Nevada family-law case summaries

Leslie and Josue Ortiz married in 2016 and Leslie filed for divorce in 2023. A central dispute in the divorce was who owned a condominium on Cardiff Lane that Josue had purchased in December 2018 for $110,000 with a $10,000 down payment. When the condo was purchased, Leslie signed a deed (a "grant, bargain, sale deed") that transferred her interest in the property to Josue, leaving it in his name alone. At trial, Leslie testified that she did not realize she had signed a deed, thought the document was for loan purposes, received no money for signing, and did not intend to give the property to Josue. Josue testified differently: he said the couple had discussed the purchase and agreed he would buy the property in his own name as his own property, and that the couple generally kept their finances, assets, and debts separate. He acknowledged he gave Leslie no money in exchange for the deed and that the couple had no written prenuptial or postnuptial agreement other than the deed itself. The district court decided that the Cardiff property was Josue's separate property. The court found Leslie's testimony not credible on the question of whether she knew the property was being bought as Josue's separate property, and found Josue's testimony credible. The court treated Leslie's signing of the deed as a gift of the property to Josue. The court also ruled that Leslie's cleaning business was her own separate property and ordered each spouse to keep their own bank accounts, debts, and vehicles. The Court of Appeals agreed with part of the district court's decision and disagreed with another part. On the question of whether Leslie had given Josue her interest in the property by signing the deed, the appellate court upheld the district court. Under Nevada law, when one spouse transfers title of property to the other spouse, the law presumes it was a gift, and the spouse who gave it up must prove with strong evidence ("clear and convincing evidence") that it was not. Because the two spouses gave conflicting accounts and the district court chose to believe Josue, and because appellate courts do not re-decide who is telling the truth, the Court of Appeals affirmed that Leslie gifted the title and the $10,000 down payment to Josue. But the appellate court found a gap in the lower court's reasoning. Even though Leslie gave Josue the property, Josue continued to pay the mortgage during the marriage. In Nevada, the wages a spouse earns during marriage generally belong to the "community" - that is, to both spouses jointly. There was no evidence Josue used any separate (non-community) money to pay the mortgage, so the court inferred he paid it with his earnings, which were community funds. When community money is used to pay down a mortgage and improve a property, the community can gain a share of the increased value. Josue also refinanced the property in 2023, pulled out money for home improvements, and the property's value rose to about $220,000. The district court never made findings about whether the use of community funds to pay the mortgage and make improvements gave the community an interest in the increased value of the condo. Because of this missing analysis, the Court of Appeals concluded the decision to award the property entirely to Josue as separate property was not supported by adequate evidence and findings. It sent the case back to the district court to perform a specific calculation (a "Malmquist analysis") to determine how much of the property's value is separate and how much belongs to the community, and to divide the community's share between the parties.

Kassim Carney and Susan Moruri divorced through a stipulated decree of divorce—a divorce judgment the two sides agreed to. That decree divided their shared property and debts, and both parties represented that they had made a "full and fair disclosure" of their assets. Less than six months after the divorce, Moruri asked the court to set aside the decree under a court rule (NRCP 60(b)). She argued, among other things, that Carney had formed a real estate business and had not disclosed it before the divorce was finalized. Carney did not initially file a response, and the court first granted Moruri's request. Carney then filed a combined motion asking the court to reconsider and opposing Moruri's motion, arguing that the business had no value when the decree was entered. The court granted his request to reconsider and scheduled an evidentiary hearing—a hearing where evidence is presented. After that hearing, the district court sided with Moruri on the real estate business. It found that the business was an "omitted asset" because Carney had not disclosed it, that bank statements Moruri submitted showed the business was worth $69,877.12 when the decree was entered, that Carney had not shown he owned less than 100 percent of the business, and that Moruri was therefore entitled to $34,938.56—half the business's value. Carney appealed. On appeal, Carney raised two arguments about the court's power (jurisdiction) to decide the issue and two arguments about the merits. First, he argued the court lost the power to grant relief because it did not resolve Moruri's motion within six months of the decree. The appellate court explained that the deadline depends on when a motion is filed, not when the court rules on it, and that Moruri had also relied on a Nevada statute (NRS 125.150(3)) that gives a party up to three years after discovering fraud or mistake to ask the court to divide an omitted asset. Because Moruri filed within six months, this argument failed. Second, Carney argued the court had no jurisdiction because the parties had moved to Texas after the divorce. The appellate court noted Carney did not dispute that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the parties from the start of the case, and explained that this jurisdiction continued and allowed the court to decide the parties' interest in the business, even though the business was formed in Texas. On the merits, Carney argued the business was his separate property because it had not made a profit or distributions before the divorce. The appellate court explained that under Nevada law, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community (shared) property unless an exception applies, and Carney did not argue any exception applied or point to clear and convincing evidence that the business was separate property. Finally, Carney argued the court should have relied on a professional appraisal rather than the bank statements Moruri submitted to value the business. The appellate court found that Carney had not raised the valuation or appraisal issue before the district court, and that he had not provided a transcript of the evidentiary hearing showing he raised it there or offered contrary evidence. Because of this, the court presumed the missing record supported the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed.

