Nevada family-law case summaries

Adam and Sandy Goldstein married in April 2011 and went through divorce and child custody proceedings beginning in 2019 after Sandy filed for divorce and custody. The case was split into two parts (a "bifurcated" trial): a custody trial in May 2021 and a financial trial in September 2021. In May 2022, the district court awarded Sandy primary physical custody and permission to move with the children to Colorado, finding that Adam had opposed the relocation in bad faith. The court also found that Adam had made unsubstantiated claims that Sandy was an alcoholic, withheld parenting time from Sandy, influenced one of the children's testimony, and made an unsubstantiated claim of educational neglect to gain an advantage. The court issued a separate divorce decree on financial issues that included alimony for Adam. Adam did not appeal any of those orders. After those rulings, both parties asked for attorney fees. Sandy requested fees under a Nevada statute and argued that Adam's bad-faith conduct drove up the cost of the litigation. The district court denied Adam's request and granted Sandy's. The court reasoned that the attorney fees were a "community obligation" (a shared marital debt) and that it could divide that debt unequally because Adam had engaged in improper litigation tactics that wasted shared marital assets. After Sandy submitted billing records seeking $194,861.25, the court reduced that figure—cutting certain "block billing" entries it could not allocate, reducing the custody-trial fees by 30 percent, and reducing the total by another 20 percent for time spent supervising a junior attorney—and awarded $124,627.12. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Adam on one point: the attorney fees should not have been treated as a community obligation. Drawing on prior Nevada cases, the court explained that debt incurred after spouses separate, and not for the benefit of the marriage, is not community debt. Because these fees were incurred after separation and did not benefit the community, the district court could not use that as the basis for the award. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed anyway. Under the rule that an appellate court will uphold a lower court's decision if it reached the right result even for the wrong reason, the court looked to a different legal basis that Sandy had raised below: a statute allowing fees against a party who brings or maintains claims without reasonable grounds or to harass the other party. The district court had already made detailed written findings that Adam pursued frivolous and bad-faith positions—on relocation, the alcoholism allegation, withholding the children, and influencing a child's testimony. Importantly, the Court of Appeals noted that Adam, in his reply brief, conceded that those findings were the type that would support a fee award under that statute. Because Sandy was the prevailing party and the findings supporting a fee award were backed by substantial evidence, the court held the fee award could stand. The court also rejected Adam's arguments that the district court ignored the income disparity between the parties and that the amount awarded was unreasonable. The record showed the court did consider income—finding the parties had essentially equal net income after accounting for Sandy's rental and travel costs versus Adam's low housing expenses, and noting Adam received alimony—and that the court applied the established factors for setting a reasonable fee amount and explained its reductions.

Conrad and Heidi Roberson were married, had two children, and divorced in 2018-2021 after extensive litigation. After their divorce was finalized by a stipulated decree in October 2021, Conrad asked the trial court to change the decree and the child-custody arrangement. The trial court said no, and Conrad appealed that decision. While that earlier appeal was still going on, Heidi went back to the trial court and asked it to order Conrad to pay $25,000 to help cover her lawyer costs in fighting the appeal. (This kind of payment is called "pendente lite" attorney fees - fees a court orders during an ongoing case so one party can carry on or defend the suit.) Heidi explained that Conrad was behind on what he owed under the decree, and her lawyer noted that the appeal had been removed from the settlement program, with a briefing schedule already set. The trial court agreed and ordered Conrad to pay the $25,000, pointing to a large gap in the parties' incomes: Heidi earns about "$50,000 a year along with court-ordered child support and alimony," while Conrad earns approximately $500,000 a year. Conrad then filed a motion asking the court to reconsider (a "motion to alter or amend") and to pause the order. He argued that the court did not properly weigh his finances - including the alimony and child support he already pays Heidi - and that the fee award was not actually connected to the future appellate work that still needed to be done. The trial court rejected those arguments. It also found that Conrad had acted in bad faith by refusing to pay and continuing what it described as litigation games, and on that basis awarded Heidi an additional $10,975.32 in attorney fees under a separate statute that allows fees against a party who brings claims without reasonable grounds or to harass. Conrad appealed both fee awards. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Nevada affirmed - meaning it upheld the trial court's decisions. The court explained that because Heidi asked for the fees while the appeal was still pending and before briefing was filed, the award was properly tied to future appellate work. It also concluded the trial court had adequately considered both parties' financial circumstances, including the income gap and Conrad's existing payments. As for the additional fee award, the court found there was enough evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that Conrad's reconsideration motion lacked reasonable grounds and was brought in bad faith. The court also denied Heidi's request for sanctions on appeal.

Sharlena Polk and Charles Rowland married in 2007 and had two children. In 2020, Rowland filed for divorce and asked the court to divide the couple's shared (community) property. At a hearing on July 15, 2021, the couple told the court they had agreed on most issues - including child custody and many financial matters - but they had not agreed on what to do with the marital home. Rowland wanted to keep the home but first needed to see whether he could refinance the mortgage to buy out Polk's share. Polk did not want to keep the home and agreed to sign whatever paperwork was needed to let Rowland refinance or sell it. The couple did not agree on how much the home was worth or how much each person should receive from its value (its equity). At that same hearing, the court verbally declared the couple divorced but explained the marriage would not actually end until a written divorce decree was signed. The written decree was filed on December 16, 2021. In the decree, the court did not decide the home's value. Instead, it gave Rowland 90 days to either arrange a refinance and buy out Polk's share, or to sell the home. Rowland got an appraisal in August 2021 that valued the home at $360,000. He completed the refinance in May 2022. Using the older August 2021 value (and subtracting child support Polk owed), he calculated that Polk was owed about $56,000. Polk objected, pointing out that a more recent appraisal valued the home at $430,000, and argued Rowland improperly used the lower, older figure. Rowland responded that the couple became divorced at the July 2021 oral pronouncement, so the August 2021 appraisal was the right one to use. The district court agreed with Rowland, ruling that the marital community ended when the judge orally declared the couple divorced in July 2021, and that the home should be valued as of that date. Polk asked the court to reconsider, pointing to a Nevada Supreme Court decision, Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, which held that a marital community is not terminated by an oral pronouncement of divorce - it continues until the written decree is entered. The district court acknowledged the Kogod decision but stuck to its view and denied reconsideration. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the district court's conclusion that the marriage's community ended at the oral pronouncement conflicted with the binding Kogod decision and was therefore erroneous. Because of that error, the district court never made proper findings about what the home was worth when Rowland actually refinanced it - which is the moment the decree itself had set for distributing the value - or how much Rowland should have paid Polk. The court also rejected Rowland's argument that earlier court minutes had already settled the home's value, finding that no such agreement was ever reached. The Court of Appeals sent the case back to the district court to make specific findings using the home's appraised value at the time of the refinance and to divide that value fairly between the parties as the decree required.