Nevada family-law case summaries

Robert and Joanna Ronchi began dating in 2004. The day before their 2008 wedding in Pennsylvania, they signed a premarital agreement - a contract made before marriage that decides how property will be divided if the couple later divorces. The agreement said it would be governed by Pennsylvania law, listed each person's separate property (including Robert's interest in his business, Element 115, and his retirement accounts), and included provisions in which each spouse gave up any claim to property held in the other spouse's sole name. Joanna, a Polish citizen, was 19 weeks pregnant when she signed. The couple married the next day and moved to Nevada in 2010. In 2015, Robert bought a house, titled only in his name, that became the family home. Joanna filed for divorce in 2022. After hearings, the district court ruled the premarital agreement was valid. It then divided the couple's property, awarding Joanna half of the portion of Robert's Fidelity IRA that came from his wages during the marriage and half of the equity in the house, while confirming Robert's business interest as his separate property. The court later ordered Robert to pay Joanna $30,304 in attorney fees. Both sides appealed. The Nevada Court of Appeals resolved the appeal in four main parts. First, it upheld the ruling that the premarital agreement was valid. Because the agreement chose Pennsylvania law, the court applied Pennsylvania contract principles, under which signed agreements are presumed valid and a person challenging one must prove it invalid by clear and convincing evidence. The district court had found that Joanna generally understood the agreement's purpose, could read and write English at the time, and that both parties handwrote on the agreement, "I choose to waive representation by an attorney." The district court was not persuaded that her pregnancy and immigration status amounted to duress, and the Court of Appeals concluded those findings were supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Court of Appeals reversed the award to Joanna of half of the marriage-era contributions to Robert's Fidelity IRA. Although the agreement never specifically said Robert's wages would be his separate property, its plain language released each spouse's rights to "[a]ny and all rights to any property of the other party titled in the other parties' sole name, whether before or after the marriage." Because the IRA was solely in Robert's name, the court held it remained his separate property even though marital wages went into it. For the same reason, the court reversed the ruling giving Robert a community interest in Joanna's own solely titled Fidelity IRA. Third, on the house, the Court of Appeals held the district court applied the wrong legal framework. The district court had used Nevada's "gift presumption" caselaw - the idea that when a spouse signs over title, she is presumed to have gifted her interest - and found Joanna rebutted that presumption with evidence that the house was titled in Robert's name only because of her credit problems, was paid for from a joint account, and that Robert admitted in an audio recording he had promised to put her name on the house and still "owed" it to her. The appellate court said that under the premarital agreement's plain language, property titled in one spouse's name stayed separate, so the gift-presumption analysis was error. But it concluded the substance of Joanna's argument and the district court's findings pointed to a different doctrine: "constructive fraud" - a breach of the special duty of trust spouses owe each other, which can allow a court to impose a "constructive trust" recognizing that an asset is actually co-owned despite how it is titled, even where a premarital agreement exists. The court vacated the ruling on the house and sent the issue back for the district court to decide whether Joanna established constructive fraud giving rise to a constructive trust. Fourth, the court rejected Joanna's argument that she was entitled to a share of the increase in value of Robert's business, Element 115. The Pennsylvania statute she relied on excludes from marital property anything the parties excluded by valid agreement, and the business was listed as Robert's separate property in the agreement's financial disclosure. Finally, because part of the property division was reversed, the court vacated the $30,304 attorney fee award. The case now returns to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the order.

