Nevada family-law case summaries

Irina and Donovan Hansen married in 2007 and have one child. During the marriage Donovan worked as a firefighter (later a battalion chief) for the city of North Las Vegas, while Irina initially worked as a real-estate agent, became a stay-at-home mother, and later obtained a cosmetology license and opened a salon using a home-equity loan. When the marriage broke down, Donovan filed for divorce in 2019. The case went to trial in 2021, where Donovan had a lawyer and Irina represented herself. The trial court divided the couple's property, set child support and alimony, and awarded joint legal custody with Irina having primary physical custody. Irina appealed, arguing the trial court got several financial issues wrong and was biased against her. The Court of Appeals of Nevada rejected each argument and affirmed (upheld) the trial court's decision. On child support, Irina argued the court used inaccurate figures for Donovan's income. The appeals court explained that trial judges decide disputed facts and weigh witness credibility, and appellate courts do not second-guess those calls when they are supported by adequate evidence. Donovan's pay stubs, tax documents, and testimony supported the court's finding that his gross monthly income was $15,376.19, which produced a child support order of $1,445 per month. On alimony, Irina wanted at least $6,000 per month rather than the $3,000 per month for 60 months she received. The appeals court noted trial courts have broad discretion to award alimony that is "just and equitable." The trial court found Irina could earn about $3,000 per month from her cosmetology work and salon, that her reasonable post-divorce expenses were about $5,500, and considered her child support - and concluded $3,000 per month for five years was appropriate. The appeals court found this supported by the evidence. On property division, Irina argued Donovan got an unequal share without proper findings, that she should have kept the marital home, and that Donovan wasted community assets. The appeals court explained that community property is generally split equally, that the trial court found much of Irina's testimony about asset values not credible, that selling the marital home made sense given the mortgage and home-equity loan on it, and that Irina had not proven waste. It also upheld the finding that money in Donovan's deferred compensation account before the marriage ($87,992.62) was his separate property. On the pension issue, Irina wanted to be named the survivor beneficiary on Donovan's PERS (Public Employees' Retirement System) benefits. The appeals court explained that under Nevada law a divorce decree does not have to give a former spouse a survivor beneficiary interest, and the trial court permissibly let Donovan choose his survivor beneficiary at retirement while still splitting the community interest in the pension equally. On attorney fees, Irina argued she should have received an amount matching what Donovan spent. The trial court noted both sides spent substantial sums, that some of Irina's spending reflected her "stated intent to drag this case out for her financial advantage," but that there was a significant income disparity, and awarded her $10,000. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in declining to award more. Finally, on the bias claim, the appeals court held Irina had not shown the judge relied on information from outside the case or displayed the kind of "deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible" required to establish bias.

Erich and Raina Martin married in 2002 while Erich served in the military. When they divorced in 2015, they negotiated a marital settlement agreement that the district court incorporated into the divorce decree. The decree gave Raina half of Erich's military retirement benefits. It also included a key promise: if Erich later chose to receive military disability pay instead of retirement pay (which would shrink Raina's share, because federal law requires veterans to waive retirement pay dollar-for-dollar to receive disability pay), Erich would reimburse Raina for the reduction. Erich retired in 2019, and Raina began receiving her share. In 2020, Erich elected full disability pay, waiving all retirement pay. The federal pay agency stopped sending Raina checks, and Erich refused to pay her himself, arguing federal law forbade it. Raina asked the district court to enforce the decree. The district court agreed with Raina and ordered Erich to pay her monthly installments equal to what she would have received absent the waiver. On appeal, Erich argued that federal law - specifically the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act and two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell - bars state courts from ordering a veteran to make up the difference when disability pay reduces a former spouse's share of retirement pay. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The majority drew a distinction: federal law does prevent state courts from dividing disability pay as community property or unilaterally ordering a veteran to indemnify a former spouse. But here, the parties themselves negotiated and agreed to the reimbursement provision, the district court entered that agreement as part of the divorce decree, and that decree became final. The court held that enforcing a final, agreed-upon decree under Nevada's res judicata (claim preclusion) doctrine and ordinary contract principles is different from a state court imposing such a division on its own. Under Nevada precedent, particularly Shelton v. Shelton, courts may enforce such agreements, and Erich may satisfy the obligation from any source of money he chooses, including his disability pay. The court also affirmed the $5000 attorney-fee award. Under NRS 125.040, a court in a divorce suit may require one party to pay money to enable the other to carry on or defend the suit, after considering each party's financial situation. The district court found Erich's income was about three times Raina's and tailored the award accordingly. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the four-factor Brunzell test for the reasonableness of attorney fees does not apply to such pendente lite awards because Brunzell evaluates work already performed, while NRS 125.040 fees cover prospective work - here, defending the appeal. Two justices concurred in the result. They would have held that the decree's indemnification provision is in fact preempted by federal law under Mansell and Howell, but agreed that under Nevada law, the decree had become a final judgment that Erich could not collaterally attack, so res judicata required affirmance.

