Nevada family-law case summaries

Natasha and Michael Neyman married in 2002, had two children, separated in 2006, and divorced in 2015 through an agreed-upon (stipulated) divorce decree. The decree gave Natasha primary physical custody and required Michael to pay child support, the children's extracurricular costs, and two kinds of spousal support (alimony): $3,000 per month in general family support and $2,000 per month in "rehabilitative" alimony to help pay for Natasha's education. To get the rehabilitative alimony, Natasha had to give Michael proof she was enrolled in school. These payments were to run for seven years, starting May 1, 2015, meaning the final payment was due April 20, 2022. Natasha stopped going to school at the end of 2020 because she and the children had health problems, and by January 2021 she was no longer enrolled. She did not give Michael proof of enrollment, but Michael kept paying her $2,000 per month for 15 more months — a total of $30,000. On June 30, 2022 — about two months after the alimony period ended — Natasha filed a motion asking the court to increase child support and family support because Michael's income had gone up sharply, and to recover money she said Michael still owed her. Michael agreed his child support should go up, but said his alimony obligation had ended in May 2022 and that he was not behind on any payments. The district court ruled that it had no power (jurisdiction) to change the alimony because the alimony period had already expired when Natasha filed her motion, and there was no evidence Michael was behind. It raised Michael's monthly child support to $4,035. It also found that Natasha had failed her duty to give proof of school enrollment for 15 months, but that Michael knew or should have known she was no longer in school. Splitting the difference, the court ordered Natasha to repay Michael $15,000 — half of what he had paid during that period — then subtracted $6,500 in attorney fees Michael still owed her, leaving Natasha owing Michael $8,500. The court found neither side was a "prevailing party," so each paid their own fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court on most points but reversed the order requiring Natasha to repay the rehabilitative alimony. The court explained that under Nevada law, once an alimony period ends, a court can only modify alimony if the paying spouse was behind ("in arrears") when the motion was filed. Here, the alimony period had ended on April 30, 2022, and Natasha herself had admitted Michael had made all his payments before she filed. The text messages she pointed to as a supposed agreement to push the start date back did not count, because the decree said it could only be changed by a written agreement signed by both parties. The most important reversal concerned the order that Natasha repay $8,500. The court found that Michael never properly asked for that money back. He mentioned in passing that he had overpaid, but he did not formally request reimbursement, and did not say how much, until his pretrial memorandum — filed after Natasha's lawyer had quit, after the discovery period closed, and just two weeks before the hearing. The court concluded this violated Natasha's right to fair notice and a chance to respond (due process). It therefore reversed the repayment order and directed that Natasha receive the full $6,500 in unpaid attorney fees with no reduction. The court also upheld the child support ruling (finding Natasha had not properly argued below that the base amount was too low for the children's needs), upheld the denial of her request to postpone the hearing, and upheld the court's refusal to accept her digital documents, which she needed to bring in physical form so they could be authenticated and so Michael could object.

This case is about whether parents can undo a court-approved visitation arrangement with a grandparent simply because they are the parents. After Roger Rennels divorced in 2001, he and his daughter Martina lived for five months with his mother, Audrey Rennels, in northern California, and Martina and Audrey developed a close relationship that continued after Roger and Martina moved away. According to Audrey, Roger stopped allowing Martina to see her in June 2004, so Audrey went to court under NRS 125C.050, a Nevada statute that lets a nonparent ask for visitation rights with a child. Before the court could hold an evidentiary hearing, Audrey and Roger settled. They signed a stipulation - a formal written agreement - stating that "all pending issues" between them were resolved, and the court entered an order adopting it. Under that order, Audrey received four supervised visits per year, a guardian ad litem (a person appointed to represent the child's interests) was appointed, and a psychologist would counsel the family. If the guardian ad litem and the psychologist concluded supervision was no longer needed, Roger agreed to abide by that determination. The parties followed this arrangement until 2008, when the psychologist, Dr. John Paglini, recommended unsupervised visits and Roger refused. Audrey asked the court to enforce the order; Roger and his wife Jennifer (who had adopted Martina in 2006) countered by asking the court to end Audrey's visitation entirely, relying on Troxel v. Granville, a U.S. Supreme Court decision recognizing that fit parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests. The district court sided with the parents and terminated Audrey's visitation. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held, first, that the stipulated visitation order was a final judgment - meaning it resolved the dispute and could not simply be relitigated on the same facts. Second, the court held that while the parental presumption applies when a nonparent first seeks visitation, it no longer controls once a court has approved a visitation arrangement. At that point, a parent who wants to change or end the arrangement must satisfy the same two-part test that applies when parents seek to modify custody between themselves: show (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare, and (2) that the change serves the child's best interest. Because neither the parents nor the district court identified any substantial change in circumstances - the court pointed only to increased "acrimony" between the parties, which the Supreme Court said is not enough by itself - the termination order was reversed. The stipulated visitation order remains in effect, and on remand the district court must appoint a new guardian ad litem before deciding whether Audrey's visitation should be modified or terminated under the new test.