David and Christie Stucke entered a domestic partnership in May 2015, married in May 2016, and have two children together. After about two and a half years of marriage, David filed for divorce. The case was, in the district court's words, "hotly contested and litigated," with a five-day trial that included testimony from both spouses and a jointly retained custody expert, psychologist Dr. John Paglini. Both sides asked the appeals court to review parts of the final divorce decree. The disputes fell into two groups: how property was split, and how the children's custody and support were handled. On property, David argued that a house on West Maule Avenue should not have been divided equally. He said he had used his own money — poker winnings earned before the domestic partnership — for the down payment and for repairs, and that the house was meant to stay his. Because the parties acquired the house after entering their domestic partnership, the law presumed it was community property (property both partners own together). David wanted the court to use a formula from an older Nevada case, called Malmquist, to give him credit for his separate contributions. The appeals court explained that this formula only applies when separate property increased in value through community effort, or community property increased in value because of separate contributions. David never argued that his contributions increased the home's value, and he did not provide the supporting evidence needed to run that calculation. So the court upheld the equal division. Christie, in turn, challenged the district court's decision to give David all the sale proceeds from two other houses — one on Birkland Court and one on Grandview Place — as his separate property. For the Birkland property, David had bought it with separate funds and set up a rental business through an LLC; Christie had signed paperwork acknowledging the house was David's separate property. The law says that once property is separate, turning it into community property ("transmutation") must be proven by clear and convincing evidence — a high standard. Christie did not point to anything in the record meeting that standard, so the appeals court upheld that award. For the Grandview property, Christie had signed a quitclaim deed giving up any interest, David had used pre-marriage retirement funds, and there was no evidence community funds paid the mortgage. Nevada law treats a spouse-to-spouse transfer of real estate as a presumed gift that also requires clear and convincing evidence to undo. The appeals court upheld that award too. David also asked that Christie repay the community for "marital waste" — money he claimed she wasted, mostly through gambling and by allegedly devaluing her businesses. The district court found Christie's credibility about her finances "questionable" but also found it "impossible" to figure out how much money, if any, was actually wasted, partly because David's financial summaries were incomplete and he had no accounting background. Because the court could not determine an actual amount of waste, it declined to order reimbursement (though it did make Christie responsible for the businesses' expenses and taxes). The appeals court found this supported by the evidence and upheld it. On custody, David argued that he should not have to share joint physical custody, pointing out that several of the district court's findings were unfavorable to Christie. The expert, Dr. Paglini, had spent extensive time with the family, produced an 88-page report, found both parents fit, and recommended joint physical custody with roughly a 60/40 split in David's favor. Dr. Paglini noted Christie's unsubstantiated allegations that David had raped her and molested their daughter, and said that if the court found she fabricated those claims for advantage in the divorce, David should get primary custody — but Dr. Paglini himself did not reach a conclusion that she had fabricated them. The district court found the allegations unsubstantiated but also could not conclude Christie had fabricated them. It went through each statutory "best interest" factor and adopted Dr. Paglini's recommendation. The appeals court noted that "a different court may have reached a different conclusion," but concluded this was not an abuse of discretion, and it upheld the joint-custody award. It also upheld the label "joint physical custody" for the roughly 60/40 schedule, because Christie had the children at least 40 percent of the time and more than 146 days per year. Finally, David argued the district court should have imputed more income to Christie and ordered her to pay child support. The court found Christie had not accurately reported her income and that her actual income was "almost impossible to discern." It concluded she could earn at least as much as David, set both incomes at David's monthly figure of $8,333, and ordered equal child support, netting to zero. The appeals court pointed out that the district court had actually imputed income to Christie — the opposite of what David claimed — and that David never provided figures showing what the correct amount should have been. Finding the decision supported by the evidence, the court affirmed the entire judgment.