Erich and Raina Martin divorced in 2015 after Erich had served in the military. As part of their divorce, they signed a settlement agreement, which the district court incorporated into the divorce decree. The decree gave Raina half of Erich's military retirement benefits. Critically, it also said that if Erich later chose to take military disability pay instead of retirement pay, he would have to reimburse Raina for any reduction in her share. That contingency mattered because of how federal law treats military pay. A veteran who wants tax-free disability benefits must give up an equal amount of taxable retirement pay - he cannot collect both for the same dollars. When Erich retired in 2019, Raina began receiving her share of his retirement pay directly from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). The next year, Erich elected full disability pay, which wiped out all of his retirement pay - and with it, Raina's share. When Raina asked him to make up the difference as the decree required, he refused, arguing that federal law forbade it. Raina asked the district court to enforce the decree. The court agreed and ordered Erich to pay her the monthly amounts she would have received absent his waiver. The court also awarded Raina $5000 toward her attorney fees for the appeal, citing the large income disparity between the parties. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court explained that under U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Mansell v. Mansell and Howell v. Howell, a state court cannot, on its own authority, treat military disability pay as community property or order a veteran to "indemnify" a former spouse for the dollar amount of retirement pay the veteran chose to waive in favor of disability pay. But the Nevada court drew a distinction: those federal cases addressed what a state court can order on its own; they did not bar enforcement of an indemnification term that the divorcing spouses themselves negotiated and put into their property settlement. Because Erich and Raina expressly agreed to the reimbursement provision, and because the divorce decree had become a final judgment, the doctrine of res judicata (which prevents parties from relitigating matters already resolved in a final judgment) required enforcement. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding $5000 in pendente lite (during-litigation) attorney fees under NRS 125.040 without analyzing the Brunzell factors. Those factors evaluate the quality of work already performed, whereas NRS 125.040 fees are designed to fund work yet to be done. A two-justice concurrence by Justice Cadish, joined by Justice Pickering, agreed the decree should be enforced - but only because res judicata bars Erich's collateral attack on the final judgment. The concurrence would have held that the reimbursement provision itself is preempted by federal law, even though the parties had agreed to it, and would overrule Shelton v. Shelton to that extent.

Alan and Brianna Barber were married in 2013 and have two children. After one of the children told Brianna that Alan had been sexually assaulting her over an extended period, Brianna contacted law enforcement, Alan was arrested, and Brianna obtained a temporary restraining order. Alan was later released while the criminal case proceeded, but Brianna did not know where he was. Brianna filed an amended complaint for divorce seeking sole custody of the children with no parenting time for Alan, child support, and division of the couple's community property. Rather than serving Alan personally, her attorney delivered the summons and amended complaint to Ryan Helmick, the lawyer representing Alan in the pending criminal case. Helmick apparently signed the acceptance of service. Alan never responded, the court clerk entered a default (a finding that a party failed to answer), and after a "prove-up" hearing at which Brianna testified, the district court entered a divorce decree by default. The decree gave Brianna 100 percent of the marital home. When Brianna later asked the court clerk to sign a quitclaim deed transferring the home, Alan learned of the divorce proceedings, hired a lawyer, and asked the court to set aside the decree. He said he had never authorized Helmick to accept service for him, so he was never properly served. The district court denied his request. Although the court acknowledged at the hearing that it did not "have enough information" about the service issue, it did not find the service invalid, and it declined to consider Alan's other arguments because his motion did not invoke the specific grounds listed in NRCP 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect). The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed. It explained that "[a] default judgment not supported by proper service of process is void and must be set aside," and that the mere fact that a Nevada-licensed attorney signed an acceptance of service does not by itself show the attorney was authorized to accept service for the client. Alan's sworn assertion that Helmick was not authorized to accept service was uncontradicted, which created a factual dispute the district court was required to resolve. The Court of Appeals sent the case back with instructions: the district court must decide whether Helmick actually had Alan's consent to accept service. If service was improper, the default decree must be voided and a new decree considered. If service was valid, the district court must then evaluate, under a proper NRCP 60(b) analysis, Alan's remaining arguments about custody, child support, and the property division.