Todd and Tracy Elwardt married in 2013. In October 2023, Tracy filed for divorce, asking the court to divide their property and to award her alimony (financial support paid by one spouse to the other). After a trial, the district court divided the couple's property and gave Tracy support. Among other things, the court awarded Tracy four dogs valued at $2,000, half the equity in the marital home, and half of roughly $400,000 in sales commissions Todd earned during the marriage but had not yet been paid. The court also ordered Todd to pay Tracy $4,000 per month for four years (periodic alimony) and $24,000 over two years (rehabilitative alimony, meant to help her get training or education). Todd appealed and raised several arguments. First, he said two of the dogs, Fiona and Enzo, were gifts to him and therefore his own separate property, or that the court valued the dogs incorrectly. The appeals court explained that property acquired during a marriage is presumed to belong to both spouses (community property) unless someone proves otherwise with strong evidence. Because the dogs were acquired during the marriage, and because Tracy had been caring for them while Todd had limited contact, the court concluded Todd had not proven they were his separate property. On the value, only one dog's cost ($2,000) was proven at trial, so the court accepted that figure. But the appeals court noted the decree did not make clear whether Todd received other property to make up for his share of the dogs' value, and directed the lower court to fix that on remand. Todd's main challenge concerned the connection between the commissions and the alimony. Todd is paid entirely on commission, and those commissions are not paid to him until a client pays the underlying sales contract - which can take up to three years. That means in the years right after the divorce, much of Todd's monthly income could come from commissions he earned during the marriage, half of which the court had already awarded to Tracy. The appeals court agreed the commissions counted as community property, but found the district court did not adequately account for the fact that handing Tracy her share of those commissions would reduce Todd's income while boosting Tracy's finances. Because the court did not make specific findings on how this affected Todd's ability to pay and Tracy's need, the appeals court vacated (canceled) the $4,000-per-month periodic alimony award and sent it back for the district court to reconsider with proper findings. The appeals court rejected Todd's other arguments. On the marital home, Todd argued the money should be traced back to homes he owned before or during the marriage as his separate property. The court explained that when separate property is put into a jointly owned home during marriage, it is presumed to be a gift to the community unless proven otherwise, and Todd had not overcome that presumption - the home was in joint tenancy, mortgage payments came from shared funds, and Todd himself acknowledged Tracy had "earned" being on the title. On rehabilitative alimony, the court found Tracy's testimony about the cost and time to finish her master's degree supported the $24,000 award. Finally, Todd asked that a different judge handle the case on remand, arguing the judge formed negative opinions of him (the decree mentioned Todd spoiling Tracy's medication, writing derogatory notes on support checks, and reducing the functionality of Tracy's Tesla). The court presumed judges are unbiased and found the judge's comments came from what the judge learned during the case, not from an outside source, and did not show deep-seated antagonism. Importantly, the court said the district court did not actually rely on that conduct in deciding alimony or property. So the case did not need to be reassigned.

Melissa and Paco Horta married in October 2012 and have three minor children. About a decade before the marriage, Paco's father gave him a landscaping business called Silver Lands, Inc. Paco earned a salary from the business and also took money out as company profits. Paco filed for divorce in May 2021, and while the case was pending the district court ordered him to pay temporary spousal support, temporary child support, and some of Melissa's attorney and expert fees. After a trial, the district court issued a divorce decree. It calculated Paco's monthly income, imputed (assigned) an income of $100,000 per year to Melissa based on her earning capacity, awarded her alimony of $3,000 per month for five years and child support of $3,474 per month, and divided the couple's community property. Because of the way it divided property, the court ordered Paco to pay Melissa an "equalization payment" of about $738,000 in monthly installments over ten years. The court declined to award either party additional attorney or expert fees. On appeal, Melissa raised many arguments: that the court miscalculated Paco's income by leaving out a $461,000 "shareholder loan" he took from the business; that the court should not have assumed she could earn $100,000; that it should have awarded more child support and back child support; that Paco wasted $476,000 of marital money on a failed Reno property investment; that she deserved attorney and expert fees; and several other points about parenting time, the family therapist, keeping discovery open on the marital home, and interest on the equalization payment. Paco, in his cross-appeal, argued the court miscalculated the community's interest in Silver Lands. The Court of Appeals rejected almost all of these arguments, finding that the district court acted within its discretion and that its findings were supported by the evidence. On most points, the appeals court explained that it does not re-weigh conflicting evidence or re-judge which witnesses were more believable - that is the trial court's job. The appeals court agreed with Melissa on one narrow point. While the trial court properly found that Melissa had not proven Paco "wasted" the $476,000 Reno investment, the trial court never made findings about whether any of that money still existed. Paco testified he got no return on the investment, but also said the investment home was eventually sold, though he could not recall the sale price. Because some or all of the money might still exist, the appeals court sent the case back (remanded) so the trial court can determine whether any funds remain and, if so, divide them. The court affirmed everything else in the decree.

