break the required six-month residency period. Because the evidence supported the district court's finding that the children left Nevada in June 2004 for a temporary three-month vacation, Nevada remained their home state, and the Nevada court properly had jurisdiction. Second, was the order sending the children back to the U.S. proper? The district court had relied on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, an international treaty designed to ensure the prompt return of children wrongfully taken from their home country. But Japan has not signed that treaty, so the Convention and its U.S. implementing statute provide no remedy here. Even so, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not need the treaty: because it had custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, it had authority to order the children's return as part of the custody case. So the return order stood, even though the Hague Convention did not apply. Third, was the default divorce decree proper? A "default" is what happens when a party fails to respond to a lawsuit. Here, Shinichi had filed an answer and a countercomplaint for divorce, and his lawyer appeared at the divorce hearing - only Shinichi himself was absent. The Supreme Court held that under those circumstances a default was inappropriate, and that the district court erred by treating the hearing as a one-sided "prove-up," awarding Yoko everything she asked for, cutting off meaningful cross-examination, and never deciding the case on its merits. The court reversed the decree's awards of custody, property, support, and fees, and sent the case back for a hearing on the merits. It denied Shinichi's request that the case be reassigned to a different judge on remand, because he cited no record support or legal authority showing reassignment was necessary.