Aaron and Tracy Romano divorced in 2019. They have seven minor children. Before the divorce decree was entered, they signed a stipulated order resolving custody. Under that arrangement, the three oldest children spend roughly 90 percent of their time with Aaron, and the four youngest spend roughly 95 percent of their time with Tracy. Even though those percentages would not normally count as "joint physical custody" under Nevada law (which generally requires each parent to have the children at least 40 percent of the time), the parties agreed to label the arrangement joint physical custody. They also signed a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) setting Aaron's child-support payments and Tracy's alimony, and providing that the prevailing party in any litigation over the MSA would get attorney fees. About eight months later, Aaron asked the court to officially relabel the arrangement: he wanted the order to say he had primary physical custody of the three older children and Tracy had primary physical custody of the four younger children. He also asked the court to recalculate child support, both because of the actual time-share and because, he said, Tracy's monthly income had jumped from $0 to about $6,018. Tracy responded that nothing had actually changed - the time-share was exactly what they had agreed to, and her income (alimony plus interest on a promissory note Aaron pays) was already known and built into the deal. The district court denied Aaron's motion. It said there was no change in circumstances justifying a custody change, suggested Aaron was really trying to manufacture a change so he could take advantage of new child-support guidelines, and found Tracy's income had not actually changed. It then awarded Tracy attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court used the case to clear up a recurring confusion in its own prior decisions. Earlier cases had suggested that courts use one test to modify "joint" physical custody and a different test to modify "primary" physical custody. The Supreme Court held that there is just one test, regardless of label: the parent asking to change the arrangement must show (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children's welfare, and (2) that the change would serve the children's best interest. The Court overruled the part of its earlier Rivero decision that had implied a district court must first figure out which kind of custody actually exists before deciding whether to change it. Applying that single test, the Court agreed with the district court that nothing meaningful had changed in the short time since the parties signed their agreement. The actual time-share was the same one the parties had agreed to. On child support, the Court held that Nevada's new child-support guidelines (in NAC Chapter 425, effective February 2020) do not, by themselves, count as a "change in circumstances" that lets a parent reopen support. A specific regulation, NAC 425.170(3), says exactly that, and the Court ruled the regulation is a valid exercise of the agency's authority. Tracy's income also did not count as a change, because it was already factored into the original agreement. Because Aaron lost on the merits, Tracy was the prevailing party, and the attorney-fees award (based on the MSA's fee-shifting clause and NRS 18.010(2)(b)) was upheld.