This is a divorce case between Irina and Douglas Ansell. Before marrying in 2012, the couple signed a prenuptial agreement—a contract that spells out, in advance, how property will be treated as "separate" (belonging to one spouse) or "community" (shared) and how it will be divided if they divorce. Doug's separate property included several businesses (called the Ansell companies) and real estate. The couple married, had one child, and Irina filed for divorce in October 2015. The case took years. The district court split it into three separate trials: one on child custody, one on whether the prenuptial agreement was valid (the court ruled it was and that it would govern the financial issues), and a third on how to divide the couple's assets. That third trial happened in December 2017, but the court did not actually issue the divorce decree until February 2021—more than three years later. The decree gave Irina some alimony, child support, and an "equalization payment" (a lump sum meant to balance out the division of property) of $972,471. After the decree, both sides filed motions. Doug asked the court to give him credit for personal income tax payments he had made, arguing those taxes were a shared community obligation, and he asked for attorney fees. The court agreed with Doug: it credited half his tax payments against what he owed Irina and awarded him attorney fees, which together wiped out his entire equalization payment obligation—reducing Irina's award to essentially zero. The court denied Irina's own late-filed motion as untimely. Irina then appealed. Before reaching the substance, the court had to deal with a technical problem: Irina's notice of appeal named only the November 2021 post-trial order, not the February 2021 decree. Doug argued this meant she could not challenge the decree at all. The court disagreed. It explained that Nevada strongly prefers deciding appeals on their merits rather than on technicalities, that Irina's intent to appeal the decree could be reasonably inferred from the circumstances, and that Doug was not misled or harmed. The court did, however, remind Irina's counsel to name every order they intend to appeal in the future. On the substance, the court reached mixed results. It rejected Irina's argument that the district court was required to accept a particular expert's much higher valuation of Doug's businesses (about $9.9 million in appreciation); the court found she had not properly preserved that argument, had not cited the record to support it, and had not cogently explained why the court was bound to adopt that valuation. But the court agreed with Irina on several other points. It held that the district court wrongly refused to give Irina any share of the increase in value of Doug's real estate. Under the plain language of the prenuptial agreement, Irina automatically got a community property interest in the appreciation of Doug's separate property—whether or not she had put personal time or effort into managing the properties. The court also held that the district court wrongly assigned certain of Doug's loans and debts to the community, because the prenuptial agreement said debts became joint only if both spouses signed a document agreeing to be jointly indebted, and no such document existed. The court further held that the district court failed to consider whether Irina received any benefit from Doug's income after the couple separated—income that, under Nevada law, is presumed to remain community property until the divorce is final. On the tax issue, the court found the prenuptial agreement was ambiguous about whether Irina could be liable for tax debt incurred during the marriage without a signed joint-indebtedness document, and the district court had not made the factual findings about the parties' intent needed to resolve that ambiguity. Because of that, and because it was unclear whether Irina received any of Doug's income during the relevant period, the court reversed the tax ruling and sent it back. Finally, because the court reversed parts of the decree, the attorney fee awards no longer rested on solid ground—it was no longer clear that Doug was the "prevailing party" or that he had beaten his settlement offer—so the court vacated (cancelled) the fee awards. The case returns to the district court to redo the affected portions.

Kerstan and Michael Micone divorced in 2009. They shared joint legal custody of their two children, but Kerstan had primary physical custody. Their daughter I.M. struggled in Las Vegas public schools, possibly due to dyslexia. The parents agreed I.M. should attend private school in Reno and live during the school year with her paternal grandparents there, returning to Kerstan in the summers. I.M. moved to her grandparents' home in August 2013. In 2014, Michael asked the family court to give him primary physical custody of I.M. Kerstan opposed the change. Instead of choosing between the two parents, the district court awarded primary physical custody to the grandparents - even though the grandparents had never asked to be part of the case and neither parent had been told the judge was considering that option. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that custody award. The Court explained that a court generally cannot enter a judgment for or against someone who is not a party to the lawsuit. To get custody, a non-parent (like a grandparent) must either file their own custody case or formally join (intervene in) the existing one. Beyond that, before a Nevada court can take custody away from a fit parent and give it to a non-parent, it must make specific findings that giving custody to either parent would be detrimental to the child and that placing the child with the non-parent is necessary to serve the child's best interest. None of that happened here. The Court also held that giving custody to the grandparents without warning violated the parents' due process rights - their right to fair notice and a chance to be heard - because both parents had been arguing only about which of them should have custody, not about whether the grandparents should. The Court left undisturbed the portion of the order dealing with child support arrearages, because Kerstan did not include the hearing transcript needed to review that ruling. The case was sent back to the district court. On remand, the district court was directed to consider Kerstan's argument - which she had raised only in a reconsideration motion below - that no change in custody is warranted when a custodial parent sends a child to live elsewhere for educational reasons.