Aaron and Tracy Romano divorced in 2019 and have seven minor children together. Before the divorce decree was entered, the couple signed a stipulated order spelling out a complicated custody timeshare: the three oldest children spend roughly 90 percent of their time with Aaron, and the four youngest spend about 95 percent of their time with Tracy. Even though those percentages would not normally qualify as "joint physical custody" under Nevada law (which generally requires each parent to have the child at least 40 percent of the time), the parents agreed to call it joint physical custody anyway. They also signed a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) that set Aaron's child-support payments and other financial terms. About eight months later, Aaron asked the district court to "confirm" that the actual living arrangement was really primary physical custody (not joint), and to recalculate child support accordingly. He argued two things had changed: the actual time-share with the children, and Tracy's monthly income, which he said had risen from $0 to about $6,018. He also argued that Nevada had adopted new child-support guidelines (NAC Chapter 425, effective February 1, 2020) and that the new guidelines were themselves a change of circumstances justifying a recalculation. The district court denied the motion, found Aaron had not shown any change in circumstances, awarded Tracy her attorney fees, and Aaron appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The Court used the case to clean up an inconsistency in Nevada custody law. For years, courts had applied two different tests depending on whether parents had "joint" or "primary" physical custody. The Court now holds there is just one test: to modify any physical custody arrangement, the parent asking for the change must show (1) a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) that the modification serves the child's best interest. The Court overruled portions of its earlier decision in Rivero v. Rivero to the extent that case suggested a district court must first figure out whether the existing arrangement is "really" joint or primary before ruling on a motion to modify. Applied to Aaron's case, the Court held the district court reasonably found nothing had substantially changed in the few months between the stipulated order and Aaron's motion. The custodial timeshare was the same one the parents had agreed to, and Tracy's income reflected payments (alimony and interest on a promissory note from Aaron) that were part of the same global settlement. On child support, the Court held that Tracy's income had not actually increased post-MSA - it was already what the parties used when they set support. As to the new state child-support guidelines, the Court pointed to NAC 425.170(3), a regulation stating that adoption of new guidelines, by itself, is not a change in circumstances sufficient to modify an existing child-support order. The Court held that regulation is a valid exercise of the agency's authority delegated by NRS 425.620 and NRS 425.450(1), and it carves out a narrow exception to the general rule that a change in the law can be a change in circumstances. Finally, because Tracy was the prevailing party and the MSA and NRS 18.010(2)(b) authorized fees, the Court upheld the attorney fees award.

Kirk and Vivian Harrison divorced and agreed to share legal and physical custody of their two minor children. Their written agreement, which the district court adopted, included two unusual provisions. First, once a child turned 14, the child would have "teenage discretion" to choose how much time to spend with each parent. Second, the parties would use a "parenting coordinator" - a neutral outside person - to help resolve disputes about parenting issues. When the older daughter turned 14, conflict erupted over what "teenage discretion" actually meant. Vivian read it to mean the children could decide where to be and the parents had to honor that. Kirk read it to mean the children could only request changes that either parent could refuse. Kirk said he was kept from seeing his daughter for two weeks because of Vivian's reading. The parents also could not agree on a parenting coordinator, so Vivian asked the court to appoint one. The district court appointed a parenting coordinator and clarified that the coordinator could resolve nonsubstantive disputes (like scheduling) and make recommendations; if a parent objected, the parent could seek court review. Kirk then asked the district court to modify the original agreement, arguing both provisions were against public policy. The district court refused, and Kirk appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. As to teenage discretion, the majority held the provision did not violate the children's best interests because it allowed only limited, week-to-week schedule flexibility - not the ability to dismantle the joint custody arrangement the parents had agreed to. The court emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children, and small scheduling adjustments do not rise to the level of harm that would justify court interference. The court declined Kirk's alternative request to rewrite the provision so that either parent could veto the child's choice, explaining that courts do not redraft agreements the parties did not make. As to the parenting coordinator, the court held the provision served the children's best interests in this contentious case by providing a faster, less formal way to resolve everyday disputes like sick days, school cancellations, and extracurricular scheduling. The court also rejected Kirk's argument that appointing a parenting coordinator improperly handed off the judge's decision-making authority. The coordinator's role was limited to nonsubstantive matters, the coordinator could not change the underlying custody arrangement, and either parent could ask the district court to review a recommendation. Because the parties had voluntarily agreed to use a coordinator and the court retained final authority, the arrangement did not violate due process. Three justices dissented. They would have invalidated both provisions, arguing that custody decisions belong to the district court and cannot be delegated to children or to a non-judicial coordinator without sufficient judicial review.

Hony Fernandez and Jennifer Fernandez (now known as Jennifer Rothman) divorced in 1998 after a brief marriage that produced two children. Both worked in the securities industry. The original divorce decree required the father to pay $3,000 per month in child support, plus health insurance, uncovered medical expenses, a housekeeper, and a nanny or day care. In 1999, the parties agreed to raise support to $4,000 per month (effective 2001) and to add private-school tuition. In 2000, after a failed reconciliation, they entered a third stipulation giving both parents joint physical custody — and in that stipulation, both parents "voluntarily waive[d] any right they may have pursuant to Chapter 125B of the Nevada Revised Statutes" to seek modification of the father's child support obligation. By 2007, according to the father's motion, his fortunes had reversed dramatically. He had once earned between $500,000 and more than $4,000,000 a year trading securities, but heavy market losses beginning in 2002 left him earning $3,000 a month selling cars, plus a similar amount in interest — while his child support obligations totaled roughly $80,000 a year. The mother, meanwhile, had remarried; her household income equaled or exceeded his, and the two had comparable net worth. The trial court itself found that if it applied the statutory child support formula to the parties' current incomes, "neither party would be obligated to pay child support to the other." Even so, it refused to modify the order, relying on the parties' waiver and on the fact that the father could still pay from his remaining assets. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that parents cannot, by agreement, strip a court of its statutory power to review and modify child support. Once a support agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree, it becomes a court order, not just a private contract, and Nevada's statutes provide for its periodic review and modification — up or down — as circumstances change. Quoting a California decision, the court concluded that "the court always has the power to modify a child support order, upward or downward, regardless of the parents' agreement to the contrary." The court also rejected the trial court's approach of requiring the father to draw down his assets before modification could be considered, and it rejected the mother's argument that her partial performance of the agreement barred the father from challenging it. One limit remained for the father, however. Under the court's recent decision in Rivero v. Rivero, the mere fact that more than three years had passed since the last review entitled him to a review, but not automatically to a modification: on remand, he must still demonstrate changed circumstances. The court noted that his alleged income drop — more than 80 percent — appears to satisfy the statutory trigger, under which a change of 20 percent or more in the support obligor's gross monthly income is deemed a changed circumstance requiring review for modification.

Thomas and Svetlana Potter married in 1994, had a child in 1995, and divorced shortly after the child was born. Svetlana was initially awarded primary physical custody, but in 1996 the parents agreed by stipulation to share joint physical and legal custody - meaning both parents shared responsibility for the child's day-to-day care. According to the record, the arrangement worked without custody problems from 1996 to 2003, with both parents actively involved. In 2003, Svetlana received a job offer from a California hospital for a registered nurse position at a higher salary than she was earning in Las Vegas, and she wanted to pursue a nurse anesthesiologist degree from a California school - a program not available in Las Vegas. She filed a petition under NRS 125C.200, Nevada's relocation statute, asking for permission to move to Corona, California with the child. Thomas opposed it, arguing that the Legislature amended the relocation statute in 1999 so that it no longer applied to joint physical custody arrangements, and that Svetlana would first have to win primary physical custody before she could seek relocation. The district court treated the case as an ordinary relocation petition under NRS 125C.200, analyzed the relocation factors from an earlier case called Schwartz v. Schwartz, granted Svetlana's petition, awarded her primary physical custody, and provided for significant contact and visitation between Thomas and the child. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. It held that NRS 125C.200 does not apply when parents share joint physical custody. The statute's current text speaks only of "custodial" and "noncustodial" parents; an earlier version of the statute (formerly NRS 125A.350) had expressly covered "a parent having joint custody," but the Legislature removed that language. The court found the legislative history confirmed that the statute was intended to apply only to primary physical custody situations. Instead, the court explained the correct procedure: when a parent who shares joint physical custody wants to move out of Nevada with the child, that parent must file a motion for a change of custody under NRS 125.510(2), seeking primary physical custody for the purpose of relocating. The district court then decides, under the "best interest of the child" standard, whether the child is better off living outside Nevada with the relocating parent as primary physical custodian, or living in Nevada with the non-moving parent as primary physical custodian. The moving parent bears the burden of proving that living out of state with him or her serves the child's best interest. Because the district court applied the wrong statute, did not use the factors from Truax v. Truax, and made no finding that the move was in the child's best interest, the Supreme Court reversed and sent the case back for the district court to decide whether it is in the child's best interest to live in California with Svetlana or in Nevada with Thomas.